



STUDIES IN HISTORY 




KNIGHTS of COLUMBUS HISTORICAL 
COMMISSION 




Class E na 

.io 



PRKSKNTED BY 



.K61 



STUDIES IN HISTORY 



n^O encourage investigation into the 
origins, the achievements and the 
problems of the United States; to in- 
terpret and perpetuate the American 
principles of liberty, popular sovereignty 
and goverment by consent; to promote 
American solidarity; and to exalt the 
American ideal. 



II 



STUDIES IN HISTORY 




Edited by 

Edward F. McSweeney, Chairman 



Knights of Columbus 
Historical CoTnmission 

Edward F. McSweeney 
William S. Benson 
Henry Jones Ford 
Hannis Taylor 
Charles H. McCarthy 
George Hermann Derry 
Joseph Dunn 



Committee of Judges 
For Awarding of Prizes 

Gaillard Hunt 
Frederick A, Cleveland 
David A. McCabe 
Frank I. Cobb 
John H. Edmonds 



III 



Copyright, 1922, by 
Knights of Columbus 

out 



KNICHTS OF COIVMBUS 



OLUmBIS 






IV 



FOREWORD 

THE history movement of the Knights of Columbus was born of the demon- 
strated necessity for some organization of large membership, of tested public 
achievement, and with influence and resources sufficient to establish the work, 
to encourage investigation into the origins, the achievements and the problems of 
the United States; and to perpetuate the American principles of liberty, popular 
sovereignty and government by consent. 

This work was not inspired by hostility to any nation or people, but prompted 
by the desire to promote patriotism on the lines laid down by Washington in his 
"Farewell Address" when he warned that, "Excessive partiality for one foreign 
nation, and excessive dislike of another, cause those whom they actuate to see 
danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on 
the other." 

The ideal causing prominent Americans to accept without protest the move- 
ment for the revision of American History was of a character to enlist the sympath y 
and support of many who did not realize that their minds were being swayed by an 
impulse the very reverse of that which caused Washington to utter his warning. 

The desire for world peace possesses the minds of all who seek for orderly progress, 
but those furthering this laudable aim, utilizing the methods adopted by the 
"revisionists," overlooked the danger to domestic peace through the disintegrating 
force of racial ostracisms, foreign to the genius and temper of a Republic that owes 
its origin and maintenance to many races, and which can survive in its present 
form and strength only so long as the allegiance of its citizens is safeguarded 
by an ardent patriotism. 

As stated by the late Secretary of the Interior, Franklin K. Lane, "Before we 
take up this work of Americanization of others we must first be sure that we have 
Americanized ourselves." 

Always keeping in mind that the membership of the Knights of Columbus is 
drawn from various countries on the American continent, the unchangeable pur- 
pose of the History Program is that all should be encouraged to love their own 
country, and in seeking to serve their own land, in faith, reverence and affection, to 
achieve the basis of a common brotherhood. 

Our Prize Competition, as announced at San Francisco, was devised to encour- 
age the preparation of historical studies in American history. Under the direction 
of the Historical Commission, this purpose was very thoroughly advertised on the 
entire American continent. This phase of the program has been most satisfactory, 
and it is hoped that the report of the Judges awarding the prizes in some of the 
classes will be made to the Convention at Atlantic City in August. 

In addition, it was deemed wise to introduce a secondary program consisting 
of the publication of studies in selected subjects. This Non-Competitive Program 
has already produced some remarkable studies. We trust they will prove conclus- 
ively the need of the work accomplished, and serve as an indication of the honesty 
of our purpose and achievement. 

The three monographs submitted within the covers of this book to the delegates 
to the 1922 convention of the Knights of Columbus are intended to illustrate in a 
practical way the reasons for the Order's historical program. 

While there has been a general acknowledgment of the truth of the charges made 
a year ago against the revised histories, there was at first some doubt whether the 
movement complained of was of an organized character, or merely a result of the 
abnormal development of war psychology. 

The first study included in this volume is a survey of the history propaganda 
movement by Charles Edward Russell, for more than three decades one of the lead- 
ing editors in the United States, a writer and lecturer on sociology, political economy, 
author of a brilliant book on the Philippines and other works on travel and research. 
In 1917 Mr. Russell was a member of the Special Diplomatic Mission sent to Russia 
by the United States and in 1918 was Commissioner to Great Britain for the United 
States Committee on Public Information. In 1919 he was a member of the Presi- 
dent's Industrial Commission. Mr. Russell's study is based on more than twenty- 

V 



five years of personal observation of this matter. It is an earnest, unprejudiced 
statement of facts and will carry conviction to the people of the United States. 

The second study was written by Doctor Frederick J. Kinsman, a distinguished 
scholar and writer, formerly Bishop in the Protestant Episcopal Church, and author 
of many books on religious and historical subjects. 

Within the last few years there has been concerted effort to restrict credit for the 
struggle for liberty to one race and nation, and thus to practically exclude all other 
racial contributions to the forward march of freedom. 

At the request of the Historical Commission, Doctor Kinsman has written "The 
Great Charters of Liberty" to show that the history of liberty is age-long and varied. 
Dr. Kinsman has given special consideration to the written guarantees of liberty from 
the time of the Hebrew down to the Declaration of American Independence. 

The third study herewith presented, although the first to be written, "The 
Monroe Doctrine" by Thomas H. Mahony, may be considered one of the definite 
expressions of American liberty, and a wider application of American principles as 
stated in the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution of the United 
States. 

It has been frequently stated that the publication of this study of the Monroe 
Doctrine alone would have justified the Knights of Columbus Historical Program. 
It has been widely circulated and has yet to be contradicted in any of its essential 
statements. 

The writer, Thomas H. Mahony, a member of the Knights of Columbus, does 
not claim any special originality for the monograph, but merely that all the sources 
have been searched and the conclusion presented in such a way that it is hoped will 
carry conviction to and win the final approval of the American people. 

JAMES A. FLAHERTY. 

Supreme Knight, Knights of Columbus. 
New Haven, Connecticut, 
August, 1922. 



VI 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Origins of the Propaganda Movement to Pervert 

American History Page 1 

By Charles Edward Russell. 



Charters of Liberty Page 17 

By Frederick Joseph Kinsman. 

The Monroe Doctrine Page 61 

By Thomas H. Mahony. 



VII 



Origins of the Propaganda Movement 



To Pervert American History. 



BY 



CHARLES EDWARD RUSSELL 



Origins of the Propaganda Movement 



No one should blame the statesmen of Great Britain for striving 
to guard and to extend the British Empire. Aims like theirs 
are the business of statecraft. No one should blame indis- 
criminately the methods they use to attain these aims. If we are to 
have empires at all, some of the latter day maneuvers of imperialism, 
including those I am about to discuss, are comparatively innocent. 
It is better to make propaganda than to make war; I had rather see 
men fooled than see them bayoneted. It is only when the propaganda 
threatens the national independence of the United States and attacks 
the records of its national achievements that a democratic American 
must be moved to protest, and no less than this is the condition that 
now confronts us. 

My acquaintance with British endeavors to revise American history 
began in 1896, when I was city editor of the New York World. There 
came into my office one day in the spring of that year a well-dressed 
and courtly Englishman, bearing letters of introduction from English 
friends. It was soon after the crest of the Venezuela incident, which 
had brought forth President Cleveland's celebrated document about 
the Monroe Doctrine. These still burning topics, after some intro- 
ductory commonplaces, my English visitor began to discuss, regretting 
the stand that President Cleveland had taken, but rejoicing that the 
sharp tension it had caused in Anglo-American relations seemed to 
have passed. I should explain that editorially the World had opposed 
President Cleveland's course, rebuking sternly the suggestions of 
armed conflict that obsessed some minds and gloomed the stock 
market. This fact I soon perceived had been the magnet to draw 
my visitor to our office. 

Anglo-American relations having thus been broached, he passed 
easily to the general attitude of the American public, lamenting that 
it seemed unfriendly. I said I did not think it was unfriendly, but we 
were to remember that there was at stake an issue that the United 
States deemed vital to its national existence and inherently righteous, 
and the people were determined to support that position. 

I thought he seemed a little taken aback at this, but he went on to 
say that to his mind the American attitude in the pending controversy 
had revealed a deep-seated antagonism to Great Britain that he 
regarded as most unfortunate and to be removed if possible. It 
seemed to him this antagonism was the direct result of the manner in 
which history was taught in the public schools. He said the tone of 
the history textbooks, particularly in relation to the American Revolu- 
tionary period and to the War of 1812, was such that antagonism must 
be engendered in the minds of the children thus instructed and of 
course they retained the same feeling when they grew up. He then 
developed a proposal that the World should undertake a movement to 



secure the revision of American school histories so that they should 
no longer produce this antagonism. 

I asked him why he deemed these changes so desirable. He said 
the interest and welfare of civilization demanded the cordial co- 
operation of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. I asked him why the Anglo- 
Saxons were so vitally important to civilization. He said that as the 
Anglo-Saxons were in all ways the ablest people in the world and the 
best equipped to govern, their union and progress would make mani- 
festly for the world's liberty and enlightenment, or something of the 
kind. I asked him if he was aware that a majority of the people of 
the United States were not Anglo-Saxons. He was much astonished 
and showed plainly that he did not believe me. I said at the end that 
I was unable to see wherein the plan that he proposed came within 
the chart whereby I steered my share of the World concern, and he 
went away. 

Within a week I observed that a movement to revise American 
school histories had been launched in New York and that Andrew 
Carnegie had pledged to it financial and other support. Thus I per- 
ceived with interest and some amusement that my English friend had 
found the right trail to a more sympathetic audience. 

Still, the whole incident might have faded from my memory if it 
had not been within a few weeks recalled upon me in all its details. I 
went to England and there was astonished to find that a change, to 
me very remarkable, had come upon the attitude of the press toward 
America and her affairs; not upon all of the press, but upon that 
part I had always been accustomed to regard as setting forth the 
views and will of the governing class, always the true index to British 
policy. Gone was the old familiar tone of supercilious contempt; 
in its place behold an excess of laudation, novel and puzzling! As a 
newspaper man I was bound to inquire into this phenomenon and, 
having recourse to English friends familiar with the inside of policies 
and events, gained an explanation that struck me as more enduringly 
interesting than the fact itself. 

It appeared that the change was a by-product of Venezuela and in 
a way that I should certainly never have suspected. From the 
Geneva award of 1873 until the cloud of Venezuela appeared on the 
horizon, official relations between the United States and Great Britain 
had been generally peaceful and cordial. A new generation had grown 
up in the British governing class, to which the American Civil War, 
Confederate bonds, the cruise of the Alabama and its sequels were only 
the dry bones of history. Among the new statesmen the chance of war 
between the two countries had never been seriously considered. 
President Cleveland's frank declaration that the United States pur- 
posed to protect Venezuela even at the cost of War came upon them 
with the impact of a sudden shock. They were like men thrust with- 
out warning under an icy douche and coming out gasping and stutter- 
ing. When they recovered breath they began to think. The sug- 
gestion of war with the United States stood revealed before them, a 
cold hard, unquestionable fact, as certain as the purpose of the Amer- 
ican people to stand by their government. War with the United 



States would mean almost at once the loss of Canada; 75,000,000 
people against 5,000,000. But the loss of Canada would mean the 
disruption of the British Empire, would it not? Most assuredly; 
Canada because of its position and its possibilities was become the 
keystone of the imperial arch; no Canada, no Empire. To keep and 
to extend the Empire — these were the chief aims of British statesmen 
then as in previous generations; for these they had planned, labored, 
devised, intrigued, maneuvered, made treaties, made wars, shed 
blood, secured Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, the Suez, Singapore, as bas- 
tions and supports of the great structure — all for the Empire, at once 
the glory of Britain and the source of its material prosperity. 

But now this towering creation of so many years was threatened 
with overthrow; no Canada, no Empire. Such was the plain meaning 
of a war with the United States. From this disturbing thought the 
psychological rebound was not merely natural but inevitable. If a 
conflict with the United States meant destruction to the Empire, 
union with the United States meant absolute safety for the Empire; 
so defended nothing on earth could shake it. Out of this rebound 
grew the movement for an Anglo-American alliance, which has never 
ceased from that day to this, but has grown stronger as events always 
showed more clearly its great and solid advantages to imperial 
stability. 

The subject must have been brought home sharply to many a 
statesman's mind as he reviewed the rather unhappy course of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. The real purpose of this arrangement was 
to strengthen the defences of India, in a material way the most val- 
uable of the imperial possessions. Yet it was from the beginning a 
pact most distasteful to the dominions of Australia and New Zealand, 
and as these manifested increasing uneasiness under it, he must have 
been a dull officer on England's quarter deck who did not think how 
needless would be any such partnership if there were but a definite 
understanding with the United States. 

But the United States is a democratic country; in some important 
particulars, the most democratic of all countries. Other govern- 
ments may make alliances or break them at discretion. In the United 
States, alliances, if possible at all, can be made only with the consent 
and goodwill of the people, as represented through the United States 
Senate. Here then was the practical difficulty. The people of Amer- 
ica failed to recognize what seemed to the British the sure ties of 
blood relationship. Looking upon themselves as a separate nation, 
with a separate origin and destiny, they had no sympathetic interest 
in the development, or indeed in the fate, of the British Empire. This 
attitude was revealed plainly in the Venezuela crisis and was well 
enough known to anybody who took the trouble to investigate the 
American psychology. As long as it remained, the Anglo-American 
co-partnership was impossible because of the peculiar and democratic 
structure of the American government. 

I ought to explain here that the excellent people of Great Britain, 
whom I esteem highly and to whom I am bound by many ties of grati- 
tude, are not quite able to distinguish between language and kinship. 



The error is natural, no doubt, but unfortunate. To the mind of the 
British governing class, always the arbiter in British affairs, the 
Americans, speaking English, or something like it, were necessarily- 
English, only separated from the Mother Country by a trifling domestic 
dispute that the Mother Country had largely forgotten. What then 
kept alive this memory in America? The deplorable methods of 
teaching history in the American schools. Only this separated "the 
two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon family." 

After a commission had on the spot examined the American school 
system and reported upon its efficiency as an original molder of public 
opinion, the terms of the problem must have seemed rather simple. 
Before there could be an Anglo-American alliance there must be a 
change in the American attitude toward Great Britain. Before there 
could be a change in that attitude there must be such changes in the 
American classroom history as my friend, the English visitor, had 
indicated to me and as the movement endorsed by Mr. Carnegie had 
undertaken to secure. The choice of Mr. Carnegie for this sponsor- 
ship, I may remark in passing, was in the end particularly happy. 
Better able than he to foster such work was no other man in America, 
for the Carnegie Teachers' Endowment Fund brought him into 
sympathetic relations with the teaching end of the whole American 
educational establishment. 

The efforts to bring about these changes have been indefatigable 
ever since and have attained a degree of success that must always 
interest every investigator of the power and possibilities of propaganda. 
Nearly a dozen "revised" American histories for school use have been 
produced, all so written that in them no advocate of the Anglo- 
Ainerican alliance can find an objectionable passage. 

In behalf of these publications there has been waged a campaign 
so skilful and persistent that in scores of American cities we find now 
the only teaching of American history in the public schools is upon 
"revised" lines. According to this instruction the American Revolu- 
tion was a family quarrel of negligible importance, the American 
colonists had no just cause for complaint against the Mother Country, 
the issue they raised against taxation without representation was with- 
out substance or merit, nothing admirable pertained to their conduct 
of the war, the independence of the colonists was not won by their 
valor and persistence but through the generous good nature of the 
British government. We learn from "revision" also that the War of 
1812 was wholly unjustifiable and shameful, achieved nothing but 
defeats and had best be forgotten; that throughout our brief and 
inconsequential history Great Britain has been our friend and helper; 
that the real history of America is British, since whatever ideas we 
have stood for were of British origin, and that our true place in the 
world is as a member of the British household. 

This is the propaganda with which our schools are now being 
quietly inundated. Now and then some American citizen or body, 
devoting unwonted attention to what goes on in education, discovers 
what is afoot and makes vigorous protest against these perversions of 
fact and record. Then he, or it, is met with assertions of race prejudice, 

6 



ignorance or mediaeval notions about the way history should be 
written. 

Meantime also an active propaganda goes on in other ways to 
secure the alliance that for twenty-five years has been one of the first 
objects of British statecraft. I have been in England many times in 
these twenty-five years but never without observing some mani- 
festation of the purpose of the British governing class to attain this 
end. By whatsoever name it might be called, Anglo-Saxon Unity, 
Co-operation of the English-Speaking Nations, Hands across the Sea, 
Closer Relations of the Great Anglo-Saxon Democracies, Friendly 
Understanding of the English-Speaking Peoples to Preserve Peace or 
what else, this was what it obviously meant. However varied the 
name, the thing it stood for was always the same. The purpose was to 
secure for the Empire the support of America; physical and active sup- 
port if possible, moral and influential support always. All for the 
Empire, to keep and to extend which had cost British statesmanship 
in all these generations so much of labor and anxious thought! To this 
end now the great power of social, commercial, financial, literary and 
academic influences was exerted by past masters of inductive art. The 
total of these subtle forces is much greater than the unobservant man 
will readily believe. All things were made easy for their exercise here. 
What is called American "society" for instance, has always taken its 
tone, rules, customs, etiquette, implicitly from England. It appears 
that there is a considerable element in American life that prefers in all 
things the colonial attitude, in literature, art, science, history, inter- 
national affairs, or what not. Citizens of a great and wonderful nation 
with a great story and greater potentialities, they prefer to think of it 
as a dog wagged by its tail. Peculiarly liable, it seems, to this attitude 
are members of the academic class before whose eyes loom always the 
glories of Chaucer, Spencer, Shakespeare, with the cool delightful 
cloisters of Oxford and Cambridge as the inspirational shrines of their 
cult and class. 

In such soil the sowing of such propaganda seed as I have described 
was, of course, sure of fruitful crops, and these equally sure to reflect 
the original trend of thought. I should not overlook, either, the subtle, 
often irresistible power that lies in social recognition, a power which 
in my term of residence in England I was often obliged to note with 
a feeling akin to awe, so great were its resources. I will recite but one 
instance that fell under my observation, but this will be typical and 
of a nature to illuminate sufficiently the whole subject. 

It was the case of an American writer that came to England to 
spend his summer vacation. He was a college professor, the author of 
one of these "revised" histories of America that have been most 
sharply criticised for traversing and obscuring the time-honored 
American traditions. In America he was scarcely known outside of 
the classroom, and not widely there; but it was quickly evident that 
the English governing class knew all about him and had been notified 
in advance of his coming. So apparent was this that I was led to 
strange surmises as to the existence in America of some organization 
that kept watch upon persons departing thence for England, and sent 



timely word about them. Immediately upon his arrival he was received 
with extraordinary and flattering attention, interviewed at length in 
the press, referred to as a representative American (which assuredly 
he never was), invited to public luncheons, dinners, receptions, taken 
to one of the universities and there endowed with the highest honors 
it could bestow. No other people in the world can manage so ably as 
the English the magic of this social power; centuries of caste have un- 
folded to them all its secrets. No other people have a more charming 
and gracious hospitality. For years they had made it evident to every 
American visitor of influence or position that the facile road to their 
regard and to their delightful social circles led through substantial 
agreement with them about the necessity of the Alliance, by what- 
soever name disguised. Upon our friend, the college professor, they 
now conferred their most gratifying attentions, because, as the news- 
papers pointed out, his historical writings had proved him to be a 
friend of England. 

We may do well to take impartial note of the meaning of such a 
demonstration. Suppose an author in his own country never to have 
won the recognition he deserved. By right he should be popular and 
eminent; he is, in fact, obscure. He goes to England and finds Fame 
standing tiptoe upon the landing stage to welcome him. In some way 
his merits, to which his countrymen have been so strangely blind, have 
been recognized in the better atmosphere of England. Applause rises 
on all sides as he goes along; he is feted and acclaimed. Week-ends at 
country homes, the most beautiful in the world, are his regular portion. 
The newspapers interview him ; he finds his lightest words become sud- 
denly of moment. His books are talked about, particularly those in 
which he has upheld the colonial theory of American existence. He 
would be strangely superior to human weakness if he were not im- 
pressed. Not he alone; through him a large part of the writing guild 
is instructed. Here is the nation that recognizes merit. Wise enough 
to perceive the genius of writers, it must be of equally infallible judg- 
ment about other things; naturally it must be. In dealings with 
other nations, for instance, it must have preserved a high standard of 
wisdom and justice. There is the historic quarrel with the American 
colonies. England now regards this as a silly little row over the family 
breakfast table; such as might be occasioned by a son that wanted 
to stay home from school against the paternal orders. It has erected 
a statue of George Washington and put his bust in St. Paul's. What 
more could anyone desire? Go home, therefore, and write a book in 
which the American Revolution is ridiculed in accordance with "the 
new view of history writing," the men that took part in it are prop- 
erly discredited, and America is treated throughout as a member of 
the British Empire, slightly different in the deta-ils of its government, 
may be, but still in all essentials keeping happy pace, step by step, 
with the other Dominions. 

I may speak without supposition as without prejudice about all 
this because I had unusual opportunities to see the processes in their 
working. In 1918 I was stationed in London as commissioner to the 
United Kingdom for the United States Committee on Public Informa- 

8 



tion. It was a position that brought me into dose and intimate rela- 
tions with some of the most influential members of the governing class 
and I think no one so placed could have failed to understand the sig- 
nificance of what was going on before one's eyes. I had been in my 
post not two weeks when I was invited to address the largest luncheon 
club in the city, a place where almost weekly and without restraint 
the attractions of the Alliance, understanding, pact or whatever it 
might be called, were set forth to many applauding listeners. The 
gentleman who sat at my right hand at the speaker's table (by an 
arrangement that I soon understood not to have been accidental) in- 
troduced himself as the founder of an Anglo-American organization 
the purpose of which was to foster the "closer relations" of which I had 
heard so much. With skill and grace he led the conversation to a 
point where it must appear, if I kept silence, that I acquiesced in all 
his rosy views about the Alliance, and yet it was, of course, a subject 
that a man in my official position could not discuss without the 
gravest risk of indiscretion. From this embarrassing situation I was 
rescued in the nick of time by the arrival of the moment for my 
address, but my indefatigable friend was still upon my trail. A few 
days later he gave me a luncheon at his club, where with consummate 
ability he argued again for the project that allured him. The climax 
of his plea seemed to be reached when he told me that the first practical 
object he aimed at was to have the British governmental machine en- 
larged so as to include a "Chief Secretary for American Affairs" with 
position and duties similar to those of the Chief Secretary for Ireland 
and the Chief Secretary for India. At this I could not restrain a gasp 
of astonishment. He seemed surprised and hurt, for he said in a 
plaintively protesting way, that he had suggested this to other Amer- 
icans who had warmly approved it. I found that at his club and 
wherever else, among all visiting Americans that came his way, he 
labored incessantly to spread his Alliance gospel, and before I had left 
England he had been knighted for his effective work along these lines. 

Social honors for the Americans that aided the plan; knighthood 
for the British. 

I think I never talked with any of these gentlemen confidentially 
for so much as half an hour without having the subject opened before 
me in one shape or another. "You are a journalist; how do you think 
the American people would regard an American alliance with Great 
Britain?" To something like that we arrived so regularly that I came 
always to expect it. It was the hope that dominated all other con- 
siderations; even, at bottom, the chances of the war. After peace 
would be made there must be some permanent arrangement by which 
the United States and Great Britain should work together for the 
practical control of the world's affairs. 

I recall in particular a conversation I had about this time with the 
public man whom I regarded as the wisest and best informed in all Eng- 
land. He asked me, after traversing the usual circumlocutory road, 
what I thought of the chances of such an Alliance. As I had known 
him intimately for years, I had no hesitation in saying that in my 
judgment such a thing was impossible. A working arrangement for 



certain limited purposes in which France should be included might 
be possible, but no alliance with Great Britain. He asked why not. 
I said because in America everything depended upon the attitude of 
the people, and while there was no hostility to Great Britain there 
was no feeling that we were closer to her than to another nation. 

He seemed astonished at this and said: 

"I don't see why not. We have done everything in the world to 
please you people. For twenty-five years we have bent all our policy 
to give you whatever you wanted. Take the Alaska boundary dis- 
pute, for instance. The United States was absolutely in the wrong 
about that; you had not a leg to stand on. Yet Sir .... (naming 
one of the greatest names in England) told me himself that we deliber- 
ately threw away our case in order to please the United States, although 
we incurred thereby the fiercest criticism in Canada and even started 
talk, there of Canadian independence. I don't see what more we can 
do. It has been so in every crisis. You people must be hard to please." 

I said I didn't think this was where the obstacle lay, but insuper- 
ably in the fact that the Americans as a mass regarded themselves as 
a separate and individual nation and purposed to remain so, and hav- 
ing drawn their blood from so many sources they could not think of 
themselves as more bound to one of these sources than another. It was 
evident that this point of view was new to him; I found that generally 
it was either new, or seemed fantastic or improbable to those to whom 
I presented it, and I am convinced that even if publicly and repeat- 
edly urged it would have discouraged in no way the agitation that 
went on everywhere in favor of the Alliance, by whatsoever name. 

It was while this campaign was being dinned daily into my ears 
that I learned from indubitable sources something of the extent to 
which the British propaganda had been carried to America also. I 
was told that Great Britain had at that time no fewer than 220 agents 
in the United States, all engaged ostensibly in furthering war efforts 
but really at work to advocate a permanent union, and I recalled some 
of them with whom I had spoken at patriotic rallies in America and 
the stress they had laid upon the ties of race and kindred. 

Considering the resolute persistence of these efforts, the long 
period in which they had been prosecuted and (from the British 
point of view) their reasonable purpose, the extent to which American 
history has been "revised" is not to be wondered at. Not only public 
schools but academies and colleges have adopted as text-books the 
outgivings of writers plainly of this inspiration. In the way of business, 
publishers naturally approve of a substitution that involves large new 
orders. No one objects because scarcely anyone observes the import 
of the change. Its advocates in urging it put forward the view that 
the new history is written from the modern point of view, which is 
strictly impartial and true. Cleverly under this pretense the men and 
deeds of the Revolution are besmirched or obscured. 

But in this instance, it is not the impartial truth that is told, but 
only half-truths and perversions. The "revisionists" view the Revolu- 
tion as a sordid little altercation about taxes, which after all were 
righteously imposed, or as springing from the niggardly refusal of the 

10 



colonists to bear their part of the expense of driving France from 
Canada. The truth is that the American Revolution was no such 
struggle, but a profound rending apart of new ideas and old. There 
had come to these shores certain hardy spirits, mostly driven from 
Europe because they had taken on some habit of independent thought 
and action. Here they were projected upon conditions and environ- 
ments totally different from any they had known in the old countries. 
From all the mental processes, conceptions of politics, social ideas 
and ideals that dominated Europe, they were isolated first by 
distance and then by the absorbing interests of a new life. Under 
these conditions, because of this inheritance, because of the struggle 
among their descendants generation after generation, an idea of a 
system of society irreconcilable with that of the old world. Conflict 
between the new idea and the old was inevitable. The tax issue was 
but the striking of the match across the powder keg already in place. 
If it had not been taxes, it would have been something else. As well 
might one say that the war of 1914-1918 was about the murder of the 
Austrian Archduke. The conflict was between ideas, and the triumph 
of the new idea in the success of the United States was one of the 
great turning points in the history of mankind. 

The difference between the new idea and the old has never been 
adjusted. Europe has followed along, reforming and remodeling, 
establishing popular assemblies, enlarging the suffrage, limiting or 
tardily unseating its kings, but always protesting up the road where 
the success and prosperity of the new democracy has dragged it. 
With all our faults and all our shortcomings, still the fact remains 
that we did strike out here a higher notion of government and its 
relations to the people, a higher notion of liberty and its responsi- 
bilities. When all is done and all is revised, nothing can obscure the 
fact that to this day we are not European, we are American and the 
word has distinctive meaning. The essence of its distinction and the 
very heart of the American idea of government are comprised in the 
story of the American Revolution and nowhere else. If we drag 
down that momentous episode from the level of a struggle for a lofty 
and enduring principle to the slop-ditch of a family brawl about 
nothing, we annihilate not only our own great source of inspiration to 
righteousness and the forward path but a great landmark on the 
world's march from darkness to light. 

In sober earnestness, it has been much more than a landmark. 
The story of the American Revolution as it actually was, as hitherto 
we have taught and believed it, as the world has accepted and re- 
spected it, has in the last 140 years inspired every revolt of any people 
anywhere against tyranny, oppression and the lingering blight of 
monarchism. In its true proportions, as one of the decisive battles 
between the principle of autocracy and the principle of democracy, 
it has been the sign of hope and the great beacon light to millions of 
wronged people in every part of the world. I know that in these days 
it is not fashionable to talk about these matters; the reaction from 
the patriotic fervors of the war period has carried us into a mood of 
national self detraction. Even at other times we hesitate to do 

11 



justice to this phase of our history less we should seem to be guilty of 
the vaunting that has been ascribed to us as our national sin. Yet 
the simple truth is as I have stated it. The American Revolution 
was in its consequences the greatest event of modern times. From 
it came the regeneration of France and the down-fall of autocracy in 
western Europe, the rise of parliamentary government, the liberation 
of Southern and Central America, the rescue of Greece, the rise of 
national consciousness in Hungary, the beginning of a new order in 
Turkey, the freedom movement in India, the birth of the Chinese 
Republic, the dawn of democracy in the East, Far and Near. About 
the later phases of this long and memorable record I have some reason 
to know. I am lately come from a study of conditions in the Orient. 
Without prejudice, sentiment or exaggeration, I may say that the net 
result of any such examination is that the hope of the Far East is the 
United States and the origin and basis of that hope is the story of the 
American Revolution as a struggle for the advancement of mankind 
and an everlasting principle of their freedom. 

It is now urged that at a time when this view of our story means 
more than ever to the world of unenfranchised men we shall ourselves 
degrade it to something lower than Wat Tyler. If we do so, we should 
understand well of what inestimable national asset we shall deprive 
ourselves. For what is America? Most Americans have been proud 
to think of it as something more than an area of 3,026,788 square 
miles of earth and rocks situated between so many degrees of latitude, 
so many of longitude. They have thought of it as an idea, as a nation 
with a mission, as a permanent departure from the European concep- 
tion of national life led for grabbing and holding. The substance of 
the labors of the "revisionists" is to erase all this fair hope. Deliber- 
ately they return America to the place of a colony in the British 
organization; deliberately they would substitute British ideals for 
our own, deliberately direct the minds of new generations to British 
history as the true source of our light and guidance. Instead of 
independence they would prefer submersion in a system hitherto 
different from our aims and development. For the great lesson that 
peoples must not be coerced by alien despotisms, they would substitute 
the inspirations to be drawn from the stories of British rule in India, 
Ireland, South Africa and Burma. Instead of Washington, perhaps, 
Clive and Hastings; instead of Lexington, the story of Amritsar. 

It is a grave matter when the ideals that have led a nation forward 
for 140 years are proposed to be overthrown. For a change so drastic 
the reasons ought to be made clear and unmistakable. If our con- 
ception of the origin and foundation of the American state is erroneous, 
the error ought to be exhibited in the full light of day to all the nation, 
openly and frankly. The new contention ought to be supported by 
documents and records. The old faith ought not to be undermined 
in the dark with insinuations and innuendos; it ought not to be 
assailed by literary porch-climbers and second-story men in felt 
slippers. We ought not to be left to awake some morning to the fact 
that our children are being covertly taught to sneer at the history by 
virtue of which alone Americanism has any meaning. 

12 



But there are no such documents, no such records, no such new 
discoveries to show that the faith we have accepted is a mere travesty. 
All the facts in the story of the American Revolution were known, 
examined, weighed, considered, debated long ago. Not one new dis- 
covery do the "revisionists" produce. In writing their histories they 
but follow a method as old as written speech and familiar in the usage 
of the perverters of records since before the days of Pharoah. They 
have taken and set in a row the facts that agree with their theory 
and discarded all the rest. By this same process, the prestidigitators 
that haunt the fringes of serious history writing have, as literary 
stunts, rehabilitated every old scoundrel in the human story. As 
stunts they have shown that Henry the Eighth was a mild, sweet, 
virtuous prince, abounding in meekness, piety and grace; Richard 
the Third, without selfish ambition, desiring only the good of the 
nation; John, a model of wisdom and honesty; Captain Kidd, a 
worthy commercial pioneer; Cataline, a patriot. With such methods 
it is possible to prove anything; there is no good man in history that 
cannot be rolled in the mud, no good cause that cannot be smeared 
with filth. 

I will mention one easy example. Some of the "revisionists," 
eager to belittle the American Revolution, seem to desire us to adopt 
the English upraising of 1688 as our true standard of revolt against 
tyranny. Nothing involved in this uprising had or could have the 
least relation to any American problem, but I will not urge that point 
now. I will but point out that, by applying to it the methods used 
by the "revisionists" themselves, anyone can demonstrate that it 
was of sordid origin, without just occasion, promoted by selfish 
adventurers, conducted stupidly and foolishly, winning by hazard 
and not by merit and without historical significance. 

The truth, of course, is that no work of man is so well done that 
flaws cannot be picked in it. Men are but men. In whatsoever they 
undertake, let it be with whatsoever high motives, they will err and 
fall away from the original lofty purpose. The American Revolu- 
tionists, though inspired with a wonderful new sense of liberty and a 
new idea of democratic society, were not angels. Of course they 
went astray; of course the Continental Congress was at times factious, 
foolish, ill-ordered, incompetent, distracted with bickerings and 
petty jealousies. What of it? Of course Gates turned out to be a 
weakling, Charles Lee to be insubordinate. Of course Washington 
was often defeated. Of course there were Americans that did not feel 
the stirring of any impulse to freedom and the human cause just as 
there are Americans that do not feel it now. Put together if you 
relish such employment, all the weakness, vacillation, incompetence, 
failure that can be charged against these men as against all other men 
that ever lived. Still the facts will remain, when all is said, that they 
did contend for a great and vital principle; that they did find their 
way to proclaim it, that in its defense they challenged the greatest 
power in the world; that for eight years, with a constancy and devo- 
tion that in other men the world has most honored, they endured and 
sacrificed for their faith. Against these facts there is set no denial 

13 



and no question. To pick and peck at their story, to sneer and jeer, 
to show with exultation where one sHpped and another failed, to 
underline their weaknesses and obscure their virtues, is poor business. 
The errors of men are transitory; the good they do is indestructible. 
These men had for their objective a full release from the mediaeval 
monarchism in which dwelt England and all Europe. In the greatness 
of that conception their errors become to the world the gnats and 
blown dust of history. 

It seems to me that instead of obscuring and smutching this great 
chapter in the story of the human advance, what we most need now 
is to revive it and ponder upon it. Instead of giving it too much heed, 
we give it too little. In every national crisis we have found it most 
wholesome to remind ourselves of the manner in which this nation 
was created and the purposes to which it was dedicated. Sometimes 
the republic has confronted armed foes without and sometimes much 
more perilous subversions within. By whatsoever test it has been 
tried, the basic principles of the Declaration of Independence have 
been found its safeguard and sure bulwark. If we reject them now 
when the national existence is threatened by new perils, we should be 
strangely unwise, and to reject them at the instance of an alien power 
attentive only to its own advantage would be not less than insane. 

We are urged to believe that to continue to teach veritable Amer- 
ican history in our schools is to keep alive the spirit of hate, arouse in 
the young a passion for war, and endanger our good relations with 
Great Britain. This is going far in the search for excuses. If the 
plea has any merit, then assuredly English history ought not to be 
taught in English schools lest it breed antagonism to France, nor 
Swedish history in Swedish schools lest it inculcate hatred of Russia. 
Indeed, that very substitution of English for American history that 
the "revisionists" advocate would by this doctrine recoil upon their 
own heads, for if it is true, how could we study the long series of 
English wars with France without imbibing a dangerous anti-French 
complex leading inevitably to war? Indeed, if this specious argument 
had any substance, no history could be taught in any school. History 
in the large resolves itself into the record of one long struggle of the 
people against some form of autocratic and irresponsible control. 
By slow degrees and with infinite pains and sacrifices, the people have 
won against the autocratic conception. With profit and renewed 
hope we go back now to dwell upon each vantage point they have 
gained, observing that each has been in its turn a signal to the next. 
To contemplate these victories arouses in us no resentment against 
the armies that marched on the side of retrogression. They are clean 
out of the consideration. It is not the British soldiers that climbed 
Bunker Hill we consider, but the idea for which 'they fought. Do but 
try to imagine the mind that would cherish some feeling against a 
Persian because the army of Darius was chiefly composed of Persians! 
The passions that contended at Marathon perished with those that 
felt them, but the idea of liberty that won there remains still to be 
revived wherever there is oppression or injustice. 

It is exactly so with the American Revolution. An idea triumphed 

14 



there, inconceivably valuable to the human race. Out of that struggle 
and founded upon it the Republic has grown great as an influence for 
betterment. The ideas and principles that have led it are to this day 
irreconcilable with the guiding principles of monarchical Europe. It 
is not against any people that we contend but against the destruction 
of the world's hope. 

The epitome and abstract of that hope are expressed in the history 
of this nation. 




15 



CHARTERS OF LIBERTY 

By 
Frederick Joseph Kinsman, LL. D. 



CONTENTS 



Struggle for liberty, the social expression of the human instinct of self- 
preservation; age-long, inevitable — Moments of achieving even 
temporary success, landmarks of history; special significance of writ- 
ten guarantees — History of liberty begins with Hebrews, culminates 
with Americans, though final stages are not yet reached — Main stages 
indicated by illustrations selected from many. 

CHAPTER I 

Page 
ATHENS — Reforms of Solon and age of Pericles — Importance of the philos- 
ophy of Plato and Aristotle 23 

CHAPTER II 

ROME — Struggle for popular rights under the Republic — Assurance of many 

rights under the early Empire 25 

CHAPTER III 

CHRISTIANITY — Christian principle of liberty — Paganism, resting on 

slavery, gradually disintegrated 28 

CHAPTER IV 

GERMANY — Teutonic spirit of independence described by Tacitus — 
Germanic influence in the laws of Theodoric, Liutprand and Charle- 
magne 30 

CHAPTER V 

SPAIN — Similar developments in many states — Development of the Spanish 

Cortes, especially under Alphonso V 34 



19 



CHAPTER VI 

ITALY — Municipal freedom gained in Italy — Frederick Barbarossa and 

League of Lombardy in 1183 36 

CHAPTER VII 

ENGLAND — Charters given by early Norman Kings — the Great Charter 

extorted from King John in 1215 39 

CHAPTER VIII 

HUNGARY — The Golden Bull, great charter of Hungary — Confirmation of 

class privileges, vague as to general rights 42 

CHAPTER IX 

NETHERLANDS— Municipal freedom in Low Countries— Dutch War of 

Independence — Holland and Belgium 45 

CHAPTER X 

ENGLAND — Parliamentary victory over Stuart kings — Victory for respons- 
ible and representative government — Locke 50 

CHAPTER XI 

AMERICA — Latest and typical achievements — Declaration of Independ- 
ence and Constitution analyzed 55 

CHAPTER XII 

THE COURSE OF HISTORY— Intermittence in progress, yet unmistakable 

gains — Necessity of first principles as contained in the Christian law . 58 



20 



CHARTERS OF LIBERTY 



THE history of liberty is one aspect of the history of the human 
race. Struggles to secure it, age-long and inevitable, are the 
social expression of the instinct of self-preservation. Warfare 
to secure rights has seemed natural in a life determined by irrepressible 
desires to express its full powers. Persistent struggles have resulted 
in intermittent progress. Certain epochs show gains having promise 
of permanence. These are of critical importance in human evolution, 
landmarks in history. They have sometimes been due to the forma- 
tion of fixed habits, sometimes to the securing of written guarantees, 
to charters of custom as well as to charters of parchment. Study of 
the charters reveals in the general course of events a movement 
toward greater freedom, whose main stages and phases they illustrate: 
it serves also to indicate the honorable place in that movement held 
by our own national institutions. There were undoubtedly struggles 
for liberty, and victories in those struggles, before history began to 
be written. When its light first shines, there are signs that men 
oppressed were ever ready to seek freedom: there has been no epoch 
since in which there have not been fresh campaigns in an irrepressible 
conflict. 

Lord Acton well defines liberty as "the assurance that every 
man shall be protected in doing what he believes his duty against 
the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion." ^ It 
is commonly assumed that freedom is a natural right of man by 
virtue of creation : but realization of the right has only come through 
conflict with various forms of irresponsible might. Though it is 
"liberty that is ancient, despotism that is new," the theoretical 
liberty, which all concede, has only been realized in a succession of 
liberties gradually and painfully won. Among the more significant 
epochs in the history of liberty are the sixth and first centuries of the 
pre-Christian era, the first, eighth, eleventh, thirteenth, seventeenth 
and eighteenth of that in which we live. It begins with the Hebrews; 
its recent stages largely concern the Americans: yet its end has not 
been reached, nor will it be while man lives subject to his present 
conditions. 

The ideal of freedom is to be closely connected with the teachings 
of revealed religion, since its dawn is to be seen in the racial history 
recorded in the Old Testament. The government of the Israelites 
was a federation held together by unity of faith and race and founded 
on a voluntary covenant. It laid down the "parallel lines in which 
all freedom has run — the doctrine of national tradition and the 

1 Acton: History of Freedom and Other Essays, Macmillan, 1909, p. 3. The essays on Freedom 
in Antiquity and Freedom in Christianity give an excellent outline. 

21 



doctrine of the higher law; the principle that a constitution grows 
from a root by process of development, and not by essential change, 
and the principle that all political authorities must be tested and 
reformed according to a code that was not made by man." ^ Divine 
authority guarantees the liberty, which human absolutism is always 
trying to take away. The Old Testament, chiefly in the utterances 
of the later prophets, gives expression to the principles upon which 
experience has shown that liberty must rest. As long as the chosen 
people were obedient to the God-given law, there was a freedom for 
them which none of their neighbors possessed; but this they lost as 
they fell away from the observance of their law: and the last glim- 
merings of anything like national freedom faded, when they were 
carried into captivity. Six hundred years before the birth of Christ 
absolutism held unbounded sway; rights secured by equal laws and 
division of authority existed nowhere. "Might threatened, right 
quailed; night blackened, light failed." 

1 Acton, op. cit., p. 4. 



22 



CHAPTER I 

ATHENS — Reforms of Solon and age of Pericles — Importance of the philosophy 

of Plato and Aristotle. 

1. Athens. From this universal degradation the world was 
rescued by the most gifted of the nations of the ancient world, when 
Athens appointed Solon to revise her laws. Solon, the most profound 
political genius of antiquity, established precedents which have done 
nore than anything except revealed religion for the regeneration of 
society.^ Reform of the Athenian laws was necessary owing to the 
tyrannical attitude of the rich toward the poorer classes, many of 
whom, in lieu of payment of rent or loans, had become slaves, while 
the landholders, comparatively few in number, became more and 
more powerful. To readjust the economic balance against aristo- 
cratic and capitalistic predominance, Solon abolished the law which 
permitted imprisonment for debt, and prevented accumulation of 
land by "enclosure." He also provided for the encouragement of 
farming and trade. 

His chief reforms were constitutional. His state was a moderate 
oligarchy, in which political privilege was graduated by possession 
of land; yet he paved the way for democratic development. He 
recognized four classes of citizens, all of whom were put into definite 
relation to the political organism. Even the lowest class had a share 
in the public deliberations and voice in the choice of magistrates. 
He transferred to wealth what had hitherto been the privilege of 
birth, since upon the rich fell the burden of taxation. The poorer 
classes were exempt from taxation and were ineligible for office. He 
established courts of justice and provided that jurymen should be 
appointed by lot from all classes of citizens. The chief importance of 
his reforms appears in his effort to give to each class such power as 
could be wisely used and such as seemed adequate to secure protec- 
tion of all special interests. He thus inaugurated the reign of moral 
influence, whereas before all political power had depended on force. 
Government by consent superseded government by compulsion. By 
making every citizen guardian of his own interest, Solon admitted 
the element of democracy into the State. What he accomplished at 
Athens in the sixth century was for all time to benefit the world. He 
is chiefly to be remembered for his fundamental doctrine that "political 
power ought to be commensurate with public service." It is also 
notable, that he recognized a higher law to which human regulations 
should conform without having clear conceptions of what this might 
be; that he conceived of the State as a body of citizens all of whose 
interests should be protected; and that he strove to lodge authority 
with those upon whom fell the chief burdens of protection and admin- 

' Encyclopedia Brittanica, 11th edition, art. Solon. 

23 



istration. He upheld a noble ideal of chartered right and privilege, 
grounded in Justice. 

The ideals of Solon came nearest realization in the age of Pericles 
(490-429), under whose influence Athenian conceptions became more 
nearly democratic. He provided that jurymen, archons, soldiers and 
others should be paid from the public treasury for their respective 
services to the State; as it was probably he who opened the archon- 
ship to the lower classes. At the same time he restricted the franchise 
to those who on both sides could claim Athenian parentage. Solon 
had wished to distribute power according to actual capacity: Pericles 
was more concerned to grant power to potential capacity. Regarding 
the whole people as the seat of power, he introduced the idea that 
there should be such diffusion of power as would afford equal security 
to all. He wished not to confirm the predominance of any interest as 
chartered privilege, but to preserve with equal care the independence 
of labor and the security of property as chartered right; to make the 
rich safe against envy, the poor against oppression. This marks the 
highest level attained by the statesmanship of Greece. It expressed 
an ideal of the balance of power which subsequent generations were 
to endeavor to upset in the interest of money, land, and numbers. 

The Athenians were the only people of antiquity to grow great 
by democratic institutions; yet they had not learned to protect 
minorities. They were often the victims of chance-majorities, being 
guilty of unjust acts which showed that they felt bound by no stand- 
ard of eternal right, nor by anything higher than transient expediency. 
Athenian democracy had not learned lessons of restraint. Govern- 
ment by the whole people may be an evil of the same nature as un- 
mixed monarchy, and requires institutions which shall protect it 
against itself, upholding permanent law against arbitrary revolutions 
of opinion. A "rule of laws not men" is required not only as protec- 
tion against irresponsible individuals in office, but also against un- 
manageable mobs. Athens stated problems it did not solve, illus- 
trated difficulties it could not remove, and failed to attain many of 
its immediate objects. Yet it left a legacy of philosophy and experi- 
ence of unique value to students and statesmen of later days. To the 
age of Pericles we owe the best of Greek philosophy and much of the 
best political knowledge we possess. The Laws of Plato and the 
Politics of Aristotle hold a unique place in the history of Law and the 
proclamation of Justice. They may be regarded as the classic ex- 
amples of the contribution to the cause of chartered liberty made by 
ancient Greece. They abound in maxims which would seem to 
reflect distinctly modern experience; yet in dealing with fundamental 
principles, they seldom go beyond the teaching of Solon, who may 
well be remembered for two sayings: "The greatest glory of a ruler 
is to create popular government," and "It is of the essence of democ- 
racy to obey no master but the law." 



24 



CHAPTER II 

ROME — Struggle for popular rights under the Republic — Assurance of many 
rights under the early Empire 

2. Rome. The Romans worked at the same problems with 
greater constructive power and greater temporary success, never 
rivaling the Athenians as exponents of political theory, but excelling 
them in practical sense which effected more stable results. Yet the 
Roman experiment, too, ended in catastrophe. The Roman Republic 
was for centuries, however, a strong government, which represented 
the efforts of a practical people to secure greater degrees of self- 
development. The aristocrats overthrew the kingdom, yet themselves 
strove to retain the powers which the kings had been forced to relin- 
quish. They in turn were attacked by the plebs, who sought pro- 
tection and privilege in the State, and after two centuries of struggle 
were admitted (286 B. C.) to political equality. Then followed a 
century and a half of unprecedented prosperity and glory, during 
which the Romans became the strongest race of the age and estab- 
lished the supremacy of their republic over an ever-widening domain. 
This domain, won by republican arms, gradually came into possession 
of comparatively few men until fewer than two thousand controlled 
the whole. These magnates found themselves defied by suffering 
masses, who eventually gave their confidence to Julius Caesar. He, 
supported by a victorious army, overthrew the power of the mag- 
nates who constituted the Roman Senate, and converted the Republic 
into a Monarchy. 

Yet the overthrow of the Republic did not involve loss of popular 
freedom. The Roman Republic affords examples of the same efforts 
to secure popular rights that are to be found in all modern states of 
the West, many of which met with temporary success. Yet there was 
comparatively little freedom under the late Republic and consider- 
ably more under the early Empire. The student of political history 
must always be looking behind names to things, and must not confuse 
the substance of liberty with vague use of its popular watchwords. 
"The Roman Empire rendered greater service to the cause of liberty 
than the Roman Republic. The poor had what they had demanded 
in vain of the Republic; the rich fared better than during the Tri- 
umvirate. The rights of Roman citizens were extended to the people 
of the provinces. To the imperial epoch belong the better part of 
Roman literature and nearly the entire civil law. It was the Empire 
that mitigated slavery, instituted religious toleration, made a begin- 
ning of the law of nations, and created a perfect system of the law of* 
property. The Republic which Caesar overthrew had been anything 
but a free state. It provided admirable securities for the rights of 
citizens: it treated with savage disregard the rights of men. It 

25 



allowed the free Roman to inflict atrocious wrongs on his children, 
on debtors and dependents, on prisoners and slaves. What the slave 
was in the hands of his master, the citizen was in the hands of the 
community. The most sacred obligations vanished before the public 
advantage. The passengers existed for the sake of the ship." ^ By 
their disregard of private interests, and of moral welfare, both Greece 
and Rome destroyed the vital elements on which the prosperity of 
nations rests, and perished by the decay of families and the depopula- 
tion of the country. To them may be traced the confusion between 
tyranny and authority and between lawlessness and freedom. The 
Athenian had tried experiments in pure reason, the Roman in material 
interest: but pure reason and tested custom were alike powerless to 
establish free government, which can only be the fruit of long, mani- 
fold, and patient experience. Both Greeks and Romans had evolved 
systems of government based on selfishness, on human ambitions 
unrelated to anything higher, the one on selfishness enlightened, the 
other on selfishness experienced: and both failed. 

The history of the ancient world makes it plain that modern 
problems are perennial problems; that the ancient world attempted 
to solve them by a series of age-long experiments; that ancient experi- 
ence can never be disregarded; that the literature it produced has 
unique value for all generations. Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and 
Philo give admirable expression to many principles and maxims which 
must always form part of the stock in trade of statesmen. The 
practical experiments in popular government of the nations of an- 
tiquity are of too great importance for moderns to ignore. They 
afford warning examples of the ways in which "monarchy hardens 
into tyranny, aristocracy contracts into oligarchy, and democracy 
expands into the supremacy of numbers." They showed how equality 
could only be preserved by federalism. Yet in spite of the noble 
sentiments contained in their literature they made no provision for 
representative government, liberty of conscience, or abolition of 
slavery. The theory of universal freedom was expressed. "Neither 
conquest nor purchase," said Zeno, "can make one man the property 
of another": "true freedom consists in obeying God." Yet in spite 
of such abstract recognition of human rights, nothing was done to 
end slavery; and it was as based on slavery that the ancient civiliza- 
tion fell. This was the cause of its downfall as it had been its con- 
tinuing curse. 

"The pre-Christian religions were an age-long prayer; the In- 
carnation was the answer." Similarly pre-Christian politics were 
an age-long experiment of which the Christian Church was to furnish 
the solution. Sages among both Jews and Gentiles had apprehended 
truths concerning the rights of man and given them noble and forcible 
expression: yet the systems with which they were identified lacked 
the principle of life and degenerated into hopeless despotisms. Chris- 
'tianity alone realized the noblest aspirations of pre-Christian times. 
Our Lord who ever upheld the supremacy of God, also sanctioned the 

1 Acton: op. cit., p. 12. 

26 



authority of Caesar, giving civil authority a sanctity it had never 
before possessed, and not only giving precepts as to the mode of its 
exercise, but also giving power to obey them. 



27 



CHAPTER III 

CHRISTIANITY — Christian principle of liberty — Paganism, resting on 
slavery, gradually disintegrated. 

3. Christianity. The pre-Christian world afforded various 
examples of the efforts of men to protect themselves against the 
tyrannies of force, and of progressive recognition of rights belonging 
to various grades of men in the social scale. Yet the early history of 
liberty is rather the record of successive concessions of extorted 
privilege, than of recognitions of the equal rights of men. Chris- 
tianity introduced a new conception, of human rights guaranteed 
by Divine law, of universal brotherhood as consequence of universal 
sonship. All men are sons of God: hence they are on an equality as 
brothers in the family and household of the Almighty Father. 

The great charter of Christian liberty is contained in our Lord's 
words to the Jews.^ "Then said Jesus to those Jews who believed 
on Him: 'If you continue in My word, you shall be My disciples 
indeed. And you shall know the truth; and the truth shall make 
you free.' They answered Him: 'We are the seed of Abraham; and 
we have never been slaves to any man. How say est Thou: "You 
shall be free"?' Jesus answered them: 'Amen, amen, I say unto 
you that whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin. Now the 
servant abideth not in the house forever; but the son abideth forever. 
If therefore the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed.' " 
The incarnate Word promises freedom to all who accept the truth 
of the Gospel, and defines freedom as obedience to the laws of God. 
The true rights of man are not privileges he extorts from hostile 
fellow-men, one selfishness triumphant for a time over another selfish- 
ness, but phases of the life he lives in obedience to God, as son "created 
in the image" of the eternal Father. "Man, by a necessity of his 
nature, is wholly subject to the most faithful and ever-enduring 
power of God: as a consequence, any liberty, except that which 
consists in submission to God and in subjection to His will, is un- 
intelligible. To deny the existence of this authority in God, or to 
refuse to submit to it, means to act, not as a free man, but as one who 
treasonably abuses his liberty; . . . for to reject the supreme 
authority of God, and to cast off all obedience to Him, is the greatest 
perversion of liberty." ~ 

Pagan civilization, built upon slavery, disintegrated under the 
influence of the Christian doctrine of human brothferhood and equality 
before God. From the Constantinian era onwards there was advance 
in various fields of activity, not by even steps or persistent gains, yet 
with sufficient steadiness to indicate that the difference between the 
fourth century, when paganism ceased in the western world, and the 

'St. John VIII: 31-36. 

2 Pope Leo XIII. Great Encyclical Letters of Leo XIII, Benziger, New York, 1903, p. 159. 

28 



thirteenth, when Christianity had risen to great heights of power, was 
tc be accounted for by the influence of the Christian leaven in society, 
and the superiority of this to any other that the world had known. 
The history of liberty was still the chronicle of competition of selfish 
interests, yet always, at any rate in Catholic countries, affected more 
or less by the Christian assumptions. Men fought against the agres- 
sions of brothers, yet never forgot that they were brothers: they 
tyrannized over brethren when they had the chance, yet were haunted 
by the sense of sacrilege. Struggles for freedom were ennobled as 
fresh assertions of man's divine right. The Christian leaven was 
always secretly working and gradually transforming society. 

The Catholic Church, as a great mother of freedom, was the 
chief influence which determined the extensions of political liberty 
among the young nations of Europe during the early Middle Ages. 
Yet there was another, quite independent of this and pagan, that of 
Teutonic migration which permeated the Roman world. There was 
a sturdy individualism, a habit of acting as freemen, in the Teutons 
which affected every country into which they forced themselves, 
and developed its highest powers when the Teutons came under in- 
fluence of the Church. From them came faculties of self-govern- 
ment and self-control which made valuable contribution to the com- 
posite European character: from them came many customs which 
favored government by the people as a whole. Yet the Teutonic 
system had obvious limitations; the immediate effect of the Teutonic 
migrations was retrograde; it was only in a wider context than it 
had made for itself that the Teutonic genius was to rise to full heights 
of its possibilities. It is necessary to distinguish between freedoms 
built up from below, self-assertions extorting privileges from reluctant 
might, and the freedom received as a gift from above, brotherhood 
realizing its responsibilities as a divine sonship. These are distinct, 
though not necessarily opposed. Their interaction has determined 
the course of modern civilization; every age has its examples of their 
triumphs: some of the most striking belong to the Middle Ages. 



29 



CHAPTER IV 
GERMANY — Teutonic spirit of independence described by Tacitus — ■ 
Germanic influence in the laws of Theodoric, Liutprand and Charlemagne 

4. Germany. Liberty may be safeguarded by tradition and 
custom. This fact is illustrated by the history of certain Teutonic 
conceptions by which most peoples in western Europe have been 
influenced. Chief of these is the conception of leadership, of which 
responsibility rather than privilege is the correlative, obscured by the 
later developments of feudalism, but consecrated by Christianity and 
typically expressed in the rites of royal coronation. The kingly office 
is closely associated with certain stages of the history of liberty; and 
reverence for this has been deeply implanted in the Germanic branch 
of the Aryan family. "It has been the especial function of the Ger- 
manic peoples to carry kingship and faithfulness to the king, royalty 
and loyalty, farther down "into the ages than any other group of free 
nations. That peculiar combination of kingly authority and popular 
freedom contained the seeds of the institution which we now call 
Constitutional Monarchy." Teutonic races have often shown ex- 
ceptional faculties for governing and being governed. 

Important evidence for the early customs and conceptions of 
Germanic tribes is given by Tacitus in De Moribus Germaniae. 
What the Roman historian noticed in the beginning of the Christian 
era was exhibited in many ways during the centuries that followed. 
He described chieftains who were the prototypes of modern constitu- 
tional monarchs, recognizes their strength, and notes that Rome 
suffered less from the despotisms of the East than from the inde- 
pendent barbarians. Quippe regno Arsacis acrior est German- 
orum liber tas} Among the German tribes there was a correlation 
of the principles of Liberty and Authority. Leadership was not 
allowed to encroach on liberty and was, for the most part, conceded 
only to ability. "They choose their kings for nobleness of character, 
their leaders in war for valor; nor do their kings possess unrestricted 
or arbitrary power: but they are leaders more by example than 
authority; if they are resourceful and distinguished, if they put them- 
selves at the head of their warriors, they gain precedence through 
popular admiration." - There was great variety in their political life. 
Only one race, the Suiones, inhabiting the Baltic islands and Sweden, 
was under a single head;^ nor was government. by kings universal. 
In many tribes kingship depended on birth, descent from some mythical 
ancestor; yet there was no law of primogeniture. In others leader- 
ship was only temporary, generals being chosen for war, presidents 



1 Tacitus: Germania, 37. 

- Tacitus: Germania, 1 cf. 44. 

s Tacitus: Germania, 44 cf. 25. 



30 



and judges for times of peace. For the most part, they preferred 
elective magistracies, kings being selected from the men of royal 
stock, "inheritance tempered by election." Around the king was a 
body of nobles, natural leaders by birth and service, the comitatus 
(Gefolgschaft) , and outside these the freemen, with the nobles 
members of the concilium (Folkmote) . "This is the king's dignity, 
this his strength, to be ever surrounded by a body of men, in peace 
his distinction, in war his defense." ^ 

The most distinctive Teutonic institution was the Concilium, 
the primitive parliament, held monthly in small tribes, twice a year 
in large ones. Every free warrior had the right to attend, although 
only those who were landholders had full voice and vote, and the 
members of the comitatus exerted most influence. The priests 
ordered the proceedings, in which there was freest debate and careful 
suppression of violence. The nobles, comitatus, were jealous of 
any despotic assumption on the part of the king; and the share taken 
by all freemen in discussing all sorts of questions and settling them 
by vote, kept alive the tradition of the rights of all the people, the 
responsibility of their rulers, their amenability to criticism, and 
their dependence on popular support.^ 

Germanic ideals affected all the northern tribes and nations, and, 
when the northern tribes invaded the Empire, left traces on all the 
institutions established by the invaders in the midst of Roman so- 
ciety. Goths, Visigoths, Vandals, Ostrogoths, and Lombards, all 
representing in varying degrees the Teutonic tradition, gave this 
impress to their respective kingdoms. "All these wars, all this stir 
and movement among the peoples, tended to increase the power of 
kingship. A weapon which was to pierce the Empire's defensive 
armor of castles and legions needed to be sharpened to a point and 
tipped with steel; and that steel point was royalty." ^ The kings of 
the invaders were of the Germanic type; and the better aspects of 
Germanic influence are to be seen in their laws. The various collec- 
tions of Leges Barbarorum are so many charters of popular liber- 
ties, representing a Teutonic graft upon a Roman stock, a Roman 
expression of Teutonic ideals. 

Illustration of this may be seen in the rule of Theodoric the Ostro- 
goth, 493-526. Although in his capital of Ravenna he ceased to be a 
king after the simple Teutonic pattern, being compelled to adopt 
Roman methods and Byzantine fashiorfs since, in ruling Romans as 
well as Goths, he could not ignore southern traditions formed during 
five hundred years, he was, nevertheless, a ruler who considered the 
welfare of his subjects in distinctly Germanic ways.^ 

The same thing is true of Liutprand the Lombard, 712-744. ^ 
His Statute Book bears the Germanic stamp; and his annual assem- 

' Tacitus: Germania, 13. 

2 Tacitus: Germania, 11. 

3 See for the whole context Hodgkin: Italy and Her Invaders, Book IV, Chapter 7 in Volume III 
of the Clarendon Press edition of 1896. 

^ See ahstract of EdiciumTheodorici Regis given in Hodgkin: Italy and Invaders, Vol III no 309- 
314. Note E. 

^ Hodgkin, Book VII, Chap. 10 in Vol. VI. 

31 



blies represented the concilium of Tacitus. These were held on the 
first of March, and, on fifteen of the thirty-one years of his reign, were 
marked by pubhcation of laws, decisions in typical cases intended to 
uphold justice for all people of his realm. Thus runs the preface to 
the code of 713: "Liutprand, the Christian and Catholic King of 
the Lombards, together with all Judges of Austria, Neustria, and 
Tuscia and the rest of my faithful Lombards, with also all the people 
assisting, have decreed these things by common consent of all for the 
fear and love of God." Liutprand confirmed the statutes of his pre- 
decessors, Rothari and Grimwald, and issued one hundred and fifty- 
five capitula of his own, dealing with cases not covered by the older 
decrees. The Lombardic jurisprudence was crude, but exhibited an 
advance, in its higher valuation of human life, murder no longer 
being punished merely by guidrigeld, blood-money; in its begin- 
nings of "personal law," whereby Franks and Romans, members of 
the community no less than Lombards, were protected in living 
under their respective ancestral codes; and in its efforts to expedite 
justice, and to protect slaves, women and children. Liutprand aimed 
at ruling justly and at securing the assent of his subjects to his deci- 
sions. He emphasized the king's amenability to law by enacting 
that, since donation by a minor was invalid in other instances, no 
exception should be made in the case of such a donation made to 
a king.^ 

All laws of this period show a tendency toward milder manners 
and protection of the weak, notably the legislation of Charlemagne, 
772-814." The restoration of the Empire under Charlemagne, 
Roman in form though largely Teutonic in spirit, led to an increase 
of popular freedom. The Lombards readily acquiesced in the rule of 
the Prankish Charles, probably recognizing the Germanic kinship; 
and although Lombard dukes, whose powers were excessive, were 
superseded by Prankish counts, Lombards', as well as Charles' other 
subjects, found his rule beneficial. The most direct evidence as to 
conditions of the time is to be found in his Capitularies.^ Charles 
largely increased the power of the Church, perceiving that in the 
Church lay "the best hope of civilizing and humanizing the chaotic 
population of the Empire." Hence he insisted, first of all, on a dis- 
ciplined, holy and educated clergy. He also required schools, pro- 
vided with suitable books, better churches, and more "reverent, 
prayerful, and humble" congregations. Always champion of the weak, 
he pledged his "ban" to punish eight special crimes: dishonor to 
Holy Church, injustice to widows, injustice to orphans, injustice to 
the poor, abduction of a freeborn woman, burning of another's house 
or stables, destruction of another's hedge or cottage, refusal to fight 
against the country's foes. He provided for 'juries and courts of 
justice and sent out commissioners to expedite the course of justice in 
provincial courts. He aimed not only at revival, but also at re- 
invigoration, of Roman rule. 

^ Leges Liutprandi are given in Vol. Ill of Troya: Codice Diplomatico Longobardo. 

- Hodgkin: Italy and Invaders, Book IX, Chap. 10 in Vol. VIII. 

3 Capitularies of Charlemagne in Migne: Patrologia Lalina, Vol. XCVII, pp. 121-370. 

32 



His plans for the more effective government of Europe were frus- 
trated shortly after his death. His grandsons, in the Treaty of Ver- 
dun, divided his Empire, in effect establishing the rival states of 
France, Germany and Italy, paving the way for "the Feudal Anarchy, 
which history has called, with unintended irony, the Feudal System." 
"The political solution was already crystallizing into feudalism; and 
possibly no king or emperor could have arrested the development of 
the process. . . . Feudalism triumphed over all the attempts of 
the central power to check its progress; duke, marquis, count and 
baron made their titles hereditary, and became virtually, each one, 
sovereign in his own domain: thus ten thousand disintegrating in- 
fluences destroyed the unity, not only of the Empire, but even of 
each of those kingdoms into which it was divided." ^ Feudalism 
represented the protection of sundry rights; but it also produced 
various forms of oppression against which modern struggles for 
constitutional liberty have represented the reaction. 

1 Hodgkin, Vol. VIII, p. 301. 



33 



CHAPTER V 

SPAIN — Similar developments in many states — Development of the Spanish 
Cortes, especially under Alphonso V. 

5. Spain. The extension of popular government, as a rule, 
indicates an extension of liberty, since the aim of various classes of 
people is to safeguard their own interests, and share in the govern- 
ment is intended to ensure protection of special rights. Hence the 
history of liberty deals largely with government by representative 
assemblies. The parliamentary form is essential to popular govern- 
ment. The earliest examples of this are found in Spain. 

The Spanish Cortes may be regarded as the dean of the repre- 
sentative assemblies of the world. Its origins are to be found in the 
Councils of Toledo, and in the councils summoned as early as the 
seventh century by the Visigothic kings in Spain, composed of eccle- 
siastics and nobles, and held in conformity with Roman precedent.^ 
Sixteen of these councils are recorded between the days of Recared 
(586-601) and the Arab invasion in 711. Here may be recognized 
the embryo of the Cortes eventually appearing in most Spanish 
states; yet the emergence of the Cortes to light must be connected 
with the reign of Alphonso V (999-1027), whose council of magnates 
was beginning to develop into something like the later assemblies. 
This reign is also important for the charters granted to towns, for a 
model charter granted to Leon in 1020, and for a code of laws for the 
kingdom.'- The privileges guaranteed by Alphonso were confirmed 
by Ferdinand I in the Council of Coyanza in 1050, an important date 
in constitutional history, since it assured to sections of Spain the 
enjoyment of rights v/hich in m.ost countries of Europe were not 
conceded until two centuries later. 

The Spanish Cortes, however, was not coherent or fixed in con- 
stitution. The Spaniards were careless of form and regularity and 
seem not to have adopted clear rules as to the constituent members 
of national assemblies. There was no rule as to whom the king must 
summon, nor that clergy and nobles must be represented, nor that 
the consent of the Cortes was necessary in making laws. Customs 
differed in the various Spanish kingdoms. The commons only secured 
representation in the Cortes of Leon in 1188, still later in Castile, 
and in the common Cortes of Leon and Castile in 1301. Aragon 
was the last to adopt a Cortes and to take its place in the common 
Cortes. This might have been expected to promote the unification 
of the Spanish kingdoms and peoples: but the looseness of its work- 



1 Encyclopedia Brittanica, 11th ed., Art. Spain. Cf. Acton: Freedom, p. 33. 

2 Spanish history throws important light on the formulation of civil law. Among the earliest 
codes is that of the Visigothic king Euric (466-485) which has first place in any discussion of Ger- 
manic Laws. 

34 



ings, in which it resembled most institutions of the country, pre- 
vented this. After the admission of the commons, the assemblies 
were fairly representative of the people, and served to check the 
power of the kings. It came also to be recognized that no tax should 
be imposed without the consent of the commons who were called 
upon to pay it. 

From the eleventh century to the fourteenth, Spain affords in- 
teresting illustration of self-government in its chartered towns. 
These were practically republics, each with its own law. Spanish 
life exhibited little uniformity. All was local law, usage and privilege; 
and it was privileges rather than rights that were specially confirmed 
by charter. There was no general law in favor of the Church; yet 
the Church was exempt from taxation by the special privileges granted 
to bishoprics, chapters and monasteries. As the nobles were exempt 
from taxation, the burden of this fell upon non-nobles and towns. 
The status of the towns was usually defined in charters, granted 
sometimes by kings, sometimes by nobles and ecclesiastics with 
royal sanction. These assured control over adjacent villages; yet 
often villages were powerful enough to secure independence, charters 
of their own, and the right to erect their own gallows in the market- 
place. Serfs also secured chartered privileges by successful uprisings. 
No general law controlled local usages. There was nothing like a 
general system of justice until the reign of Alphonso X, who in 1260 
combined the best parts of existing charters as a general rule for one 
set of towns and villages. This however was promulgated as a code 
of law by the Cortes of Alcala in 1338 during the reign of Alphonso XI, 
with the restriction that it was not to prevail against established 
local law. 



35 



CHAPTER VI 

ITALY — Municipal freedom gained in Italy— Frederick Barbarossa and 
League of Lombardy in 1183. 

6. Italy. More definite in achievement and more influential 
by example, was the development of chartered municipalities in 
Italy, where municipal freedom in the twelfth century paved the 
way for national freedom in the thirteenth. Throughout the period 
the chief guarantee of the liberties of classes, localities, and peoples is 
seen in the granting of solemnly attested charters. Those of Italy 
formed models for the northern countries, and among them municipal 
charters hold the first place. As early as 958, Berengarius and Adal- 
bert, joint kings of Italy, conferred on Genoa sole possession of prop- 
erty to which she laid claim; there are doubtless many other con- 
temporary grants made by feudal lords to Italian towns: but the earliest 
documents extant conferring municipal privileges date from the 
eleventh century. Three, dated respectively 1059, 1061, and 1062, 
confer rights on Savona; one of 1081 recognizes certain rights of 
Lucca: in the next century there are formal recognitions of the 
institutions and customs of Florence, Pisa and Genoa. There were 
elaborate systems of local government, which feudal lords gave 
pledges to honor and protect.^ 

The twelfth century saw results of at least three centuries of 
effort. About the ninth century, cities which had been overthrown 
by barbarian invaders, began to rebuild their walls and to secure 
permission from feudal lords and emperors to arm themselves for 
defense. They thus were able to make themselves more respected, 
developed wise constitutions, trained capable magistrates, and 
erected a series' of free commonwealths on the ruins of the western 
Empire. They aimed first at protecting themselves against bar- 
barian invaders; later they guarded themselves against the encroach- 
ments of their feudal lords who had parceled out the domain of the 
Empire among themselves. - 

Yet it was to the war of investitures between Emperors and Popes, 
lasting more than sixty years, that the Italian cities owed most of 
their guarantees of freedom. Popes and Emperors bid for their alliance 
and offered concessions to secure support. During this period the 
communes grew in self-reliance, strength and liberty. In the past 
bishops had helped to free them from their feudal masters: now the 
war of investitures relieved them from dependence on bishops. An 
age of real autonomy succeeded that of feudal grants of inherited 
privilege. This was signalized by the power of the municipal consuls, 
who gradually came to represent their cities in all transactions with 



' Duffy: Tuscan Republics, p. 55. 

- Sismondi: Italian Republics, Longmans, 1901, pp. 14, 23, 30. 



36 



neighbors, being supported by assemblies of the more influential 
citizens. The rule was oligarchy rather than democracy.^ 

The war of investitures brought about the dissolution of existing 
political relations in Italy. Each city, ostensibly fighting for either 
Pope or Emperor, was in reality impelled by regard for its own sup- 
posed interests. Its citizens were filled with sentiment not for Church, 
Empire, or Kingdom, but for the City. Men fought as Guelphs or 
Ghibbelines; but the motives which impelled choice of sides were 
those of Florentines or Pisans.- The most definite charters of munic- 
ipal liberty of the twelfth century were the treaties made by the 
Emperor Frederick Barbarossa with the League of Lombardy in 
1183. Frederick's opponent, Pope Alexander III, ranged himself 
with the protectors of Italian liberties; and Frederick, after defeat 
by the Milanese and his reconciliation to the Church, among other 
things agreed to a definition of constitutional rights of the Emperor 
in relation to Italian cities. The final agreement was reached at the 
Diet of Constance in 1183, when the Emperor renounced all regal 
privileges which he had hitherto claimed in the Italian towns, and 
acknowledged the right of the towns to levy armies, to fortify them- 
selves, to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction within their walls, 
and to have their own consuls as imperial vicars. On the other hand, 
the cities engaged to maintain imperial rights which were defined. 
The result was the establishment of legal liberty for the municipalities 
included in the League of Lombardy. This treaty, which established 
important precedents for later struggles against feudal despotism, 
is one of the most important charters of liberty in all European 
history. 

Besides his treaty with the League, Frederick made formal grants 
to single cities, confirming Pisa and Lucca in their independence, 
and waiving certain imperial rights in Genoa. His son, Henry VI, 
in 1184 recognized special rights claimed by Florence, Lucca, Siena, 
and Perugia, apparently seeking to give legal sanction to encroach- 
ments on imperial rights which he was powerless to prevent.^ Behind 
all treaties between Emperors and Italian communes was the deter- 
mination of the latter to preserve independence and to protect their 
commerce. The Florentines, for example, always practical and 
business-like, consistently pursued these two aims. To preserve 
communal independence, they frequently changed the details of 
internal government, keeping the system plastic and vital: to extend 
their commerce, they were not only wary against foes, but also ruth- 
less toward friendly rivals, betraying Siena, crushing Pisa. Their 
policy was wholly selfish and successful. It allowed a small town to 
play a great part, developing strong characters and keen intellects, 
training a school of clever diplomats, and creating a home for literary 
culture and exquisite art."* It was a good school in self-government, 
since its parliament consisted of all men capable of bearing arms, who 

' Enc. Brit., 11th ed., Art. Italy by John Addington Symonds. 

- Sismondi, op. cit., pp. 21, 52f. 

3 Duffy: Tuscan Republics, pp. 67f. 

J Duffy, op. cit., p. 103. 

37 



met in the great square to elect their consuls who were charged with 
administration of justice and conduct of wars, and on special occa- 
sions to settle important questions of state. No history of "town- 
meeting" can ignore the precedents established in the Italian com- 
munes of the Middle Ages. To them we owe valuable contributions 
to the science of political economy, since the political philosophy of 
Italy was diffused throughout the northern nations. Their influence 
is to be seen among the Swiss who freed themselves from Austrian 
rule, in two lines of free cities formed in Germany, the Rhenish and 
Hanseatic Leagues, among the Parisians in certain of their experi- 
ments in governing their city and their state, and especially in the 
Flemish communes which later afforded the best examples of healthy 
and vigorous municipal development. 



38 



CHAPTER VII 

ENGLAND — Charters given by early Norman Kings — the Great Charter 
extorted from King John in 1215 

7. England. Every phase of the history of political liberty 
illustrates the importance attached to solemn promises in writing, 
fortified by oath and seal. Written charters have counted for more 
than verbal promises or prescriptions of custom; and of these none 
is more famous than the Great Charter of England. This has played 
a great part in English constitutional history, less perhaps as a thir- 
teenth century achievement than as a traditional symbol for right 
and justice. Most writers of the present day emphasize the fact that 
modern imagination has invested Magna Carta with an importance 
transcending its actual effect upon mediaeval politics. "The Great 
Charter must not be overrated as an expression of general constitu- 
tional rights: to a large extent it was a mere recapitulation of the 
claims of the baronage, and gives redress for their feudal grievances." ^ 
"In itself the Charter was no novelty, nor did it claim to establish 
any new constitutional principles." - "It is a misunderstanding 
to regard the Great Charter either as containing new principles or as 
terminating a struggle. On the contrary its character is eminently 
conservative."^ "Although in later ages its importance has been 
enormously magnified, it differs only in degree, not in kind, from the 
charters granted by Norman and early Plantagenet kings. Its 
greater length, however, still more the exceptional circumstances 
attending its birth, gave to it a position absolutely unique in the 
minds of later generations of Englishmen. This feeling was fostered 
by its many confirmations; and in subsequent ages, especially during 
the struggle between the Stuart kings and the parliament, it was 
regarded as something sacrosanct, embodying the very ideal of 
English liberties, which to some extent had been lost, but which must 
be revived. Its provisions, real and imaginary, formed the standard 
toward which Englishmen must strive." ^ Its positive value is well 
stated by Bishop Stubbs."" "Although not the foundation of Eng- 
lish liberty, it is the first, the clearest, the most united, and historically 
the most important, of all the great enunciations of it; for it was a 
revelation of the possibility of freedom to the mediaeval world. 
The maintenance of the Charter becomes from henceforth the watch- 
word of English freedom." Moreover, it differs from the charters 
hitherto considered as being a covenant between a feudal lord and 
not merely one class of feudatories, or a municipality, but with a 
nation. 

1 Enc. Brit., 11th ed., Art. English History by C. W. C. Oman. 
- Green: Short History of the English People, Chap. Ill, sec. 3. 
3 Traill: Social England, Vol. I, p. 267. 

« Enc. Brit., 11th ed.. Art. Magna Charta by A. W. Holland. 
» Stubbs: Early Plantagenets, p. 158. 

39 



Kings of England at coronation made promises to their people; 
and at times these promises took the form of charters. William 
Rufus, endeavoring to secure his authority against his barons, prom- 
ised good government and maintenance of old customs to the people, 
and favored the Church recognized as the champion of popular 
rights. His brother, Henry I, pursuing the same policy, published a 
charter. In this he promised to relax feudal rules against the barons, 
whom he ordered to show similar lenience to their own vassals. He 
promised that "the laws of Edward" (the Confessor), that is, the 
old English institutions, should be preserved. During his reign 
there was steady improvement in good government. Local courts 
were revived; local customs were recorded in charters; the system of 
finances and taxes was improved: Henry's reign was regarded as 
an era of prosperity.^ His successors, Stephen and Henry II, issued 
coronation-charters, confirming the laws of Henry I; but the custom 
was not continued by the second Henry's sons, Richard and John. 

The reign of John, who was able and unscrupulous, exhibited a 
succession of attempts at tyranny, many of which were successful. 
The barons v>^ere harassed, their people oppressed: there seemed no 
limit to the king's exactions. However, he was beaten in controversy 
with Pope Innocent III; he was beaten in battle by the King of France, 
thereby losing his continental possessions: finally in 1212 his barons 
raised the standard of rebellion, and for three years England suffered 
from civil war. In 1213, Cardinal Stephen Langton, Archbishop of 
Canterbury, produced the charter of Henry I, and upheld it as a 
standard of good government. This gave the barons an aim, the 
recovery of "lost liberties." They drew up a list of Articles, com- 
prising forty-eight demands for redress of special grievances. John, 
bidding for support against them, granted special charters to the 
Church, assuring free elections, and to the City of London: but 
both churchmen and Londoners ranged themselves with the barons 
against the King, who had to yield in the face of national rebellion. 

On June 15, 1215, at Runnimede near Windsor Castle, John was 
compelled to sign the Great Charter, an elaboration of the charter of 
Henry I to make it conform to the Articles of the barons. It guar- 
anteed freedom to the Church by a general provision; it specifically 
redressed the abuses of which the barons complained; it vaguely 
recognized and safeguarded certain rights of all the people; in par- 
ticular it made better provision for the administration of justice. 
"Many regard Magna Carta as giving equal rights to all English- 
men. Yet the villains, who formed the majority of the population, 
got very little; in fact, the only clauses that protect them do so be- 
cause they are property, the property of their lords, and therefore 
valuable. They get neither political nor civil rfghts under Magna 
Carta. The traders too get little, while preferential treatment is 
meted out to the clergy and the barons. Its benefits are confined to 
freemen, and of the benefits the lion's share fell to the larger land- 

1 Traill: Social England, I. pp. 244-247. 

40 



holders. It did not establish freedom from arbitrary arrest, or the 
right of representation of the people to control taxation, or trial by- 
jury, or other conceptions of a later generation." ^ 

Nevertheless, the recognition of rights in all classes who com- 
posed the nation, though vague and incidental, was integral to the 
compact, differentiated it from earlier treaties, and gave it the char- 
acter which has accounted for its traditional influence. As a treaty 
between the King and the Nation, it assumes that the regal office is 
one of responsibility rather than of privilege. It differed from earlier 
charters in its greater fullness of detail and in its provision for a body 
of barons to enforce its observance. It benefited the Commons of 
the realm by binding the Barons to treat their dependents as it bound 
the King to treat the Barons. Of its sixty-three articles several 
provided securities for personal freedom. One of its most important 
provisions was: "No freeman shall be seized, or imprisoned, or dis- 
possessed, or outlawed, or in any way brought to ruin: we will not 
go against any man, nor send against him, save by legal judgment of 
his peers or by the law of the land." Another reads: "To no man 
will we sell, or deny, or delay, right or justice." The Charter was 
explicit in asserting the rights of freemen and confirmed many of 
the judicial and administrative changes introduced by Henry II, 
none being more important than those relating to courts. The special 
evils of the reign of John were connected with his constant exactions. 
To prevent recurrence of these, the Charter included the provision 
upon which the English constitutional system rests: "No scutage 
or aid shall be imposed in our realm save by the common council of 
the realm"; and to this Great Council all bishops and barons were 
to be summoned. There was to be free justice for all men; and special 
provisions protected the poor. Conviction by the courts was never 
to involve deprivation of the means of livelihood; under-tenants 
were protected as well as the greater vassals; towns were assured 
enjoyment of municipal privileges, freedom from arbitrary taxation, 
public discussion, free justice and regulation of trade. Vague pro- 
visions of older grants were made more explicit in the Runnimede 
Charter, so that it marks the transition from the age of traditional 
rights, preserved by memory and by custom, to the age of written 
legislation and parliamentary supremacy. - 

The Great Charter was, with some changes, reaffirmed by Henry III 
and Edward I, as well as by later sovereigns. In the political con- 
troversies of the seventeenth century it was much quoted in England, 
and in those of the eighteenth century both in England and in America. 
Yet, though a notable landmark in the history of constitutional gov- 
ernment, it must not be isolated from its context, nor accorded a 
place wholly apart from other documents of the same character, all 
equally part of the history of progressively realized freedom. 

1 Enc. Brit., 11th ed., Art. Magna Charta. 

2 See text in Stubbs; Select Charters, comments in Stubbs: Constitutional History of England. 
Cf. Green: Short History; Chap. 111:3. 



41 



CHAPTER VIII 

HUNGARY — The Golden Bull, great charter of Hungary — Confirmation of 
class privileges, vague as to general rights 

8. Hungary. The constitutional history of Hungary is in 
many ways analogous to that of England, and in no detail more 
strikingly so than in its possession of a charter which is regarded as 
the cornerstone of its constitutional liberties. Seven years after 
King John of England was forced to concede the Great Charter to 
his barons, King Andrew II of Hungary was also forced to grant a 
charter, extorted from him by nobles who may well have been in- 
fluenced by the English precedent. This was the "Golden Bull" 
of 1222, so-called from the golden box which protected the seal, 
often described as "the Magna Carta of Hungary." Like the Eng- 
lish charter, it professed to confirm ancient rights, restoring to the 
nobles "parts of their liberties as established by King St. Stephen." 
St. Stephen, first King of Hungary (997-1038), appointed "Apostolic 
King" by Pope Sylvester II, had made many wise provisions for his 
people. His character is indicated by the advice he gave his son. 
Think of the nobles "as fathers and brothers. Neither call them 
nor make them servants. Let them combat for thee, but not serve 
thee. Rule over them peaceably, humbly, and gently, without 
anger, pride or envy, bearing in mind that all men are equal, that 
nothing exalts more than humility, nor is there anything more de- 
grading than pride and envy." ^ The reign of Stephen inaugurates 
the first period of Hungarian history, an heroic period during which 
foreign foes were repelled and domestic uprisings repressed. This 
was followed by a second, during which kings and nobles fought, the 
royal power decaying and the nobles becoming secure in their power. 
Then came a third period during which the nobles were the scourge 
of the nation, defying alike king and the law. 

The Golden Bull marks the end of the second period, its impor- 
tance consisting less in immediate results, which strengthened the 
nobles against the king, than in the standard which it suggested for 
the future. Its provisions were as follows: The King should not 
bestow favors on foreigners to the deprivation of his subjects; he 
should not permit avaricious nobles to hold more offices than they 
could administer; he should protect nobles in their ancient immuni- 
ties, from taxation, from arbitrary arrest, from 'exactions, from ser- 
vice abroad; they should be free to dispose of property and in their 
persons; tax-gatherers should be chosen from among them, while 
"Ishmaelites and Jews" were to be dismissed; counties and state 
dignities should not be granted in perpetuity; estates granted to the 

' Quoted in Vambery: Hungary (Story of Nations). 

42 



injury of the realm should be revoked; everything opposed to these 
privileges should be brought to an end; and on St. Stephen's Day 
should be convoked a diet to hear complaints and defend the liberties 
of the nation. "We therefore," covenanted King Andrew, "as in 
duty bound, desirous of satisfying our nobles, request, grant to them, 
as well as to other inhabitants of the realm, the liberty granted by 
the sacred King . . . Should we, or any of our successors, at any 
time be disposed to infringe upon any of our orders, the bishops, as 
well as other lords and nobles of the realm shall be at liberty, jointly 
or singly, by virtue of this letter, to oppose and contradict us and 
our successors forever, without incurring the penalty of treason." ^ 

The Golden Bull aimed directly at strengthening the greater 
nobles against the crown by legalizing not only ancient rights but 
also recent usurpations. Indirectly it strengthened the crown in 
that it enlisted the support of the lesser nobles, endangered by the 
increased power of the great nobles; and it protected the monarchy 
against "the momentary folly or weakness of the king."'- More- 
over, the titles and estates of the lord-lieutenants of counties were 
not to be hereditary, and those who abused office were to be de- 
graded, "thus attacking feudalism at the roots." Yet the confirma- 
tion of privileges to the nobles was more striking than any limitation 
of them. In 1231 the privileges were somewhat amplified. The 
actual influence of the Bull during the period which ensued was 
slight, notwithstanding the support given by the greater nobility. 
Later, however, it came to be regarded as the foundation of national 
liberties, and was formally ratified at the coronation of Habsburg 
Kings. This was in all probability because of the claim that it was 
the safeguard for "all the inhabitants of the realm" of "the liberty 
granted by the sacred King." 

These events belong to the great thirteenth century, notable for 
achievements in thought no less than in action, among other things 
for striking statements of the principles of political science. Lord 
Acton '^ summarizes the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, which he 
describes as "language which contains the earliest exposition of the 
Whig theory of the Revolution . . . written at the very moment 
when Simon de Montfort summoned the Commons (1265), and 
showing that the politics of the Neapolitan friar are centuries in 
advance of the English statesmen." "A king who is unfaithful to 
his duty forfeits his claim to obedience. It is not rebellion to depose 
him, for he is himself a rebel whom the nation has a right to put 
down. But it is better to abridge his power, that he may be unable 
to abuse it. For this purpose, the whole nation ought to have a 
share in governing itself; the constitution ought to combine a limited 
and elective monarchy, with an aristocracy of merit, and such an 
admixture of democracy as shall admit all classes to office by popular 
election. No government has a right to levy taxes beyond the limit 

1 Vambery: Hungary, p. 128. 

2 Andrassy: Development of Hungarian Constitutional Liberty, Eng. Trans., London, 1908, p. 93; 
Knatchbull-Hugessen: Political Evolution of the Hungarian Nation, London, 1908. Vol. I: pp. 26ff. 
Cf. Enc. Brit., 11th ed.. Art. Hungary. 

' Essays on Freedom, p. 37. 

43 



determined by the people. All political authority is derived from 
popular suffrage, and all laws must be made by the people or their 
representatives. There is no security for us as long as we depend on 
the will of another man." ' Similar teaching is to be found in the 
Defensor Pads of Marsiglio of Padua (1270-1342), Rector of the 
University of Paris and counsellor of the Emperor Lewis of Bavaria. 
"Laws derive their authority from the nation and are invalid with- 
out its assent. ... In obeying laws to which all men have agreed, 
all men in reality govern themselves. The monarch ... is 
responsibile to the nation, and subject to the law; and the nation 
that appoints him and assigns him his duties, has to see that he obeys 
the constitution, and has to dismiss him if he breaks it. The rights 
of the citizens are independent of the faith they profess; and no man 
may be punished for his religion." These modern sounding senti- 
ments were expressed in the year 1324. They serve as illustration 
of how much modern political philosophy is inherited from the 
mediaeval world. 

1 St. Thomas deals with the responsibility of rulers and the advantages of distribution of auth- 
ority in Sunima I-II, Qu. 105, Art. 1. This passage supports most of the statements given above. 
Summa I-II, Qu. 97, Art. 3, implies the necessity of the "consent of the governed." Cf. II Sent. Dist. 44, 
Qu. 2, Art. 2. Summa I-II, Qu. 90, Art. 1 and Qu. 96, Art. 4, deal with the equity of law and assert 
the principle, without specific reference, of equitable taxation. The right of rebellion against tyrants 
is implied in various places, e.g., II Sent. Dist. 44, Qu. 2, Art. 2, I, De Regimine Principum, Ca.p. 6 
(end), and Lect. I on Romans XIII. For the last two sentences given by Acton the writer can learn 
of no authority. 



44 



CHAPTER IX 

NETHERLANDS— Municipal freedom in Low Countries— Dutch War of 
Independence — Holland and Belgium 

9. Netherlands. The history of chartered freedom is closely 
associated with the history of cities, as has been shown in the in- 
stances of Italy and Spain. One gauge of progress in Europe is the 
regard shown for municipal rights. These were often an inheritance 
from the Roman Empire, as in the cases of Marseilles, Nismes, and 
other cities in south France, of Milan and Pisa, of Coblenz, Bonn and 
Cologne, of London, York, and Exeter. Cities originate in all sorts 
of ways, from ancient Roman custom, from the privilege of trading- 
guilds, in communities adjacent to a palace, a monastery, or a castle, 
in great centers of trade, from the will of a benevolent ruler, from 
mutual agreements among citizens, or from mere copying of customs 
observed elsewhere.^ No part of Europe affords more important 
examples of these than the Netherlands, where municipal growth is 
the outstanding feature of their history during the twelfth and thir- 
teenth centuries. 

A place was not regarded as a city unless it had received a charter 
or statutes from the sovereign or feudal lord. The charters were 
treaties between the community and the lord, guaranteeing fixed 
dues to the lord and rights to the municipality similar to those of a 
manor. They differed in character in accordance with the impor- 
tance of the place, or the degree of pressure brought to bear upon the 
sovereign or lord, some granting but a few privileges, others estab- 
lishing little republics. The extent of the rights granted determined 
the status of the community as commune or free city. 

To communes were granted privileges relating to administration 
of justice, taxation, rights of inheritance, the use of wood and water. 
They elected magistrates of their own, usually through the medium 
of influential families known as "patricians"; and these magistrates 
served under a justiciary or bailiff, who represented the feudal lord. 
The bailiff presided over the courts, commanded the municipal levies 
in time of war, and with the magistrates appointed a body of council- 
lors, whose presidents, burgomasters, supervised the communal 
finances. These municipalities were semi-independent feudatories 
in a feudal state, governed by oligarchies. The most important of 
the type were Ghent, Bruges, Ypres in Flanders, Antwerp, Brussels, 
Louvain and Malines in Brabant, Liege, Huy and Dinant in Liege. 
In the Flemish cities the oligarchic form of government speedily 
gave way to a democratic. The organized trade-guilds ousted the 

1 Blok: History of the Netherlands, Chapter XIV on "The Rise of Cities." Cf. Thorold Rogers: 
Holland (Story of the Nations), p. 14. 

45 



patricians from power; and their victory at the battle of Courtrai 
in 1302 secured the triumph of the democratic principle. There 
was little difference between many communes in their later develop- 
ments and the free cities.^ 

The free city was usually distinguished by having its own admin- 
istration of justice independent of a seigniorial bailiff, by having a 
government of its own devising, and by exemption from the judicial 
dues and certain forms of taxation.'- Both free cities and communes 
depended on the co-operation of the citizens, who were banded to sup- 
port their rights and, when necessary, to extort recognition of them 
from a reluctant lord. 

Only a few charters dating from the twelfth century have been 
preserved. They varied greatly. Some were detailed, others short 
and concise; some give clear accounts of the municipal organization, 
others only vague and general references; some give laws in detail, 
others only specify fines; some are intentionally obscure, others 
admit of no differences in interpretation; some carefully restrict 
privileges, others establish republics. As a rule, the legal relations of 
the citizens and the financial privileges of the lord are most clearly 
defined. The community in its relation to the lord stood on a footing 
with his chief vassals, the city-magistrates performing for him ser- 
vices rendered elsewhere by the lesser nobility. Certain privileges 
were granted to communities which had earlier been the prerogative 
of the greater vassals. Not all citizens of a commune were free; all 
of them contained serfs, who only gained freedom after a period of 
undisputed residence, usually a year and a day.'' 

The development of the Flemish communes represented the 
growth of power in the commercial classes, since industry and trade 
had made Flanders one of the richest possessions in the world. In 
Utrecht, Geldersland and Friesland, the municipalities followed 
the model of the free cities of the Rhine. Various German cities, 
notably Mainz, Worms and Spires, had been practically self-govern- 
ing, and had added to their power by the formation of leagues. The 
most important of these was the Rhenish Confederation, formed in 
1254, and the Hanseatic League, a loose, but effective, federation of 
towns in north Germany, formed for the protection of trade. This 
municipal co-operation was an important factor in the development 
of the sense of nationality, and had its influence on the Netherlands. 

No municipalities were more influential than the Flemish, which 
rose to the height of their power under Jacques von Artevelde of 
Ghent, 1285-1345, after whose downfall their strength was under- 
mined by mutual jealousies. During the centuries that followed 
they were to learn lessons of self-restraint and co-operation and to 
afford a striking example of an effective confederacy. Under Philip 
the Good, Duke of Burgundy, they had reached' the full enjoyment 
of their chartered liberties and their greatest prosperity. To Mary of 
Burgundy, daughter of Charles the Bold, the last Duke, who became 



1 Enc. Brit., 11th ed., Art. Netherlands. 

2 Blok, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 222. 

3 Blok, op. cit., I pp. 223f, 26, 247. 



46 



wife of Maximilian of Austria and grandmother of Charles V, they 
owed the "Great Privilege" (1478), their Magna Carta, a constitu- 
tion which later they fought to preserve. This provided that offices 
should be filled by Netherlanders only; that the Great Council and 
Supreme Court should be re-established; that cities and estates should 
hold diets when they chose; that no new taxes should be imposed 
without consent; that no war should be undertaken without consent 
of the estates; that the language of the people should be used in 
public and legal documents; that the seat of government should be 
at The Hague; that the estates alone should regulate currency; that 
the sovereign should appear before the estates in person when sup- 
plies were required; that citizens should be protected from arbitrary 
imprisonment. This constitution was the fullest and freest which, 
by the fifteenth century, had been proposed to any people; it raised 
standards of government which the Netherlands never relinquished. 

Ten years after the Great Privilege was granted, it was revoked 
by Maximilian, acting as guardian for his son Philip. It was Philip 
who, by marriage with the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, 
brought the Netherlands under the rule of Spain. Charles V, born 
in Ghent, understood the Netherlanders and administered their 
affairs fairly to their satisfaction. Not so his son, Philip II, under 
whom the Netherlands came to hate Spanish rule, especially after 
the introduction of the Inquisition. The struggle of the Netherlands 
against Spain was partly to secure civil, partly to secure religious, 
freedom. 

In 1566, the lesser nobility of the Low Countries, by an act called 
"the Compromise," bound themselves to protect one another against 
persecution and to extirpate the Inquisition from the land. William 
the Silent, Prince of Orange, their leader and a Catholic, became a 
Protestant after marriage, and was always seeking religious tolera- 
tion. The Netherlands were in a position of peculiar difficulty. 
Catholicism was, for the time being, identified with the Spanish 
Inquisition, Protestantism with violent Calvinists and fanatical 
iconoclasts, who alienated sympathy from "reform" and intensified 
the persecuting zeal of Philip. Calvinist influence eventually pre- 
vailed in the north Netherlands, now Holland; Catholicism was 
never overthrown in the south Netherlands, now Belgium. Yet 
those who differed in religion had similar political interests; and the 
history of eighty years exhibits the curious interplay of conflicting 
motives. 

In 1572, the cities of Holland and Zealand declared their inde- 
pendence of Spain, and four years later united by an Act of Federa- 
tion. On November 8, 1576, was signed the "Pacification of Ghent," 
an agreement between the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands 
under leadership of William of Orange to remain at peace and to 
force the departure of the Spanish forces. It arranged for a repre- 
sentative assembly to regulate common affairs and matters con- 
cerning religion. 1 There was to be toleration of both Catholics 

1 Blok, op. cit., Ill, p. 105-28. 

47 



and Protestants; and, although the Spanish King was recognized as 
de jure sovereign, the Prince of Orange was to have full power as 
governor of Holland and Zealand. "The Union of Brussels," exten- 
sively signed, bound its signatories to carry out the "Pacification," 
and to maintain such charters and constitutions as Philip at his 
accession had promised to observe. Philip accepted the "Pacifica- 
tion" in a "Perpetual Edict," but did not keep his promises. In 
December, 1576, all the provinces except Luxemburg sent delegates 
to the States General, and eventually forced Philip's viceroy to 
accept the "Pacification." The Spanish troops evacuated the Nether- 
lands in 1577; and the Prince of Orange was accepted as leader in the 
south as well as north. William aimed at toleration; but both Cath- 
olics and Calvinists were opposed. Religious freedom for north and 
south respectively was only to be secured by separation. 

The League of Arras, January 5, 1579, occasioned by the violence 
of Calvinists in Ghent, bound the provinces of Hainault, Artois and 
Douay to protect the Catholic religion, and to obey the King if he 
observed the provisions of "the Union of Brussels." The southern 
provinces had to acquiesce in Spanish rule to escape Calvinist per- 
secution. On January 29, the northern provinces adopted the "Union 
of Utrecht," whereby they bound themselves to maintain all liberties 
against foreign tyranny and to grant complete religious freedom. 
Calvinist biogtry, however, did not permit William to protect Cath- 
olics in the northern provinces. It was found impossible to adopt a 
common religious policy. From 1579, with one brief interval, the 
northern and southern Netherlands have pursued separate destinies, 
eventually becoming separate states as Holland and Belgium. There 
has been nevertheless much political co-operation. 

In 1581, representatives of both north and south signed the "Act 
of Abjuration," a declaration of independence of Spain, which was 
issued at The Hague. By this William of Orange was proclaimed 
sovereign of Holland, while the southern provinces were nominally 
subject to the French Duke of Anjou. This document is of great 
importance. It represents the inauguration of the Dutch Republic, 
which was the first appeal to the people at large on matters concern- 
ing the rights and functions of rulers. "The Dutch were the first to 
justify their action by an appeal to the first principles of justice." ^ 
Then followed a long period of war. Dutch independence was not 
recognized until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, from which date 
the people of Holland were free to work out their own destinies. The 
southern provinces had a longer history of dependence. The short 
recognition of the Duke of Anjou was followed by the rule of "arch- 
dukes" until 1633, when the provinces reverted to Spanish rule as 
"the Spanish Netherlands." The peace of 1648 gave all advantages 
to the United Provinces of the north, especially injuring the southern 
provinces by closing the Scheldt, ruining Antwerp and cutting the 
Belgic provinces from the ocean. The Spanish rule, always detri- 
mental, ended in 1713, when the Belgic provinces were ceded to 

1 Blok, op. cit., Ill, p. 107. 

48 



Austria. Only after more than a century of checkered experiences 
did they finally gain powers of self-determination by the formation 
of the modern Kingdom of Belgium. 

The Netherlands, both north and south, have made important 
contributions to the development of free institutions under the in- 
fluence of democratic ideals. They have exhibited warning examples 
of disastrous regard for purely local interests, but at the same time 
inspiring examples of sturdy self-reliance, of thrift and industry in 
hard-working communities, and of firm religious convictions seeking 
to reconcile the claims of truth and charity. 



49 



CHAPTER X 

ENGLAND — Parliamentary victory over Stuart kings — Victory for respons- 
ible and representative government — Locke 

10. England. The seventeenth century saw a conflict in England 
between the Parliament and the Stuart sovereigns, whereby there 
came to be clearer assertion of the responsibility of rulers, and of 
the supreme authority of the representative assembly. Opposition 
to attempts on the part of James I to perpetuate the autocratic 
practices of his Tudor predecessors grew under Charles I into rebellion. 
For a time the monarchy was overthrown; Charles II was restored 
on conditions; James II was expelled for failing to observe them; 
under William III was inaugurated the modern constitutional 
monarchy. The most significant phases of the controversy are repre- 
sented by the contests under Charles I over the "Petition of Right" 
and "ship-money," and by the revolution of 1688. 

The Petition of Right was a statute of 1625 in which, as against 
tyrannical acts of the King, Parliament made a declaration of certain 
liberties of the people. To raise money for war against France Charles 
levied a forced loan upon his subjects, which many, including men 
of high rank, refused to pay. Those who refused were imprisoned; 
and the King attempted to enforce his will by martial law, billeting 
soldiers in private houses against the will of the owners. Parliament, 
following the lead of Wentworth, sought to end the popular grievances 
and to prevent their repetition by its Petition of Right. This de- 
nounced forced loans, called "benevolences," compulsory employ- 
ment abroad, illegal imprisonment, compulsory billeting, and proc- 
lamation of martial law in time of peace. Of the rights thus im- 
plicitly claimed the most significant were freedom from illegal taxa- 
tion and freedom from illegal imprisonment. The former was in- 
volved in the whole controversy over ship-money, the latter in all 
discussions of writs of habeas corpus. 

These writs, of which there were various kinds, afforded a remedy 
against the violation of personal liberty. "From the earliest records 
of English law, no freeman could be detained in prison except upon 
criminal charges or conviction or for a civil debt. In the former 
case, it was always in his power to demand of the Court of the King's 
Bench a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, directed to the 
person detaining him in custody, by which he was enjoined to bring 
up the body of the prisoner with a warrant of commitment, that the 
court might judge of its sufficiency, and remand the party, admit him 
to bail, or discharge him, according to the nature of the charge. The 
writ issued of right and could not be refused by the court. "^ Writs 

1 Hallam: Constitutional History, 12th edition: Vol. Ill, chapter 13; cf. Vol. I, p. 384, and Vol. II, 
p. 98. 

50 



of habeas corpus thus provided that there could be no imprison- 
ment without legal proof of its justice, thus enforcing the provision 
of the Great Charter, "No freeman may be taken or imprisoned but 
by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." By 
the seventeenth century the writ was fully established as the appro- 
priate process for checking illegal imprisonment; it now acquired 
new force and importance by legislation. The history of these writs 
is to be connected with every form of guarantee of the personal lib- 
erty of freeman and is recognized in Roman law in the forty-third 
Pandect of Justinian. 

In 1627, King Charles, sustained by his judges, maintained that 
the King's command, signified through his Privy Council, was suffi- 
cient reason for imprisonment, and sufficient reply to the demand 
for proof made by a habeas corpus writ. The Commons passed 
resolutions to the contrary; the Petition of Right protested against 
such imprisonments as illegal; legislation in 1640 assumed the validity 
of habeas corpus writs against royal warrants for arrest; and the 
discussions led eventually under Charles II to the Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1679, wherein procedure was defined by which there might be 
enforcement of the acknowledged right. ^ The importance of this 
legislation lay not in any new assertion of principle, but in new assur- 
ances that a principle long recognized would be translated into prac- 
tice. Ubi jus, ibi remedium. In the earlier stages of the con- 
troversy, King Charles I found himself compelled to grant the whole 
Petition of Right, in spite of special efforts to maintain his prerog- 
ative to imprison without assigning cause, since in no other way could 
he secure necessary grants of money.- 

No less significant than the controversy touching writs of habeas 
corpus was the conflict between King and Parliament over "ship- 
money."^ Plantagenet kings had established the precedent of requir- 
ing the maritime towns to furnish ships in time of war, or to commute 
the liability by a money-payment. Notwithstanding statutes of 
Edward I and Edward III which declared it illegal for the crown to 
tax without consent of Parliament, the prerogative of demanding 
ship-money had never fallen wholly into abeyance. There had been 
recent instances. In 1619, James I had demanded, and received, 
forty thousand pounds from London, eighty-five hundred pounds 
from other seaports. Charles himself also had, in his first years, in this 
way raised money for a fleet. In so doing he had exercised a tradi- 
tional right of the crown. He now strained this mediaeval precedent 
beyond warrant by demanding ship-money not only from coast-towns, 
but from every county in England; and by his repeated demands showed 
that he was resorting to this custom, intended to meet special emer- 
gencies, as cloak for regular taxation of his subjects without necessity 
of reference to Parliament. The necessity of some counterpose to the 
growing navies of France and Holland gave a plausible pretext. In 
1628, he called for one hundred and seventy-three thousand pounds 

1 Enc. Brit., 11th ed., Art. HabeasCorpus. Cf. Dicey: Law of the Constitution, 6th ed., p. 195. 

2 Gardiner: History of England, Longmans, 1901, Chap. LXIII, esp. Vol. VI, pp. 236, 275. 

3 Hallam: Constitutional History, 12th ed.. Vol. II, Chapter 8. 

51 



for protection against possible invasion by the French; and again in 
1634 made a similar demand to meet Dutch aggression. In spite of 
his having assessed all England, there was no objection made on 
constitutional grounds; and one hundred and four thousand pounds 
was collected. The following year he demanded twice this sum, to 
be levied against personal as well as real property, and a year later 
further sums still. There was now much opposition, since it was 
quite plain that the old restrictions had been swept away, and that 
Charles was trying to convert ship-money into a direct tax by royal 
authority. The refusal of John Hampden to pay the tax in 1638 
brought the matter before the courts. The judges sustained the 
King as having exercised a lawful prerogative and condemned Hamp- 
den; but the arguments used by Hampden made a deep impression, 
"and almost every man in England who was called upon to pay the 
tax looked upon the King as a wrongdoer under forms of law." ^ 
The judges, in sustaining this exercise of the prerogative, had prac- 
tically abrogated the right of Parliament to control supply and had 
upheld the principle of arbitrary taxation by the crown. But all 
England was set to thinking of the relation in matters of public 
policy of the personal will of the king to the interests of his subjects. 
In 1639, Charles again demanded a large sum of ship-money, and 
did not receive it. In 1641, Parliament declared ship-money illegal, 
and annulled the judgment against Hampden. The victory of Parlia- 
ment over Charles preserved popular freedom against royal aggres- 
sion. In spite of his personal virtues, Charles aimed at being an 
irresponsible monarch, reflecting the character of his romantic and 
ill-starred race. The reaction against his autocracy which resulted 
in the Puritan Commonwealth revealed dangers against freedom 
from an irresponsible parliament and irresponsible military. The 
regime of Cromwell, influenced by Independency, favored pure 
democracy in both Church and State; and yet in its pursuit of equality 
rather than liberty, and its examples of tyranny by demagogues, it 
exhibits many analogies to the French Revolution. England even- 
tually sought to preserve popular freedom by such balance of powers 
as exists in its limited monarchy. 

The history of Charles I repeated itself in that of James II. Again 
the majority of the nation arrayed themselves against an arbitrary 
ruler; again by a "Declaration" and "Bill of Rights" Parliament 
made itself the nation's mouthpiece.'- They rehearsed the arbitrary 
acts of King James, and then asserted that, in accordance with the 
ancient liberties of England, the "dispensing power" (from the opera- 
tion of laws) claimed by the King had no legal existence; that no 
money was to be exacted without consent of Parliament; that sub- 
jects had the right of petition; of free debate; of choosing their repre- 
sentatives in Parliament; and of enjoying a pure and merciful admin- 
istration of justice. The Prince of Orange was chosen King to ensure 
the inauguration of constitutional monarchy. 

This revolution of 1688, "the greatest thing done by the English 

1 Enc. Brit., 11th ed.. Art. English Hist. 

■ Statutes of the Realm, V pp. 24f ; and VI pp. 142-145. 

52 



nation," established the State upon a contract. Parliament assumed 
the right to grant the crown on conditions, and to recall the grant , 

from a sovereign who failed to observe them; it became supreme in | 

administration as well as in legislation, on the supposition that it 
most truly represented the nation as a whole and could best preserve 
the general interests. Yet, during most of the century that followed, 
the rule of a Whig oligarchy obviously failed to secure the best possible 
enjoyment of popular rights. Various classes in England continued 
to be the victims of intolerable social conditions: Ireland and the 
colonies obtained scant justice. There is much pertinence in a com- 
ment of Defoe's: "For the divine right of kings was established the 
divine right of freeholders, whose domination extended for seventy 
years." 

England was ruled by a Whig oligarchy; but its political philoso- I 

phers formulated the principles of democracy. "As Hobbes (in his 
Leviathan) reflected the spirit of the Puritan Revolution, Locke 
expounded the principles of the Revolution of 1688; and his writings 
became the political bible of the following century": "his chief 
influence was in popularizing a convenient formula for enforcing the 
responsibility of governors." ^ Locke's positive philosophy was 
contained in his Second Treatise on Government which appeared 
in 1690. 

The gist of Locke's teaching, which may be taken as typical of 
the best political thought in western Europe, is contained in such 
passages as the following. In "the State of Nature," men are in a 
condition of "perfect Freedom to order their Actions and dispose of 
their Possessions and Persons as they think fit within the Bounds of 
the Laws of Nature."- Nevertheless, "a State of Liberty is not a 
State of License."'' "(Liberty) has a Law to govern it which obliges 
every one, and Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind who 
will but consult it, that being equal and independent, no one ought 
to harm another in his Life, Health, Property or Possessions."^ 
"Men being by Nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can 
be put out of this State, and subjected to the political Power of an- 
other without his own Consent." ' In government, "the Legislative 
is the supreme Power"; ^ yet "these are the Bounds which the Trust 
that is put in them by the Society, and the Law of God and Nature, 
have set to the Legislative Power of every Commonwealth in all 
Forms of Government. First, They are to govern by promulgated, 
established Lav^s, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have 
one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the Favourite at Court and the 
Countryman at Plough. Secondly, These Laws also ought to be 
designed for no other End ultimately but the Good of the People. 
Thirdly, They must not raise Taxes on the Property of the 
People without the Consent of the People, given by themselves 

1 Leslie Stephen: English Thought in the ISth Century, Vol. II, pp. 135 and 147. 

2 Second Treatise on Government, Sec. 4. The numbers in the following notes refer to sections in 
this Treatise. 

^ Section 6. 
^ Section 6. 

5 Section 95, 95 cf. 119. 

6 Sections 135-142, cf. 150. 

53 



or their Deputies. . . . Fourthly, The Legislative neither can, 
nor must, transfer the Power of making Laws to anybody 
else, or place it anywhere but where the People have." ^ The Ex- 
ecutive is dependent on the Legislative, and over them both "there 
remains still in the People a superior Power to remove or alter the 
Legislative, when they find the Legislative act contrary to the Trust 
reposed in them."- "Prerogative can be nothing but the People's 
permitting their Rulers to do several things of their own free Choice 
where the Laws are silent,"^ "a Power in the Hands of the Prince 
for the public Good." ** "Whosoever in Authority exceeds the 
Power given him by the Law, and makes Use of the Powers under 
his Command, to compass that upon the Subject which the Law 
allows not, ceases to be a Magistrate; and, acting without Authority, 
may be opposed as much as any other Man, who by Force invades 
the Rights of others." '" "Whenever the Legislative endeavour to 
take away and destroy the Property of the People, or to reduce them 
to Slavery, under arbitrary Powers, they put themselves into a State 
of War with the People, who are therefore absolved from further 
Obedience, and are left to the common Refuge which God hath pro- 
vided for all Men against Force and Violence." '^ "Tyranny is the 
Exercise of Power beyond Right" ;^ and those oppressed "have not 
only the Right to get out of it, but to prevent it." ^ 

Locke more clearly than anyone else of his time gave expression 
to the theory of the natural rights of man and of the social compact 
as basis of political institutions. This theory, overlying a stratum of 
Old Testament teaching, as interpreted by the Puritan Revolution, 
deeply affected the eighteenth century history of England; it was 
also destined to play a decisive part in the history of America. 



1 Section 142. 

2 Section 149. 

3 Section 164. 

4 Section 158. 

5 Chapter XIX. 
« Section 222. 

" Section 199. 
s Section 220. 



54 



CHAPTER XI 

AMERICA — Latest and typical achievements — Declaration of Independ- 
ence and Constitution analyzed 

11. America. In the struggle for American independence 
efforts of many ages and many lands seemed to reach a climax. Not 
that America has solved all problems of liberty, but that by common 
consent American achievements represent as high a plane of political 
stability as has been yet attained. The American revolution gained 
more for humanity than the French, in which the interests of liberty 
were sacrified to a fanatical doctrine of equality. America has origi- 
nated no political philosophy, nor has she monopolized the fruits of 
modern progress: yet the New World has plainly given the best 
opportunities for applying the best wisdom and experience of the Old. 

The Declaration of Independence. In analyzing the political 
development of America it is scarcely possible to exaggerate the in- 
fluence of Locke. His philosophy was vigorously applied to American 
problems by James Otis and others before the publication of Rous- 
seau's Contrat Social: it underlays the teaching of Montesquieu, 
much read by Americans, even the doctrine of the separation of powers 
for which Montesquieu is best known. American pamphlets show 
little trace of French influence, though, in quoting authority, they 
frequently give chapter and verse from Locke. Interest may have 
been roused by Locke's frequent allusion to America, where he sought 
something approximating "the State of Nature." "In the Begin- 
ning all the World was America, and more so than it is now." Even 
Jefferson, later influenced by French ideas, simply summarizes Locke 
in the preamble of his Declaration. "We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all Men are created equal; that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights; that among these 
are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness; that to secure these 
Rights Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
Powers from the Consent of the governed; that whenever any Form 
of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, if is the Right of 
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new Govern- 
ment, laying its Foundations on such Principles and organizing its 
Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect 
their Safety and Happiness." ^ 

Hence the Americans renounced their allegiance to King George 
III, whose record exhibited "a History of repeated Injuries and 
Usurpations, all having in direct Object the Establishment of an 
absolute Tyranny in these States." Accepting the definition, "Tyr- 
anny is the Exercise of Power beyond Right," they judged George III 

1 Friedenwald: Declaration of Independence, New York, 1904, Chapter on "Philosophy of the 
Declaration," esp. pp. 195f. 

55 



by standards avowed by his predecessors. "The righteous and just 
King," declared James I, "doth acknowledge himself to be ordained 
for the procuring of the Wealth and Property of his People. . . . 
The Difference between a King and a Tyrant consists only in this, 
That one makes the Laws the Bounds of his Power and the Good of 
the Publick the End of his Government; the other makes all give 
way to his own Will and Appetite." Even Charles I had on one 
occasion assured Parliament that "the People's Liberties strengthen 
the King's Prerogative, since the King's Prerogative is to defend the 
People's Liberties." George III was trying to rule America for the 
benefit of certain classes in Great Britain: Americans insisted that 
their own good was the only legitimate object of his rule. That was 
the issue of the American Revolutionary War. Was America to be 
ruled with a sole view to the good of its citizens or not? 

The salient point of dispute was Parliament's right to tax. "Tax- 
ation without representation," according to English precedent and 
authority, was tyranny. The matter of taxation on tea was com- 
paratively trivial; the actual arrangement proposed would have 
given Americans unusually cheap tea: but the question of principle 
involved was vital. Although the question of taxation was most 
mooted, this grievance was only one of twenty-seven enumerated in 
the Declaration; and the dispute in regard to economic and adminis- 
trative details quickly resolved themselves into principles. The 
Americans refused to recognize the authority of Parliament in which 
they were not represented; and when the sovereign identified himself 
with the policy of his ministers, they renounced at last their allegiance 
to the king. The stand they took was the outcome of long experi- 
ence. "American law was the growth of necessity, not the wisdom 
of individuals. It was not an acquisition from abroad; it was begotten 
from the American mind, of which it was the natural and inevitable, 
but also the slow and gradual, development." ^ 

The American colonies had long been left to themselves, and had 
of necessity evolved systems of self-government. In the several 
colonies similar conditions had produced similar results. They 
acknowledged allegiance to the English crown which had granted 
their colonial charters; yet actual government rested in their local 
representative bodies, vestries, town meetings, colonial assemblies. 
The British Parliament, which had long exploited the West Indies 
for the benefit of British trade, was late in recognizing the potential 
wealth of the American settlements. When it turned its attention 
to questions of control, there was nothing new in its proposed colonial 
policies; but there was no precedent for applying them to America. 
The mercantile system which had sprung up in Spain in the sixteenth 
century held that colonies should be prohibited from trading except 
with the mother-country. Every European state had adopted this 
view; and the acquisition of fresh colonial dominions by England in 
1763 had been made chiefly for the extension of trade. Of all the 
English colonies, the American had become the most populous and 

1 Bancroft: History of the United States, 8 vol. ed., Boston, 1864; Vol. VII, p. 354. 

56 



important. ' Their proximity to the Spanish colonies had led to con- 
traband trade, which George Grenville, as prime-minister, tried to 
stop. His measures were disliked in America; yet there was acqui- 
escence in the assumption that colonial trade should be regulated in 
accordance with the interests of the mother-country. 

But Grenville proceeded further to tax the colonies without their 
consent, claiming that the colonies must thus provide funds for 
their own defense, and that Parliament, as the supreme legislature, 
must determine to what extent. Hence the stamp-tax of 1765. The 
Americans, supported by influential men in England, denied the 
right of taxation by a body in which they were not represented, 
urging that the only parliaments having authority to tax them were 
their respective colonial assemblies. All attempts at compromise 
failed. Townshend, prime-minister in 1767, continued the policy 
of Grenville, which was eventually espoused by George III and 
Lord North. The question had been clearly raised. Were the colonies 
to govern themselves according to their own best interests; or were 
these to be sacrificed to class-interests in the mother-country? The 
King, determined to suppress rebellion by force, was supported by 
the prejudices of most Englishmen, who were for the most part con- 
temptuous towards colonials, and naturally willing to shift burdens 
of taxation to other shoulders.^ 

The Americans and their friends were quite clear as to the issues 
involved. "Government by consent of the governed" meant govern- 
ment in the interests of the governed. They were firmly convinced 
that "Salus Populi, suprema Lex is certainly so just and funda- 
mental a Rule, that he who sincerely follows it cannot dangerously 
err." ^ When, therefore, they saw no hope for protection of their 
rights and interests under British rule, they declared independence, 
and in the war that followed won it. "The motive was empire on 
one side and self-government on the other. It was a question between 
liberty and authority, government by consent and government by 
force, control of the subject by the State and control of the State by 
the subject." ^ 

' Enc. Brit., 11th ed., Art. English History. 

- Locke: Second Treatise on Government, Sec. 158. 

3 Acton: Lectures on Modern History, Macmillan, 1906, p. 308. 



57 



CHAPTER XII 

THE COURSE OF HISTORY— Intermittence in progress, yet unmistakable 
gains — Necessity of first principles as contained in the Christian law 

The Constitution. The American declaration of wrongs, in- 
tended as a justification to the world, contained an indication of 
principles on which free government rests; yet the chief American 
charter of liberty is the Constitution later adopted by Americans to 
provide institutions which "seem most likely to effect their Safety 
and Happiness." The Declaration, giving "terse expression to 
widely diffused convictions of the period" ^ and voicing the colonial 
grievances with "condensed and concentrated force," - had some- 
what rhetorically expressed certain abstract principles. The Con- 
stitution, conservatively interpreting the American instinct for self- 
government, provided a system assuring liberty through obedience 
to law. 

The sources of the American Constitution were four: " (1) the 
constitution of England as understood by the fathers of the American 
commonwealth; (2) the political philosophy of the time derived from 
both England and France; (3) ideas of the government needed, which 
originated in the minds of leading statesmen and were adopted under 
their influence; (4) existing constitutions, written and unwritten, of 
the colonies.'^ There is much in its history to illustrate Mackintosh's 
dictum, "Constitutions are not made, but grow." It did not elab- 
orate a theory so much as formulate an experience. It embodied 
national customs and qualities rather than mere thought of certain 
leading men. As expressing the ideals of free government, it is in 
two ways specially notable; first, as the assertion of the supremacy 
of the whole people; second, as a guarantee of fixed principles. 

Its most significant words are those which stand first to indicate 
the authority by which it is adopted, "We, the People of the United 
States." They indicate its aim to secure a government which will 
protect the interests of all subjects. The sovereignty of all implies 
that all have rights, and that all have responsibilities. Men created 
potentially free, as potentially rational, are [bound to develop powers 
of freedom no less than powers of intelligence. Political freedom 
and equality are aspects of man's universal brotherhood; and this 
is a consequence of his creation by God. Democracy is only safe for 
the world when related to the democracy in God's Kingdom. The 
Constitution, as interpreted by the first inaugural of Washington, 
at least hints this. It is, therefore, a charter of liberty as an implicit 
assertion of the equal rights of all men. 

1 Friedenwald. 

2 Bryce. 

3 J. Franklin Jameson : Introduction to Study of Constitutional and Political History of the United 
States, in Johns Hopkins Studies, Vol. IV. 

68 



It is also important as the guarantee of fixed principles. This is 
due to its having been reduced to written form. Earlier constitutions 
were accumulations of laws, customs, precedents, which, as represent- 
ing the wisdom and experience of the past, were taken as guides for 
action in the present and plans for the future. They were habits 
rather than rules. The written Constitution was a Great Charter. 
It represented the ultimate authority of all the people to whom its 
officers owed allegiance; and also the supremacy of those principles 
of government to which all alike owed, and formally avowed, obedi- 
ence. The function of the Supreme Court as guardian and interpreter 
of the Constitution is practical proof of the supremacy of Law, of 
what is meant by "a government of laws, not men." "In plan and 
purpose, the Constitution is a product of the political ideas of the 
English race. It stands in lineal succession to such muniments of 
public right as Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights of 1689, and the Act 
of Settlement of 1700. The embodiment of Whig doctrine in a written 
constitution was, however, an unperceived revolution in political 
conditions, since it converted what was simply a working-theory, 
open to modification as times changed, into a rigid frame of gov- 
ernment." ^ 

The Constitution has played an important part in general history 
not only by determining the course of events in the United States, 
but also by serving as model for the constitutions of other republics. 
Its influence may be seen in the constitutions adopted by Switzerland 
in 1848 and 1874, by Canada in 1867, by Australia in 1900, as well as 
in those of Mexico and numerous Central and South American states. 
"As a piece of drafting, it deserves the admiration which it has re- 
ceived from nearly all American and most foreign countries. It is, 
on the whole, admirably clear, definite and concise, probably superior 
in point of technique to all the documents since framed on its model." - 

It plainly belongs to the latest stage of political evolution. The 
American Republic represented a "new and superior type of govern- 
ment, when English institutions were planted in the New World and 
began an independent career. From a humanistic point of view, it 
was the transmission of the intellectual estate of the Romanized 
world, relieved from entail to the privileged classes, and entrusted 
to a people whose capacity for government had been developed by 
the direct succession of their institutions from their own race origins, 
and whose political habits had been made instinctive by the con- 
tinuous discipline of their own race experience. In this aspect, Amer- 
ican politics may be regarded as at work upon the denouement of 
the drama of Liberty, whose acts have included the destinies of 
nations. Materials for it were provided by obliterated empires, the 
remains of which science is disinterring. It was begun in Greece and 
systematized by Rome; revised by Italy and enlarged by Europe. 
The latest episodes have been the Renaissance, the Reformation, and 
the Revolution, in their various national phases, with widely different 

' Ford: Rise and Growth of American Politics, p. 56. 

^ Bryce in Enc. Brit., 11th ed., Art. United States, section on Constitution. 

59 



results. The world now waits to see how it will come out in America." ^ 
12. The American Constitution, therefore, may be taken as typical 
example of a charter of liberty given to the world in modern times. 
It does not stand alone. Almost all peoples offer recent illustrations 
of humanity's instinctive efforts to attain freedom and of partial 
attainment of ends. The history of most, at any rate in the west, 
affords examples of various stages in the world-wide, age-long process, 
whereby men have moved, albeit by stumbling steps and fluctuating 
lines, along the road leading to fuller development of human powers 
and wider realization of human relationships. Man is in the way of 
becoming free as he learns the meaning of creation "in the image of 
God"; for freedom, that is, fullness of life, must always be related to 
the source and standard of life. The true goal of humanity's evolution 
is "the glorious liberty of the sons of God." 

Signs of the times are encouraging. Progress has not been steady; 
but progress there has been. There is ground for thankfulness when 
the merely bad is seen to have superseded the unmistakably worse. 
Pagan civilization rested on slavery; and pagan civilization fell. 
Christianity exalted new standards; and there has been approximate 
correspondence to some of them. The Middle Ages added much to 
the knowledge of political truth, almost ended slavery, condemned 
absolutism, and inaugurated systems of representative government. 
Yet, though problems of principle were well-nigh solved, there was 
no solution of many problems of practice. The sixteenth century 
saw a decline of religious influence, a loss of educational advantages 
and of some forms of political freedom. Machiavelli superseded 
St. Thomas. More recent times have seen heroic efforts for the 
betterment of less-favored classes, the extension of many phases of 
freedom, and steady widening of the sphere of constitutional govern- 
ment. Nevertheless, the modern period abounds in grave warnings. 
Too often "Liberty" has been the thin mask of Lawlessness. France, 
Germany, Italy and Russia, most countries in fact, have had their 
own examples of the tyrannies of anarchy, of the slaveries of mob- 
rule. Never have hard facts made it more apparent that the rights 
of man must be related to the righteousness of God. There have 
been many efforts to interpret and serve humanity without reference 
to God as known either through Nature or Revelation: their failure 
shows the need of harking back to first principles. "The nature of 
human liberty, however it be considered, whether in individuals or 
in society, whether in those who command or in those who obey, 
supposes the necessity of obedience to some supreme and eternal 
law, which is no other than the authority of God, commanding good 
and forbidding evil. And so far is this most just authority of God 
over men from destroying, or even diminishing, their liberty, that it 
protects and perfects it; for the real perfection of all creatures is 
found in the prosecution and attainment of their respective ends; 
but the supreme end to which human liberty must aspire is God." ^ 

1 Ford: Rise andGrowth of American Politics, p. 380. 

2 Leo XIII. Great Encyclical Letters of Leo XIII, Benziger, New York, 1903; p. 143. 

60 



THE 
MONROE DOCTRINE 

THE VITAL NECESSITY OF ITS 
CONTINUED MAINTENANCE 



BY 

THOMAS H. MAHONY 



FOREWORD BY 
REAR-ADMIRAL W. S. BENSON, U. S. N. 



PREFACE 

The Monroe Doctrine has been the subject of serious con- 
sideration and of considerable discussion from the time of its 
pronouncement on December 2, 1823, to the present time. 

The declaration to the world contained in the Monroe 
Doctrine that the United States would not permit any non- 
American nation to intervene in American political affairs, and 
Washington's policy of American non-intervention in non- 
American affairs, have been the keystone of our foreign policy 
since this country has had a foreign policy. These comple- 
mentary principles which have controlled our relations with 
foreign powers have made the United States the great and 
powerful nation which it now is. 

By reason of the World War and the international questions 
arising therefrom, the Monroe Doctrine has become an increas- 
ingly important factor in the determination of the course to be 
followed by this country with relation to foreign nations. The 
League of Nations and the various international conferences, 
in which the United States either has been invited to partici- 
pate or actually has participated, all involve the question of 
how far this country is to be guided by the policies of Wash- 
ington and Monroe. Intended solely as a measure of self- 
protection for this country, the Monroe Doctrine has received 
almost as many varying interpretations as there have been 
writers to discuss it. 

The Knights of Columbus Historical Commission, there- 
fore, deems it most appropriate to present this discussion of 
the Monroe Doctrine at the present time. The author, Mr. 
Thomas H. Mahony, formerly Assistant District Attorney of 
Boston, claims no originality in the discovery of the material 
used or treated. He presents an arrangement of the materials 
already at hand and accessible to anybody desiring to make 
use of them, which sets forth and emphasizes the American 
aspect of the Monroe Doctrine — its American origin, its Ameri- 
can development, and its American purpose. 

It is this American aspect which the Knights of Columbus 
Historical Commission intends to offer in all its publications 
dealing with American History, to stimulate a deep, sincere, 
and nation-wide spirit of patriotism , to the end that the United 
States may continue its mission of holding aloft the torch of 
freedom for all peoples. 

W. S. BENSON. 
63 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 



Summary 

Chapter I. — The Principle Involved. Page 

The United States as well as other nations possess the right 
of self -protection and of self-preservation 7 

Chapter II. — Its Early Application. 

In the exercise of this right, President Washington inaugurated 
the policy of isolation from European political affairs 12 

Chapter III.— Our Foreign Policy Prior to 1823. 

The complementary policy of preventing non-American inter- 
vention in American political affairs, was hinted at by Wash- 
ington, and actually applied by President Madison in the matter 
of West Florida 17 

Chapter IV. — The Holy Alliance and its Menace to the United States 
through the Spanish-American Colonies and the Oregon 
Controversy with Russia. 

The menace to popular government from the Holy iy^i^-nce 
and Russia's claim to Oregon presented a situation in 1823 
which called for a definite application of this second principle. 23 

Chapter V. — Great Britain and Her Desire for a Joint Declaration with 
the United States. 
Great Britain's Ministry, while sympathizing with the anti- 
republican principles of the Holy Alliance nevertheless feared 
French political ascendency in Europe and commerical ascend- 
ency in the Spanish-American colonies, and sought a joint 
declaration with the United States opposing intervention by 
France and the Holy AlUance in the affairs of the rebellious 
Spanish-American Colonies 33 

Chapter VI.— Its Refusal. 

The United States refused to enter into any such joint declara- 
tion with Great Britain 39 

Chapter VII. — The Message to Congress. 

The United States, through President Monroe, proclaimed to 
the world the determination to prevent any European nation 
from future colonization in, or extension of its political sys- 
tem to the Western Hemisphere 45 

Chapter Vin.— The Doctrine Tested. 

The "Monroe Doctrine" has been tested at various times by 
France, Spain, Germany, Great Britain and Japan, but the 
United States has resolutely maintained this policy to the present 
time 47 

65 



Summary — Continued 

Chapter IX. — Comments, Criticisms and Fallacies. Page 

Many mistakes and misinterpretations have arisen relative 
to the Monroe Doctrine such as the following: 67 

A. That George Canning, the British statesman, was the 
author of the Monroe Doctrine, and that the British fleet 
has ever supported it. 

B. That the Monroe Doctrine has been changed or extended 
beyond its original scope. 

C. That the Monroe Doctrine is a guaranty given by the 
United States to Spanish America. 

D. That the Monroe Doctrine has not been consistently 
applied by the United States. 

E. That the Monroe Doctrine is a prohibition against the 
acquisition of new territory by the United States. 

Chapter X. — The Future of the Monroe Doctrine. 

The future of the Monroe Doctrine in eflfect must resolve itself 
into one of the following policies: 85 

A. Its absolute abandonment. 

B. It continued assertion and maintenance by the United 
States acting alone. 



66 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 



CHAPTER I — THE PRINCIPLE INVOLVED 



The United States as well as other nations possess the right of 
self-protection and of self-preservation. 



For the last three or four years the Monroe Doctrine has 
been most prominent in the discussion of world politics. The 
Peace Conference at Versailles, the League of Nations Covenant, 
and more recently the Limitation of Armament Conference 
have all shared in the responsibility for directing public atten- 
tion to the Monroe Doctrine. What it is, how it came into 
existence, and what is to be its future are questions of great 
interest to all students of international affairs, and questions of 
vital importance to all Americans. 

The Monroe Doctrine has been defined or described in many 
ways, and by many people. Ex-President Taft described it in 
the following way: 

"The Monroe Doctrine in spirit and effect is a policy 
of the United States which forbids any non-American 
nation, by external aggression, by purchase or by intrigue, 
to acquire the territory in whole or in part, of any country 
or nation in this Western Hemisphere, "i 
It has also been defined or described thus: 

"A prohibition of the United States of European inter- 
ference with the political arrangements of the New 
World. "2 

"The policy by which the United States opposes 
any acts that it considers as 'oppressing' or 'controlling 
the destiny of the Latin American states. "^ 

"It is a declaration of the United States that cer- 
tain acts would be injurious to the peace and safety of the 
United States, and that the United States would regard 
them as unfriendly. The declaration does not say what 
the course of the United States would be in case such 
acts are done. That is left to be determined in each 
particular instance. . . . The doctrine rests upon the right 
of self-protection and that right is recognized by inter- 
national law. ... It does not assert or imply or involve 
any right on the part of the United States to impair or 

^Taft Papers on League of Nations, p. 292. 
^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 3. 

'R. D. Armstrong, Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Aban- 
doned, — 10 American Journal International Law, p. 77. 

67 



control the independent sovereignty of any American 
State. . . .The scope of the doctrine is strictly limited. 
It concerns itself only with the occupation of territory 
in the New World to the subversion or exclusion of a pre- 
existing American Government. "^ 
These definitions and descriptions set forth the unilateral 
character of the Monroe Doctrine, in its enimication and main- 
tenance for the security of the United States, only. 

On the other hand, Lord Bryce, former British Minister at 
Washington argues that the Monroe Doctrine, 

"was originally delivered as announcing a restriction or 
limitation which America proposed to place on her own 
action. She would not interefere in the wars and alliances 
of the Old World and she expected that in return the 
States of the Old World would not interfere in the affairs 
of the Western Hemisphere."* 

As will be pointed out, there is no foundation of historical 
fact which justifies any such conclusion as that drawn by Lord 
Bryce. On the contrary, the evidence warrants but one con- 
clusion as to this question, viz., that the Monroe Doctrine was 
based upon the right of this country to self -protection, that it 
was intended solely for that purpose, and that no obligations to 
any other power were assumed in its pronouncement. 

Many authors contend that the Monroe Doctrine has not 
attained the status of international law. Among such critics 
may be mentioned Ex-President Taft,* Elihu Root,* W. F. 
Reddaway,^ and H. Bingham.* 

On the other hand President Cleveland in his special 
message to Congress on the Venezuela question, stated most 
emphatically that while 

"It may not have been admitted in so many words to the 
Code of International law, ... if the enforcement of the 
Monroe Doctrine is something we may justly claim it 
has its place in the code of international law as certainly 
and as securely as if it was specifically mentioned. . . . 

"The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those 
principles of international law which are based upon 
the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected 
and its just claims enforced. . . . "" 

^E. Root, Addresses on International Subjects, pp. 109-117. 

^The Monroe Doctrine and a League of Nations, — The Nation, Dec. 
13, 1917. 

^Tajt Papers on League of Nations, p. 120. 

*E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 111. 

*W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 103-113. 

'H. Bingham, The Monroe Doctrine, an Obsolete Shibboleth, Atlantic 
Monthly, June, 1913. 

^Special Message to Congress, Dec. 17, 1895 — J. D. Richardson, Mes- 
sages and Papers of the Presidents, IX, 655. — J. B. 'Moore, Digest of Inter- 
national Law, VI, 577, 578. 

68 



Richard Olney, President Cleveland's Secretary of State, 
with reference to the Monroe Doctrine, said that, 

"The rule thus defined has been the accepted public 
law of this country ever since its promulgation, "i 

So far as the United States is concerned the Monroe 
Doctrine is, and must remain a principle of International Law, 
if there is any International Law, and in any event must be 
accepted as a principle controlling international relations. 
It will have the force of such a principle until such time as 
the United States shall be unable to supply the force necessary 
for its maintenance. 

Practically all students of the political history of the 
United States agree that the Monroe Doctrine is based upon 
the right of national self-protection, which right is recognized 
by international law.^* In order to secure a proper perspective 
for the Monroe Doctrine, therefore, a short glance at this 
principle of self-protection and its application will not be amiss. 
Every sovereign State possesses as incidental to such 
sovereignty the right of self-defense and of self-preservation.* 
A sovereignty without such right is an absurdity. As deeply 
rooted as is the desire for self-preservation in the individual, 
just so deeply rooted is the same desire, but raised to a national 
degree, in the State. Just as the individual's right of self- 
preservation is recognized in national law, so is the State's right 
of a similar nature recognized in what we call international law. 
In national courts of law the right of self-defense justifies 
an individual in anticipating attack. 

"One is not obliged to wait until he is struck by an 
impending blow ; for, if a weapon be raised in order to shoot 
or strike, or the danger of other personal violence be immi- 
nent, the party in such imminent danger may protect him- 
self by striking the first blow for the purpose of repelling and 
preventing the attempted injury."* 

The same right of States to anticipate injurious attack, and 
to go beyond their jurisdictional territory in exercising such 
right is recognized internationally.^ Of this there are many 

iQlney to Bayard, July 20, 1895— Senate Ex. Documents, 31-54th 
Congress, 1st Session, p. 4. 

^E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 111. 
J. W. Foster, Century of American Diplomacy, p. 477. 
A. B. Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 75, 80. 
H. Taylor, International Public Law, p. 405. 

'H. Taylor, International Public Law, p. 405, sec. 401; C. H. Stock- 
ton, International Law, pp. 97-109; Creasy, International Law, p. 149. 

*Words and Phrases Judicially Used, 2nd series, IV., 509; State v. 
Wilson, (Delaware), 62 Atlantic Reporter, pp. 227, 231. 
'Oppenheim, International Law, 3d ed. I., 214. 
Creasy, International Law, p. 153. 
Vattel, III., ch. 3, sees. 42-49. 
R. Phillimore, Int. Law, I., 216. 
H. Taylor, International Public Law, pp. 422, 426. 

69 



illustrations. The mobilization of forces upon a State's fron- 
tier by a neighboring State justifies defensive mobilization and 
even war by the former against the latter. Again, if one 
nation is attempting, directly or indirectly, to seize or occupy 
sites of great military strategical value, and such occupation 
is considered by another nation as threatening the existence of 
the latter, it might properly object to such occupation, and go 
to war if necessary to prevent it.' In the exercise of this right 
Great Britain in 1911 objected to Germany's occupation of a 
naval station on the Coast of Morocco. So, too, Great Britain 
in the past objected to Russia's occupation of Constantinople. 
In fact, the whole theory of the Balance of Power is based upon 
this principle. 2 

It must be noted at once, however, that in the present con- 
dition of international relations. International Law as enforce- 
able law, like national law, does not really exist. There is no 
underlying sanction for it,' such as there is for all national 
law in the supreme authority of the State, arising directly from 
its people. There is no international legislature to enact 
international laws, no international executive to enforce them, 
and no international courts to administer them with power to 
enforce their decrees. Strictly speaking, therefore, in the 
absence of such sanction there is no such thing as international 
law at the present time, at least no international law upon 
which alone a state might safely rely for its protection and 
preservation." The force underlying what we know as 
international law is merely the public opinion of the world, 
the comity of nations and nothing more.* Public morality, 
however, has never been sufficient to control the actions of the 
populations of States, and is not sufficient to control the 
actions of States. 

In the past the nation having power to enforce its demands 
has had the basis or results of such demands incorporated, to 
some extent, into what we call International Law.« In times 
of national stress, however, even the few rules or maxims, re- 
garded as approaching an international code, have been dis- 
regarded with impunity by nations which feared no disad- 
vantageous or disproportionate results from such disregard. 
For example. Great Britain entirely disregarded our rights as 
neutrals on the sea in the French-English wars of 1793 and 

'E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 111. 
^Creasy, Int. Law, pp. 151, 279. 
H. Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, pp. 425, 426. 
«A. J. Balfour, The British Blockade (1915), p. 10. • 
"Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, VI. 

*C. H. Stockton, Int. Law, p. 1; Pomeroy, Int. Law, p. 14; Oppen- 
heim, Int. Law, 3d ed., pp. 1, 14, 15; Creasy, Int. Law, p. 1. 
•A. B. Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 81. 

70 



1803.1 In the World War, Germany disregarded such rules of 
war as referred to blockades, to bombing of unfortified places, 
and to search of merchant vessels before sinking. Great 
Britain, to the disadvantage of the United States, and in vio- 
lation of the provisions of the Declaration of London (1909), 
by Orders in Council of August 20, 1914, October 29, 1914, 
March 11, 1915, and March 23, 1915, deliberately disregarded 
the rules of contraband, neutral trade and blockade. ^^ 

A State, therefore to retain its economic and political inde- 
pendence, must be prepared to enforce its rights, for so far. 
International Law has not furnished sufficient guaranties. 
A sovereign State at all times must be the' sole judge of whether 
its safety is or is not threatened, and of what action it will 
take. 3 To argue otherwise would be a denial of sovereignty. 
In the last analysis, it will always be a question of the potential 
energy possessed by that State which will control the necessity 
and the character of any action to be taken. 

The United States, as a sovereign State, possess the 
sole and unqualified right to say when, where or how their safety 
or their existence is endangered by the action or threatened action 
of any other State. They possess the absolute right to take 
any action which they may deem proper, to prevent the aris- 
ing of such danger or to remove it if it has already arisen. 
The practical question at any given time will be whether the 
United States has the power to carry out its desires, and to 
enforce its demands, for if at any time it is in such a condi- 
tion that any foreign nation, with which it has a dispute, 
believes itself powerful enough to disregard those desires 
or demands, or actually to overcome the United States by 
force of arms, then it is absolutely certain that no mere dec- 
laration of principle, or verbal objection, however strongly 
phrased, will be sufficient to protect the United States." 

President Roosevelt pointed this out in his message of 
December 2, 1902, relative to the Monroe Doctrine wherein he 
stated that, 

"The Monroe Doctrine should be treated as the car- 
dinal feature of American foreign policy; but it would be 
worse than idle to assert it unless we intended to back 
it up."' 

»H. C. Lodge, George Washington, II, 171, 172. 

A. J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, IV., 6-29. 

^E. J. Clapp, Economic Aspects of the War, pp. 1-108, appendix 
312-316; see also A. J. Balfour The British Blockade (1915). 

The Declaration of London set forth rules of naval warfare which 
Great Britain and the other nations there represented agreed were "actual 
principles of international law," C. H. Stockto«, Int. Law, pp. 57-58, 
App. IV., 535-549. 

'E. Root, Addresses on International Subjects, p. 111. 

*P. F. Martin, "Maximilian in Mexico," 415. 

'J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers oj the Presidents, p. 6762. 

71 



CHAPTER II— ITS EARLY APPLICATION 



In the exercise of this right President Washington inaugu- 
rated the policy of isolation from European political affairs. 

When the American Revolution ended, the United 
States was recognized as constituting a new and distinct 
nation with all the rights of sovereignty. A republican form of 
government, unusual* in the world of that period, was adopted 
by the American people. At first a loosely federated system 
was attempted, but later, the Constitution was adopted, creat- 
ing the representative democracy which we now have. At 
that time the European world was monarchical and auto- 
cratic in character. Russia, Holland, Spain, Portugal, France 
and Great Britain all had colonies in the Western Hemisphere. 
Some of these nations looked with jealous eyes at the United 
States, and all of them, with the possible exception of France, 
were opposed to republicanism. 

This new venture of republicanism was, therefore, con- 
fronted with many dangers. The success of the Revolution 
was not hoped by the European nations, and was not believed 
by England, to be permanent. ^ The same international jeal- 
ousies, manifested by the European Powers in Europe, were 
reflected in the control of their colonies. 

The continued existence of the Republic of the United 
States was at best precarious. If the experiment was to 
succeed, and if representative government was to survive, it 
was necessary to take all possible precautions to anticipate and 
to prevent the arising of any circumstances which might tend 
to destroy or to endanger it. 

It was apparent from the beginning that the greatest 
menace to the United States lay in the colonies of the European 
nations upon its borders. ^ Great Britain, in open violation 
of the Treaty of 1783, by retaining the fortified posts along our 
northern frontier, threatened trouble at any time.^ Spain 
held the west bank of the Mississippi River and closed that 
river to navigation,* and also endeavored to alienate the west- 

iWoodrow Wilson, George Washington, pp. 248, 249. 
H. C. Lodge, George Washington, II, 170, 175. 
Such opinion has been entertained more recently. See A. Carnegie, 
The Reunion of Britain and America — North Am. Review, June, 1893. 
^H. C. Lodge, George Washington, II, 133. 
J. B. Moore, Four Phases of American Development, p. 149. 
^Bancroft, History of United States, VI, 463. 
H. C. Lodge, George Washington, II, 175, 176. 
W. Wilson, George Washington, 302. 
John Marshall, George Washington, p. 255. 

^H. C. Lodge, Washington, II, 133; J. Marshall, George Washington, 
p. 269, 270. 

72 



em population from this nation. Neither of these nations was 
averse to inciting the Indian tribes along our border to serve 
their own purposes. Everything was done to render as dith- 
cult as possible the progress of this country.^ In the Caribbean 
Sea Great Britain, by hampering our trade and holding strate- 
gical places, as well as Spain and France by occupation ot 
other similar strategical points, threatened the future safety 
of the United States. Even before his election to the presi- 
dency, Washington believed that national security lay m isola- 
tion from European political affairs." _ -, ,-1 ..-u 

While the United States were developing, and while the 
various phases of national live were being consolidated, Wash- 
ington was of the opinion that they must be kept free of any 
disputes between the various European nations or their colonies ; 
moreover, he believed that all attempts of these same European 
nations to meddle in the affairs of the United States, or tend- 
m<r to endanger their political or territorial integrity, must, it 
possible, be prevented and, in any event, most bitterly opposed. 
Washington on January 1 , 1788, wrote to Jefferson as follows : 
"Our situation is such, as makes it not only unneces- 
sary but extremely imprudent, for us to take part m their 
quarrels- and whenever a contest happens among theni^ 
if we wisely and properly improve the advantages which 
nature has given us, we may be benefited by their folly, 
provided we conduct ourselves with circumspection. ' 

Washington in 1788 writing to Sir Edward Newenham 

° ^^^^^ ;<j j^Qpg ^Yia.t the United States of America will be able 
to keep disengaged from the labyrinth of European poli- 
tics and wars; and that before long they will, by the 
adoption of a good national government, have become 
respectable in the eyes of the world, so that none of the 
maritime powers, especially none of those who hold pos- 
sessions in the New World or the West Indies, shall pre- 
sume to treat them with insult or contempt."* 

In these letters Washington showed clearly that this prin- 
ciple of national self-preservation even at that time had as- 
smned in his mind a definite form, and had become the well- 
defined system, which, as President, he later followed. _ 

As one of his first executive acts, he carefully examined 
and noted all the foreign correspondence m the Government 
archives. He realized the dangers to the United States from 
the European nations with colonies along our borders, and 
became convinced that the United States should not become 

iH C. Lodge, Washington, II . 86, 87, 90, 133, 172, 175. 
m. C. Lodge Washington, II., 139. 141. 
»J Sparks, Writings of George Washington, IX., 291-^94. 
*Ibid, IX., 398-402: 

73 



entangled in the affairs of the European nations and should in- 
sist at all times upon being accorded all the rights of a sovereign 
nation. 1 The foreign policy of Washington's administration, 
based upon isolation from European entanglements, the result 
of sound logic and sober thinking was matured at the outset, 
to be applied from time to time as the occasion arose. « 

Two striking instances in our early history may be cited in 
illustration of these points. The first, illustrative of Wash- 
ington's policy, involved our refusal to be drawn into the 
European War of 1793. 

In 1789 the people of France, inspired by the success of the 
American Revolution, and of representative government, over- 
turned the monarchy and set up in its place a republic. In 
1793 France and England were at war and the former sought 
our aid. At that time treaties were in force between France 
and the United States, which provided, among other things, 
for the payment of our Revolutionary debt to France, for the 
guaranty of her possessions in the Caribbean, and for a defen- 
sive alliance." The United States was in very great danger 
of being drawn into the war by reason of the hostile activities 
of both belligerents, and at a time when every consideration 
for its future security demanded that it avoid participation. ^ 

Washington, while gratefully remembering the French 
assistance during the Revolution, and mindful of the exist- 
ing treaties with that country, nevertheless, interested in the 
welfare of the United States above all else,^ pointed out that 
it was not a defensive war, such as was covered by the treaty, 
and proclaimed the neutrality of the United States on April 
22, 1793. 

This Proclamation of Neutrality was followed in 1794 by 
the enactment by Congress of the Neutrality Act, the first of its 
kind among modem nations, which imposed upon every person 

m. C. Lodge, Washington II., 132, 133, 137, 143. 

Ubid, II, 139, 141; Bancroft, Hist, of U. S., VI., 469. 

»H. C. Lodge, George Washington, II., 166, 167. 
Treaties and conventions concluded between U. S. and other powers 
since July 4, 1776, pp. 241-254. 

^"The minds of the people are so much agitated, and resentments are 
so warm that there is reason to fear that we shall be hurried into the 
torrent that is ravaging Europe." Letter of March 24, 1794, J. Coit, 
Member of Congress, to D. L. Coit, — Oilman's, James Monroe, p. 45. 

'"Tis perhaps fortunate for us that we are ill-treated by both the 
belligerent powers; experiencing no favor from either, we shall be less an 
object of jealousy from either, and probably less in danger of rushing into 
the war than if we were ill-treated by one only, I believe we had better 
suffer almost anything than get into the war. ..." Letter March 25, 
1794, Joshua Coit, to Daniel L. Coit — Oilman's James Monroe, p. 44. 

^"All our late accounts from Europe hold up the- expectation of a 
general war in that quarter. For the sake of humanity, I hope such an 
event will not take place; but, if it should, I trust that we shall have too 
just a sense of our own interest to originate any cause, that may involve 
us in it." Washington to D. Humphreys, March 23, 1793, J. Sparks, 
Writings of George Washington, X., 331: W. C. Ford, Writings of George 
Washington, XII., 276. 

74 



in the United States, the obligation to refrain from any act, 
therein set forth and defined as unneutral, against any nation 
with which the United States was at peace. ^ 

The second instance referred to. involved the War of 1812. 
Upon the renewal of war between France and Great Britain in 
1803, the latter announced wholesale blockades of French ports, ^ 
and in addition, ordered the seizure of all neutral ships, wher- 
ever found, trading with an enemy, 2 denying them the right to 
enter any harbor on great stretches of the European coast.'* 

In 1807 Great Britain promulgated the "Orders in Council," 
intending to prohibit all neutral vessels from the use of the 
oceans, save such as traded directly with England or her colo- 
nies. ^ All this time Napoleon was replying with "orders" and 
"decrees" of a like nature.« Both belligerents by such acts 
violated the sovereignty of this country and injured it more than 
they injured all other neutral countries combined.'' American 
vessels were seized by both belligerents, but by reason of Great 
Britain's mastery of the seas, the United States suffered more 
severely by the lawless seizures of that nation.* In effect, 
American ports were blockaded. » 

Great Britain forcibly impressed at least 20,000 American 
seamen into her service,!" on the theory that a person, once a 
British subject, could not expatriate himself, and as a corol- 
lary, that the British Government could seize anybody, attempt- 
ing to do so, wherever found, and forcibly compel him to serve 
Great Britain in any way that nation or its agents might re- 
quire." The United States insisted that, as a neutral, they had 
the right to trade unhampered with other neutrals, and, under 
the proper restrictions as to contraband, had the right to trade 
with either belligerent ; they further insisted that Great Britain 
had no right whatever, forcibly to impress nationals of the 
United States into British service. 

Great Britain, by her insistence upon this alleged right of 
"Impressment," practically proclaimed the right to British 

laAct of June 5, 1794—1. Stat, at Large, p. 381, ch. 50. 

^Harrowby's Circular, Aug. 9, 1804; Am. State Papers, Foreign 
Relations, III., 266. 

'Hawkesbury's Instructions, Aug. 17, 1805; Ibid, 266. 

^Fox to Monroe, April 8, 1805, and Nov. 11, 1805; Ibid 267. 

^Orders in Council, Jan. 1807, and Nov. 11, 1807, Ibid, pp. 267-273. 

"The Berlin Decree, Nov. 21, 1806; Ibid, pp. 290-291. 
The Milan Decree, Dec. 17, 1807; Ibid, p. 290. 

^A. J. Beveridge, Life of Johri Marshall, IV., 7. 

«H. Adams, Hist, of U. S., V. 31; Rept. Secy, of St., July 6, 1812, 
Am. St. Pap. Foreign Relations, III. 583-585. 

'Channing, Jeffersonian System, pp. 184-194. 

See generally on War of 1812, A. J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, 
Vol. IV. 

»«T. Roosevelt, Naval War of 18 12, p. 42; H. Adams, Hist, of U. S., 
III., 202. 

"John Lowell, Review of Treatise on Expatriation, by a "Massachusetts 
Lawyer." 

75 



control of the oceans whenever Great Britain cared to assert 
it, and the right to destroy American commerce without 
recompense. This infringed upon the sovereign right of the 
United States, and if allowed to go unchallenged, not only 
would injure their dignity, but actually endanger their very 
existence. While the United States had ample cause for war 
against France, that nation did not resort to impressment, and 
Great Britain's activities by reason of her control of the sea, 
made a more direct and harassing contact, and aroused this 
country, then under a Republican administration, to self -pro- 
tective action. 

Henry Clay, the great champion of Americanism, stirred the 
patriotism of this country as it had not been stirred since the 
Revolution. In the United States Senate on February 22, 
1810, he argued: 

"Have we not been for years contending against the 
tyranny 'of the ocean' . . . We have . . . tried peace- 
ful resistance . . . When this is abandoned without effect, 
I am for resistance by the sword. "i 

Two years later while speaker of the House of Represen- 
tatives he said: 

"The real cause of British aggression was not to dis- 
tress an enemy, but to destroy a rival. "^ 

The United States thus aroused to action in the defense of 
their rights, dignity and existence, declared war on Great 
Britain on June 18, 1812. 

In the first instance referred to, the United States mani- 
fested their determination to pursue as their policy with refer- 
ence to foreign nations the principle of absolute non-intervention 
in European affairs, and of complete freedom from entangling 
alliances, while in the second, was made clear their refusal to 
allow without challenge any nation directly or indirectly to 
attack the sovereignty or dignity of the United States.* 

^Annals, nth Cong, jrd Session, pp. 579-582. 

^Annals, I2th Cong. ist. Session, p. 601. 

'See also the controversy of 1789-1790 relative to Nootka Sound; J. 
Marshall, George Washington, pp. 284-285; J. S. Bassett, The Federalist 
System, pp. 59-60; Manning, Nootka Sound Controversy, in American His- 
torical Association Report, 1904, pp. 279-478; Ford's Writings of Jefferson, 
v., 199-203, 238; C. R. Fish, American Diplomacy, pp. 88-92, 100. 



76 



CHAPTER III— OUR FOREIGN POLICY PRIOR TO 1823 



The complementary policy of preventing non-American inter- 
vention in American political affairs, was hinted at by Wash- 
ington, and actually applied by President Madison in the matter of 
West Florida. 



The events in the early history of the United States show 
an appreciation of and an earnest effort upon the part of those 
entrusted with government, to follow the principles of foreign 
policy just considered, as well as a ready and active response 
upon the part of the nation. 

Washington's convictions have already been referred to. 
These were emphasized by him in his "Farewell Address" in 
which he gave his parting injunction to the country in the 
following words: 

"The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign 
nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have 
with them as little poHtical connection as possible . . , 
"Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us 
have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be 
engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are 
essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, 
it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by arti- 
ficialties, in the ordinary vissicitudes of her politics, or 
the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships 
or enmities. 

"Our detached and distant situation invites and 
enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one 
people under an efficient government, the period is not far 
off when we may defy material injury from external 
annoyance . . . 

"Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situa- 
tion? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? 
Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part 
of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils 
of European ambition, interest, humour, or caprice? 

" 'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent 
alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I 
mean, as we are now at liberty to do it. . . ."i 

According to a British writer on the Monroe Doctrine, 
Washington, in this message, bequeathed to his country, "a 
policy which above all things may be called American. "^ This 

»Ford's Writings of Washington, XIII, 311-318. 
J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers 0} the Presidents, I., 222, 223. 
'W F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 10. 

77 



policy, unheard of before in international affairs, placed the 
country outside the toils of European greed, ambition and 
treachery. From this policy the Monroe Doctrine naturally 
developed.! 

Washington's successors also followed these principles and 
manifested their belief in them by many statements and actions. 
John Adams in 1782, said, 

"It is obvious that all the powers of Europe will 
be continually with us, to work us into their real or imagi- 
nary balances of power . . . But I think it ought to be our 
rule not to meddle . . ."2 

Adams also said that, 

"America has been long enough involved in the wars 
of Europe. She has been a football between contending 
nations from the beginning, and it is easy to foresee, 
that France and England both will endeavor to involve 
us in their future wars. It is our interest and duty to 
avoid them as much as possible, and to be completely 
independent, and to have nothing to do with either of 
them, but in commerce. "' 

In the Nootka Sound Controversy, in 1790, Adams de- 
clared in favor of refusing Great Britain permission to send 
troops through the United States to attack the Spanish colony 
of Louisiana.* 

Long afterward, on September 30, 1805, in a letter to Dr. 
Rush, John Adams referred to his foreign policy when President, 
in these words: 

"The principle of foreign affairs, which . . . has 
been the invariable guide of my conduct in all situations 
. . . was, that we should make no treaties of alliance with 
any foreign power; . . . that we should separate ourselves, 
as far as possible and as long as possible, from all European 
politics and wars . . . "* 

Jefferson, referring to the same policy, said : 

"I had ever dreamed it fundamental to the United 
States never to take an active part in the quarrels of 
Europe . . , "« 

This policy of abstention from European politics was early 
recognized by others as being the logical policy of the United 

»H. C. Lodge, Washington, II., 141, 143: Olney to Bayard, July 20, 
1895, Sen. Ex. Doc. ji, — 54th Cong, ist sess., p. 4. 
'^]. Adams, Diary, Nov. 18, 1782. 
»J. Adams, Works, VIII, 9, 497, 599. 
*C. R. Fish, American Diplomacy, pp. 82-92, 100. 
f^John Adams, Works, I, 200. 
•Letter to Monroe of June 11, 1823: Jefferson's Works, VII., 287. 

78 



States. Thomas Pownall, appointed Governor of Massa- 
chusetts Bay Colony in 1757, later Governor of New Jersey, and 
Governor of South Carolina, after his return to England wrote 
of the United States in 1781, as follows: 

"As nature separated her from Europe, and hath 
established her alone on a great continent, far removed 
from the old world and all its embroiled interests, it is 
contrary to the nature of her existence, and consequently 
to her interest, that she should have any connections of 
Politics with Europe other than merely commerical . . . "^ 

The second phase of this foreign policy, that of refusing to 
allow European nations to meddle with American affairs, 
which was definitely proclaimed by Monroe in 1823, manifested 
itself very early in Washington's administration. If the policy 
was not definitely announced at that time, at least the germ 
from which the final announcement developed was present. * 
On June 21, 1792, while the United States was having diffi- 
culty with the Indians, who were countenanced and aided, 
indirectly if not directly, by Spain and Great Britain,* Wash- 
ington wrote Govemeur Morris, who was then on an unofficial 
mission to England, as follows: 

"One thing, however, I must not pass over in silence, 
lest you should infer from it, that Mr. D. had authority 
for reporting, that the United States had asked the media- 
tion of Great Britain to bring about a peace between them 
and the Indians. You may be fully assured, Sir, that 
such mediation never was asked, that the asking of it 
never was in contemplation, and I think I might go further 
and say, that it not only never will be asked, but would be 
rejected if offered. The United States will never have an 
occasion, I hope, to ask for the interposition of that power, 
or any other to establish peace within their own territory."^ 

This phase of the foreign policy was more clearly defined, 
and more forcibly put forward during Madison's administration. 
Late in 1810 Spanish subjects seized Baton Rouge and declared 
it independent. The United States, against the protest of 
Great Britain, occupied West Florida, pending the settle- 
ment of the controversy due to the fact that the boundary of the 
Louisiana Purchase had not been defined in this area. Madison 
was informed and believed that Spain was about to sell West 

IT. Pownall, A Memoiial to the Sovereigns oj Europe on the State oj 
Affairs between the Old and the New World. 

^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 3, 11. 
See also on Nootka Sound Controversy as bearing on this point, C. R. 
Fish, American Diplomacy, pp. 88-92, 100. 

»H. C. Lodge, Washington, II., 86, 87, 90. 

*J. Sparks, Writings oj George Washington, X., 239. 

W. C. Ford, Writings of George Washington, XIL, 132-133. 

79 



Florida. In a message to Congress on January 3, 1811, he set 
forth most clearly this second principle, in the following words : 
"Taking into view the tenor of these several communi- 
cations, the posture of things with which they are con- 
nected, the intimate relations of the country adjoining 
the United States eastward of the Perdido River to their 
security and tranquillity, and the peculiar interest they 
have in its destiny, I recommend to the consideration of 
Congress the seasonableness of a declaration that the 
United States could not see without serious inquietude, 
any part of a neighboring territory in which they have in 
different respects, so deep and so just a concern pass from 
the hands of Spain into those of any other power. "^ 

Acting upon this recommendation Congress passed the fol- 
lowing resolution : 

"Taking into view the peculiar situation of Spain, and 
of her American provinces, and considering the influence 
which the destiny of the territory adjoining the southern 
border of the United States may have upon their security, 
tranquillity and commerce, therefore 

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States in Congress assembled, 

"That the United States, under the peculiar circum- 
stances of the existing crisis, cannot, without serious 
inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the 
hands of any foreign power; and that a due regard to their 
own safety compels them to provide, under certain con- 
tingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said terri- 
tory. "2 

It is clear, therefore, that as early as 1792 in Washington's 
administration, one of these two principles of foreign policy, 
based solely upon the right of national self-preservation, had 
become crystallized into a definite system, and the other at 
least suggested. =" By 1811 both principles had become fixed 
and might be put into these words : 

A — No American interference in European affairs; or 

"America, hands off Europe." 
B — No European interference in American affairs, or 
"Europe, hands off America." 
These two principles in no way conflict with any line of 
action the United States might take with reference to con- 
solidating its own territory, or with reference to extending its 

^J. D. Richardson's Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 488. 
2f7. 5. Stat, at Large, III., 471: Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., III., 571. 
*T. B. Edington, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 92. 

H. C. Lodge, Washington, II., 141, 143, 213-215. 

W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 10. 

80 



boundaries, by purchase, cession, annexation or otherwise. 
There is nothing contained in the two principles cited which 
would prevent the United States from annexing Texas or 
Hawaii upon the request of their respective peoples, or from 
acquiring by purchase Florida, Louisiana, Alaska, the Virgin 
Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone, or from securing by ces- 
sion California, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. As Wash- 
ington said in 1783, "The . . . true interest of this country must 
be measured by a continental scale. "^ Washington's efforts 
as President and those of his immediate successors were directed 
toward extending the country's boundaries west and south to 
the natural boundaries of the seas. 

The question of our territorial expansion, as will be shown 
later, is not involved in the Monroe Doctrine. It must be re- 
garded and treated as a matter entirely distinct and in no way 
conflicting with the Monroe Doctrine. 

Washington to Lafayette, April 7, 1783 — Sparks, Writings of Wash- 
ington, VIII., 412; Bancroft, History of the U. S., VI., 83. 



81 



CHAPTER IV— THE HOLY ALLIANCE AND ITS MENACE TO THE 
UNITED STATES THROUGH THE SPANISH-AMERICAN COLO- 
NIES AND THE OREGON CONTROVERSY WITH RUSSIA 



The menace to popular government from the Holy Alliance 
and Russia's claim to Oregon presented a situation in 182 j which 
called for a definite application of this second principle. 

Such was the status of the foreign policy of the United 
States when two grave dangers confronted it in 1823, arising out 
of matters concerning foreign affairs, firstly with the Quadru- 
ple or Holy Alliance and secondly with Russia. 

When Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808 and forced her 
King, Charles IV, as well as Prince Ferdinand, forever to re- 
nounce the Spanish Crown, and bestowed it upon his own 
brother, Joseph Bonaparte, he unknowingly aroused the 
dormant spirit of Spanish nationalism, which manifested itself 
in open rebellion. 1 Provisional juntas in opposition to the new 
king were established in the various provinces of Spain. There- 
upon the Spanish colonies on the American continents which 
for many years had been chafing under the Spanish connec- 
tion, particularly by reason of Spain's oppressive measures 
against the native Indians,^ and her commercial, political and 
economic regtdations which hindered the development of those 
colonies, 3 began to set up provincial governments, entirely inde- 
dendent of either government then attempting to function in 
Spain. All the Spanish colonies of South America, with the 
exception of lower Peru, declared their independence about the 
same time. Under San Martin in Argentine, O'Higgins, 
Rosas, and the Carrera Brothers in Chili, Bolivar and Marino 
in Venezuela, the revolutions were carried on with varying 
success, until after the restoration of Ferdinand VII to the 
Spanish throne, it became apparent that Spain could not re- 
cover her former colonies. < 

Henry Clay, the great American champion of the South 
American republics, worked incessantly for their recognition 
by the United States. He saw as clearly, if not more clearly 
than did anybody else, the great effect which such a recognition 
woiild have in securing for all time the political and territorial 
integrity of the United States. He believed and stated as early 
as 1818 that there was no other question of our foreign policy 
in which we had so much at stake in the matter of our politics, 

ij. H. Latane, The United States and Latin America, p. 27. 
''Ibid, pp. 5, 6. 

^Ibid, pp. 5-7; Hall's Journal on Chili, Peru and Mexico. (1824 — 
Edinburgh) I., 249, 296. 

^J. H. Latan6, The United States and Latin America, pp. 25-48. 

83 



commerce and navigation, and that South America once inde- 
pendent would be guided by an American poHcy.i Spurred 
on apparently by the untiring efforts of Clay,^ President Mon- 
roe, on March 8, 1822, in a special message to Congress, expressed 
the opinion that the time had arrived for such recognition and 
asked for an appropriation sufficient to effectuate it. An 
appropriation of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) was 
accordingly made. 

Such were the relations between the United States and the 
South American as well as the Central American nations, when 
the Quadruple Alliance began to cast its shadow across the 
Atlantic. This Alliance, popularly called the Holy Alliance, 
developed from the Napoleonic Wars. 

After Napoleon was finally driven from Europe, the 
European powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1814, acting 
under such high-sounding phrases as "Reconstruction of Social 
Order," and "Regulation of the Political System of Europe," 
parceled out to the various conquering nations what had been 
taken from vanquished France. » The dread of another return 
by that master soldier, who to the Allies symbolized the French 
Revolution, the Convention, and hence opposition to "Legiti- 
macy," coupled with the fear of a growing demand by people 
everywhere^ for participation in their government, particularly 
felt in France,^ in England,^, in Germany,' and in Italy, « 
induced Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria to organize 
the Quadruple Alliance which was probably the most powerful 
and efficient international combination ever created for the 
purpose of controlling the destinies of the world, and for main- 
taining as the sole basis of lawful government the principle of 
"Legitimacy," or the divine right of kings to rule, and to hold 
all the territory ruled over by them in fee simple. ^ Upon this 
principle the Treaty of Vienna was based, in entire disregard 
of the world-wide agitation for representative government, 
characterized by Mettemich in his "Confession of Faith," as 
"Presumption. " 10 

This political system generally known as the "Holy 

^Benton's Abridgement, VI., 139, 142. 

^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine. 

^Memoirs of Prince Mettemich, II., 553-586. 

'Ibid, III., 193, 194. 

^Ibid, III., 460, 468. 

^Ibid, III., 460, 468. 

'Bancroft, History of the U. S., VI., 54, 55, 472, 474. 

^Memoirs of Prince Mettemich, II., 386. 

^"The First principle to be followed by the monarchs . . . should be 
that of maintaining the stability of political institutions against the 
disorganized excitement which has taken possession of men's minds." 
Ibid, II., 473. 

^Hbid, III., 458, 459, 465, 472. 

84 



Alliance," originated in the Treaty of Chaumont, March 1, 
1814,1 and the Treaty of Vienna of March 25, 1815." 

On September 26, 1815, at Paris, Francis of Austria, Fred- 
erick WilHam of Prussia, and Alexander I., of Russia, executed 
the documents, creating the so-called Holy Alliance.' On 
October 6, 1815, the Prince Regent of Great Britain, by letter, 
while stating that the "forms of the British Constitution" 
precluded "acceding formally" to the treaty, expressed his 
"entire concurrence in its principles."^ The treaty was 
"acceded" to by France on November 11, 1815, the action 
however being apparently disregarded. 

The subscribers solemnly declared "their fixed resolution" 
to "take for their sole guide [in their political relations] the 
precepts of justice. Christian charity and peace." They agreed 
"on all occasions and in all places, [to] lend each other aid and 
assistance." They further agreed that "the sole principle 
. . . shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service . . . 
for [they] look upon themselves as merely delegated by Provi- 
dence to govern . . . branches of the one family. "^ 

On November 20, 1815, a treaty which included the real 
co-ordinating force of the Alliance, was signed by Great 
Britain, Prussia, Russia and Austria.^ This treaty, embodying 
the so-called Holy AlUance created the Quadruple Alliance. _ By 
the terms of this treaty the four powers agreed to combined 
action in the restoration of France, and in the general con- 
duct of European afifairs. In 1818 France was taken into 
the combination. This treaty among other things, provided 
for conferences of the signatory powers at fixed periods, which 
in effect placed the real governing power of Europe in the five 
sovereigns. 

The first of these conferences was held at Aix-la-Chappelle 
in October 1818, and a declaration relative thereto was made 
by the Powers on November 15, 1818, which stated in part 
that: 

"This union . . . does not tend ... to any change in 
the relations sanctioned by existing treaties ... it has no 
other object than the maintenance of peace, and the guar- 
anty of those transactions on which the peace was founded 
and consolidated . . . Faithful to these principles [the right 
of nations] the Sovereigns will maintain them equally in 
. . . meetings; whether they be for the purpose of dis- 
cussing in common their own interests or whether they 



^British and Foreign State Papers, I., 121, 129. 
^Ibid, II., 443. 

^British and Foreign State Papers, III., 211-212. 
*Ibid, III., 213. 

^British and Foreign St. Papers, III., 211-212. 
^British and Foreign St. Papers, III., 273-280. 

85 



shall relate to questions in which other governments shall 
formally claim that interference . . . "i 

It had been generally understood that Spain's colonies in 
Spanish-America were to be at least one topic of discussion at 
this conference. 2 But for some reason they were not formally 
taken up at that time. 

The revolutions in Naples, in Portugal and in Spain in 
1820 resulted in another conference of the Quadruple Alliance 
at Troppau in November of that year, after which conference 
a circular relative to its results was drafted by the "Allied 
Courts" on December 8, 1820. This circular among other 
things declared that: 

"The events which took place March 8, in Spain, 
[decree of amnesty for political prisoners] July 2 at Naples 
[ratification of a constitutional government] and the 
Portuguese catastrophe [convocation of Cortes by Lisbon 
and Oporto juntas to revise the constitution] have neces- 
sarily given rise to a deep feeling of uneasiness and chagrin 
. . . but at the same time has made them [the Allied 
Monarchs] recognize the need of reimiting and deliberating 
in common upon the methods of preventing all the evils 
which menace the foundations of Europe. 

"It was natural that these sentiments should make 
an especially keen impression upon the powers that had 
recently put down revolution and that had seen it again 
raise its head. It was not less natural that these powers, 
to combat it for the third time, should have recourse 
to the same methods of which they had made use with 
such success in that memorable struggle which delivered 
Europe from a yoke it had borne for twenty years. 

"Everything gave ground for hoping that this alliance 
. . . would also be in a position to put a check on a force 
not less tyrannical and less detestable, that of revolt and 
of crime. . . . 

"The powers have exercised an incontestable right in 
commonly concerting measures of safety against the 
States in which an overturn of the government effected by 
revolt can only be considered as a dangerous example, 
which must have for a result an attitude hostile against 
all constitutions and legitimate governments. The exer- 
cise of this right of necessity became still more urgent when 
those in that situation sought to communicate to neigh- 
boring states the evil in which they themselves were plunged 
and to propagate revolt and confusion among them. . . . 

iParl. Pap. 1819, XVIII, 351. 

^"Letters and Dispatches of Castiereagh," XII, 66, A. G. Stapleton 
"Pol. Life of George Canning," II., 10. 

86 



"We are convinced of the necessity of proceeding 
against the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, in accordance 
with the principles declared above. . . . 

"The allied monarchs being resolved not to recognize 
a government produced by open revolt. . . "^ 

Though a representative of Great Britain attended this 
Troppau conference, he took no active part therein, and on 
January 21, 1819 Great Britain, in a communication to its 
ministers abroad, expressed its dissent from the principles set 
forth in such circular, and declined to become a party thereto, 
maintaining the Alliance, however, as to all other subjects.* 

The Troppau Conference was adjourned to Laibach to 
confer with the King of the Two Sicilies, and at its conclusion 
another declaration was made on May 12, 1821, in which it was 
stated that the Alliance was 

"solely intended to combat and to repress rebellion," and 
that 

"The allied troops . . . [had] been stationed at suitable 
places [in Italy] with the sole view to protecting the free 
exercise of legitimate authority. . . . 

"In the future as in the past, they [the Allied 
Monarchs] will always have the purpose of preserving the 
independence and the rights of each state, as they are 
recognized and defined by existing treaties. The result 
. . . will still be . . . the consolidation of an order of things 
which will assure to the nations their repose and their 
prosperity. 

"Penetrated by these sentiments, the allied Sovereigns 
. . . announce to the world the principles which have guided 
them. They are determined never to recede from them, 
and all . . . will see and . . . find in this union an assured 
guaranty against the attempts of disturbers."* 

At the last conference of the Quadruple Alliance held at 
Verona in November and December, 1822, King Ferdinand VII 
of Spain requested the aid of the Alliance in dealing with 
Spain's American colonies. Spain's situation and her rela- 
tion to her American colonies were there discussed. A plan 
was made for a conference in 1823 to which the United States 
was to be invited. On December 14, 1822, after the Verona 
conference, Austria, Prussia and Russia issued a circular rela- 
tive thereto, in which appeared the following sentiment: 

^British and Foreign St. Pap., VIII., 1149-1151, (Translation).- 
Memoirs of Prince Metternich, III., 444-447. 
^Brttish and Foreign St. Pap., VIII, 1160. 
^British and For. St. Pap., VIII., 1201. 

87 



"The Monarchs [are] determined on repulsing the 
principle of revolt in whatever place or under whatever 
form it might show itself. . . . "^ 

It is a generally accepted fact, though never officially 
acknowledged, that at this Verona conference a secret treaty 
was executed by Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, which, 
whether true or untrue, indicates the real motives and inten- 
tions of the Alliance. The first article of this alleged secret 
treaty was as follows: 

"Article 1. The high contracting parties being 
convinced that the system of representative government is 
equally incompatible with the monarchial principles as the 
maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine 
right, engage mutually, and in the most solemn manner, 
to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of repre- 
sentative governments, in whatever country it may exist 
in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those 
countries where it is not yet known. "^ 

On November 22, 1822, Great Britain following a long- 
established policy in dealing with a possible French and Spanish 
accord, declared its refusal to participate in the French invasion 
of Spain^ which the Quadruple Alliance authorized. In 
this Great Britain was undoubtedly also influenced by Russia's 
growing intimacy with Spain and France as well as by Russia's 
growing rivalry in maritime and colonial interests.^ 

In apparent pursuance of the plan for a conference on 
Spain's colonies, and proving that such intervention was in- 
tended, Spain's Minister of State wrote the Alliance some 
twenty-four days after Monroe's message to Congress of 
December 2, 1823, in part as follows: 

"The King . . . has seriously turned His thoughts to 
the fate of His American dominions . . . Accordingly the 
King has resolved upon inviting the Cabinets of His 
dear and intimate Allies to establish a Conference at 
Paris, to the end that their Plenipotentiaries . . . may aid 
Spain in adjusting the affairs of the revolted Countries of 
America . . . . His Majesty, confiding in the sentiments of 
His Allies hopes that they will assist Him in accompHshing 
the worthy object of upholding the principles of order 

^Br. and For. St. Papers, X., 921-925; Memoirs oj Prince Metternich, 
III., 655-662. 

2Niles Register, Aug. 2, 1823, XXIV, 347; Eliot, Am. Diplomatic 
Code, II., 179. 

» Br. and For. St. Papers, X 4, 5, 11, 17. 

*C. K. Webster, Some Aspects of Castlereagh's Foreign Policy, Ttans- 
actions of Royal Hist. Soc, 3d Series, vol. VI. 



and legitimacy the subversion of which, once commenced 
in America, would presently communicate to Europe. . . "^ 

Invitations to attend such a conference to be held at Paris 
had been sent to Austria, France and Russia, a copy being 
handed to the British Ambassador to Spain. 2 Monroe's 
message reached Europe, however, before Canning made any 
announcement of Great Britain's position as to such a con- 
ference. 

Such were the principles and aims of the Quadruple 
Alliance. Metternich, Prime Minister of Austria, whose 
genius was the guiding spirit of Europe at this time, believed 
that Europe's only salvation lay in the maintenance of the prin- 
ciple of "Legitimacy," the divine right of kings to rule their 
people, and the corresponding "divine duty" of the people to 
submit. In Europe the French Revolution, brought about or 
hastened by the American Revolution, had set up the Con- 
vention, the representative of the people. Metternich, there- 
fore, advocated the prohibition of such popular forms of govern- 
ment, and, as a preventive therefor, urged the suppression of 
rebellions everywhere. Metternich was ably supported in 
his plans by Castlereagh the British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs.' 

In its determination to destroy popular government the 
Alliance exerted its tremendous power successfully in crushing 
revolutions in Piedmont and in Naples in 1821, and in Spain 
in 1823.* But for the objection of Great Britain, a similar 
revolution in Portugal, which had broken out in August, 1820, 
would also have been crushed. 

As indicating what the position of the Alliance would be 
if Spain under a "Legitimate" government, should attempt to 
regain her colonies, Mettemich's letter of March 20, 1823, to 
Esterhazy, relative to Great Britain's suggestion of prevent- 
ing the war between France and Spain which France's invasion 
of Spain would undoubtedly bring about, is most enlightening. 
Metternich said, 

"The idea of neutrality in this struggle is incompatible 
with our political system. The Emperor [of Austria] could 
not declare himself neutral if a principle were in question 
on which the existence of his Empire . . . depended, a 

^Br. and For. St. Papers, XI., 55-57. 
A. G. Stapleton, Political Ltje of George Canning, II., 34. 

^Stapleton's Pol. Life of George Canning, II., 33, 42. 

'C. K. Webster, Some Aspects of Castlereagh' s Foreign Policy — 
Transactions of Royal Hist. Soc. 3d series. Vol. VI. 

*Br. and For. St. Pap., VIII., 1149, 1151, 1201. Br. and For. St. Pap. 
X., 921-925. See generally, Memoirs of Prince Metternich," III., 385-651. 
A. G. Stapleton, Pol. Life of Geo. Canning, I., 133. 

89 



principle which we have never ceased to regard as the 
fundamental basis of the Alliance. "^ 

It was generally believed that the next movement of the 
Quadruple Alliance, as indicated by the Conference of Verona, 
would be a concerted action to suppress the revolutions in the 
various Spanish colonies in America. Ultimately, it was feared, 
definite action would be taken against the United States. ^ 

This, then, was the situation with reference to Spanish 
America which confronted the United States in 1823, during 
Monroe's administration. 

The second danger which confronted the United States 
at this time lay in Russia's attitude toward Oregon, which 
involved the title to a vast stretch of territory. 

The Russian-American Company, organized in Russia, 
was granted a charter by the Czar in 1799 which carried with 
it jurisdiction over the North Pacific Coast of North America 
to the 55th parallel of north latitude and also the right to 
found posts even farther south in territory not then occupied 
by other nations.' In 1792, Captain Gray, a citizen of the 
United States, had discovered the Columbia River, and in 
1806 the Lewis and Clark expedition, inaugurated by President 
Jefferson, explored the Columbia, and found no Russians, or 
other civilized peoples in that locality. It was not until about 
1813 that Russians began to establish posts farther south than 
the 55th parallel. By right of discovery and exploration, there- 
fore, the United States acquired title to the territory, then 
known as Oregon. 

Great Britain and Spain also asserted claims to this same 
territory. But in the Convention of 1818 Great Britain and the 
United States entered into an agreement providing for a tem- 
porary joint occupation of the disputed territory. Spain by 
the treaty of 1819, in ceding Florida to the United States, also 
ceded all her rights in the Oregon territory, north of the 42nd 
parallel of latitude, leaving the three remaining claimants all 
asserting title to the Pacific Coast north of California, which 
included the Columbia River and the access it gave to the 
great territory it drained. 

On September 7, 1821, Alexander I. of Russia, issued the 
following ukase: 

"The pursuits of commerce, whaling, and fishering, 

and of all other industry, in all islands, ports, and gulfs, 

including the whole of the northwest coast of America, 

beginning from Behring's Straits, to the' 51 of northern 

latitude . . . , is exclusively granted to Russian subjects. 

^Memoirs of Prince Metternich, IV., 37. 
"A. G. Stapleton, Pol. Life of George Canning, II., 20, 21. 
•J. B. Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, I., 890. 

90 



It is therefore prohibited to all foreign vessels, not only 
to land on the coasts and islands belonging to Russia, as 
stated above, but also to approach them within less than 
a hundred Italian miles. The transgressor's vessel is 
subject to confiscation, along with the whole cargo. "^ 

In this uikase Russia not only extended her territorial 
claim four degrees farther south than she had previously claimed, 
and beyond the 54° 40 'parallel claimed by the United States 
as its proper boundary, but also asserted an exclusive right to 
the North Pacific Ocean and to the Behring Sea, which claims 
were not finally settled until 1824.2 

This naturally brought about more or less strained rela- 
tions between Russia and the United States, which were 
aggravated by reason of an announcement made on October 
16, 1823, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, by Baron 
Von Tuyll, Russia's Minister to the United States, which inter- 
jected the Holy Alliance and Spanish America into the con- 
troversy: This announcement related to the question of 
Russia's recognition of the Spanish-American nations, and 
was to the effect that, 

"Faithful to the political principles which she [Russia] 
observed in concert with her Allies, she could in no wise 
receive any agent ... of the de facto governments which 
owe their existence to the events of which the New World 
has for some years been the theatre. "^ 

When directly pressed by Adams as to what was meant 
by the phrase, "political principles," Von Tuyll stated that, 

"He understood them as having reference to the right 
of supremacy of Spain over her colonies."* 

This, in effect, was a declaration that Russia, already at issue 
with the United States upon the Oregon boundary, had definitely 
aligned herself with the other members of the Holy Alliance 
against the Spanish- American nations, whose independence 
had already been recognized by the United States. 

Mr. Adams referring to a discussion on July 17, 1823, with 
Von Tuyll upon the Oregon matter, said, 

"I told him specially that we should contest the 
right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this 
continent, and that we should assume distinctly the prin- 
ciple that the American continents are no longer sub- 
jects for any new European colonial establishments."^ 



B. Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, 1., 891. 
B. Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, I., 891. 
Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI., 180-182. 
Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI., 182. 
Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI., 163. 
91 



On July 22, 1823, Adams sent a dispatch to Middleton, 
our Minister to Russia, in which he emphasized this same 
principle in the following words: 

"There can perhaps be no better time for saying 
frankly and explicitly, to the Russian Government, that 
the future peace of the world, and the interest of Russia 
herself, cannot be promoted by Russian settlements upon 
any part of the American Continent. With the excep- 
tion of the British establishments north of the United 
States, the remainder of both the American continents 
must henceforth be left to the management of American 
hands. "^ 

ij. B. Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, I., 462, 463. 
J. B. Moore, Int. Arbitrations, I., 760. 



92 



CHAPTER v.— GREAT BRITAIN AND HER DESIRE FOR A JOINT 
DECLARATION WITH THE UNITED STATES 



Great Britain's ministry, while sympathizing with the anti- 
republican principles of the Holy Alliance nevertheless feared 
French political ascendency in Europe and commerical ascendency 
in the Spanish- American Colonies, and sought a joint declara- 
tion with the United States opposing intervention by France and 
the Holy Alliance in the a fairs of the rebellious Spanish- Ameri- 
can Colonies. 



While the question of recognition of the South American 
repubHcs was being strenuously advocated by Henry Clay, 
President Monroe, on May 13, 1818, suggested to John Quincy 
Adams that Great Britain be sounded upon the proposition of 
such recognition,! and in 1819 such a step was taken, the dip- 
lomatic suggestion then being made that Great Britain recog- 
nize Buenos Ayres, and do so simultaneously with the United 
States. 

During the month of July, 1818, Castlereagh, then the 
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informed 
Richard Rush, our Minister at London, that Great Britain and 
the other members of the Alliance had been requested by Spain 
to mediate between Spain and her rebellious American colonies. 
To this Mr. Rush replied that the United States would not in- 
tervene to establish any peace unless the basis thereof was to 
be the independence of those colonies.* 

George Canning succeeded Castlereagh, as Foreign Sec- 
retary, upon the death of the latter, in 1822. At that time, the 
British Ministry was "legitimist" in its sympathies, and at 
one time, constituted "the center of the opposition to revolu- 
tionary tendencies in Europe."' 

George Canning was also an advocate of "legitimacy"* 
which inclined him to the side of the Holy Alliance, and to 
the side of Spain in her efforts to regain her American colonies. 
But British trade with these same colonies had developed 
greatly from the time of their breaking away from Spain. With 
the possible exception of the slave trade monopoly, granted 
to England in 1713, and a few other concessions, ^ Spain's 
general policy of colonial administration had been to confine 

ij. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 91-92. 

"Von Hoist, Constitutional Hist, of U. S.,l., 419. 

R. Rush, Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London, pp. 330- 

33 1' 

'F. L. Paxson, Independence of So. Am. Reps. 2nd ed., p. 251. 

*R. Rush, The Court at London, 181Q-1825, pp. 467, 468; 
A. G. Stapleton, George Canning and His Times, 380; J. S. Ewart, 
Canning Policy in Kingdom Papers, XVI., 173. 

*J. H. Latane, The U. S. and Latin Am., pp. 12, 13. 

93 



that commerce to Spain and to Spanish ships. ^ So burdensome 
were these restrictions to the colonists that a great smuggling 
trade in and out of the colonies had sprung up. « Because of 
these restrictions, and in an effort to open up this colonial 
trade to the British, there had been considerable agitation in 
England, as early as 1779, to bring about revolutions in these 
colonies, and to separate them from Spain. ^ The revolt, when 
it came "opened the door to British trade at a time when 
Napoleon was doing his best to close all other doors to it."^ 

If then, Spain were to regain her colonies, her adminis- 
tration of them, as evidenced by her past, would greatly cur- 
tail British trade. Again, if, by reason of France's invasion 
of Spain (which was almost equivalent to a declaration of war 
against Great Britain), ^ and of her contemplated assistance of 
Spain in the latter's effort to regain her colonies, France were to 
secure a portion of these colonies as compensation, and she 
apparently desired to do so,« the British merchants believed 
that Great Britain stood very little chance of holding that 
trade. 

The British "newly won commercial supremacy must be 
maintained and developed. Thus far public opinion was 
supreme."' Canning was, therefore, subjected to a tre- 
mendous pressure by the British merchant class* to prevent 
France from so intervening. In fact, as early as 1798, it had 
been determined that in the event of the colonies passing 
into the control of France, Great Britain would bring about 
their complete independence.* As between the principles of 
"legitimacy" and the interests of trade. Canning determined to 

'J. H. Latane, The U. S. and Latin Am. pp. 6, 12: HaWs Journal, I., 
pp. 249, 296. 

^Hall's Journal, I., 253, 254. 

'J. H. Latane, The U. S. and Latin Am., pp. 14, 15. 

A. Mahan, The Monroe Doctrine, National Rev. (1903), XL., 8 1. 

Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh, VIL, 266. 

*E. M. Lloyd, Canning and Span. Am., Trans, of Royal Hist. Soc. 
(N.S.), XVIII, 82: 

F. L. Paxson, Independence of So. Am. Reps., 2d ed., pp. 251-252. 

^Ajinual Register (London), 1823, p. 25. 

«E. Everett, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 4; A. G. Stapleton, Pol. Life of 
Canning, II, 32-33. 

'W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 12, 13. 

Hbid, 24. 

'"But, if as appears probably, the army destined against Portu- 
gal, and which will march through Spain, or any other means which may 
be employed by France, shall overthrow the Spanish Government, and 
thereby place the resources of Spain and of her colonies at the disposal of 
France, England will immediately commence the execution of a plan long 
since digested and prepared for the complete independence of South 
America." Life and Correspondence of R. King, II., 650). 

". . . and I should have no difficulty in deciding that we ought to 
prevent, by every means in our power, perhaps Spain from sending a 
single Spanish regiment to South America, after the supposed termination of 
the war in Spain, but certainly France from affording to Spain any aid or 
assistance for that purpose." (Memo of Canning 1823 — Life oj Lord Liver- 
pool, III, 231: Official correspondence of Canning, I, 85.) 

94 



pursue the latter. ^ His policy therein "was essentially British" 
in its character and purpose. 2 

Canning accordingly directed his efforts toward prevent- 
ing the intervention of France, first by attempting to secure 
a joint declaration by the United States and Great Britain, 
opposing such intervention, which proved unsuccessful, and 
later by endeavoring to secure a disclaimer of such intention 
from France, which endeavor was successful. The effort to 
secure this "joint declaration," constituted one of the several 
circumstances leading up to Monroe's message of December 2, 
1823. 

On August 16, 1823, Canning verbally discussed with Mr. 
Rush the question of a joint declaration by their governments, 
which would have the desired effect of forestalling any inter- 
vention by France in Spanish-American affairs. To these 
overtures Mr. Rush replied that he would take the matter up 
with the United States Government, countering, however, 
by asking Canning's position upon the question of recognition, 
to which Canning answered that no steps toward that end had 
been taken.' 

On Augtist 20, 1823, Canning wrote to Rush definitely 
suggesting such a joint declaration upon the part of the two 
governments, stating among other things, 

"1. We [Great Britain] conceive the recovery of the 
Colonies by Spain to be hopeless. 

2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them as 

Independent States, to be one of time and circum- 
stances. 

3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any 

impediment in the way of an arrangement between 
them and the mother country by amicable negotia- 
tions. 

4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them 

ourselves. 

5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any 

other power with indifference."^ 

As a matter of fact, the substance of this note, according 
to a later statement of Canning himself, had been previously 
communicated in another note to France, and thereafter to 

'F. L. Paxson, Indep. of So. Am. Rep., 2 ed., pp. 251-252. 

T. B. Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 7. 

Rush to Adams, Dec. 27, 1823. Rush Corresp., etc., Mass. Hist. 
Soc, 2d. Series, XV., 434-436. 

^T. B. Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine, 13. 

'R. Rush, The Court of London, etc., pp. 361-366. 

Rush Correspondence etc., Mass. Hist. Soc. 2nd. Series, XV., 412-415. 

R. Rush, The Court of London, etc., pp. 376-378. 

R. Rush Correspondence etc., Mass. Hist. Soc, 2nd Series, XV., 415, 
416. 

95 



Austria, Russia, Prussia, Portugal and the Netherlands/ 
Canning desiring to prevent such intervention and taking every 
step which he thought might accomplish that purpose. This 
note to Rush, therefore, did not, as some people believe, con- 
stitute an exclusive invitation to the United States. ^ 

It is to be noted that in the second clause quoted, Carming 
totally ignored the fact that the United States had already 
recognized the South American republics, and also, that in the 
fifth clause he apparently intended to have the United States 
commit themselves for all time to a non-intervention and non- 
annexation policy for South America and Central America. 

On August 23, 1823, Canning again wrote Mr. Rush, and 
to the effect that the Holy Alliance was soon to take up for 
discussion the question of Spain and her colonies, and he urged 
the making of a joint declaration. » To this Mr. Rush suggested 
immediate recognition by Great Britain, apparently being 
ready, upon that basis, to assume responsibility for a joint 
declaration.^ 

On August 31, 1823, Canning wrote Mr. Rush to the 
effect that Great Britain was not prepared to accord such an 
immediate recognition. » On September 18, and again on Sep- 
tember 26, 1823, Canning conferred with Rush. On the latter 
date he asked if Rush would not assent to a joint declaration 
on Great Britain's promise of fttture recognition, which pro- 
posal Rush immediately and unequivocally rejected. « 

The refusal of Great Britain to recognize the independence 
of the Spanish colonies at that time created an impasse be- 
tween Rush and Canning. After September 26, 1823, though 
he saw Rush on October 8 and 9, 1823, Canning scarcely referred 
to Spanish- Am erica at all, and did not again allude to the 
matter of a joint declaration. So striking was this abrupt and 
sudden cooling that Rush considered the entire discussion ended, 
notifying our State Department to that effect. He suspected 
however, that some fresh understanding between Great Britain 
and France might explain it.' As to this matter, Stapleton, 
Canning's biographer, stated that, 

"Mr. Canning thought that, next to the acquirement of 

a coadjutor so powerful as the United States, the best thing 

would be to acquaint the French Government, by a direct 

communication, that it could not prosecute its designs 

^Br. and For. St. Pap., XL, 61, 62. 

^World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, June 1918, p. 285. 

'Rush Correspondence etc., Mass. Hist. Soc, 2nd Series, XV., 416, 
417: Rush, The Court of London, etc., 382. 

*Rush, The Court of London, etc., pp. 382-384. . 

'Rush, The Court of London, etc., pp. 384-388: Rush corresp. etc., 
Mass. Hist. Soc, 2nd Series, XV., 418, 419. 

'Rush, The Court of London, etc., 384-406, Rush corresp. etc., Mass. 
Hist. Soc. 2nd Series,, XV., 422, 424. 

Ubid, XV., 424-428, 431-433. 

96 



in Spanish America, except at the expense of a war with 
this country."! 

As a matter of fact, after the conference of September 26, 
Canning, according to his own statement, sought an "explana- 
tion" with France. He conferred with Prince dePoHgnac, the 
French Ambassador at London, on October 9, 1823, and se- 
cured from him a statement to the effect that France beHeved 
it hopeless to reduce Spanish-America to its former state, and 
that France disclaimed any intention or desire to appropriate 
any part of the Spanish possessions in America, or to obtain 
any exclusive advantages therein. ^ This was not communi- 
cated to Rush, however, until late in November and conse- 
quently did not in any way affect Monroe's message.' 

According to Rush, "The apprehension of Britain [seemed] 
to be fully allayed, at least for the present ... on the score of 
French aggrandisement in Spanish America."* Canning hav- 
ing accomplished his purpose by this "explanation" of France, 
without definitely aligning herself against the Holy Alliance, 
and desiring not to offend the Holy Alliance, was apparently 
no longer interested in a joint declaration. ^ This adequately 
explains Canning's "cooling" process. 

^A. G. Stapleton, Political Life of George Canning, II, 26. 

^A. G. Stapleton, Pol. Life of George Canning, II., 26-30: Br. and For, 
St. Pap., XL, 49-53: Rush corres. in Mass. Hist. Soc. 2d Series, XV., 430- 
436. 

'Rush, The Court at London, etc., pp. 409-415: W. F. Reddaway, 
The Monroe Doctrine, p. 54. 

*Rush corres. in Mass. Hist. Soc, 2d Series, XV., 430-433. 

'"Our intercourse in August, not having led to any practical results 
nor become matter of discussion between our respective governments will 
be considered as having passed between two individuals relying upon each 
other's honour and discretion." (Canning to Rush, Dec, 13, 1823, Rush 
Corres. in Mass. Hist. Soc. 2d. series, XV,. 433, 434.) 

"All serious danger to Spanish America being now at an end, I 
do not at present see what there is to prevent a return to that effective 
amity between Great Britain and that alliance [Holy Alliance] which has 
heretofore existed. Events the most recent and authoritative justify us in 
saying, that no attempt upon the liberties of Europe, will essentially ' 
throw Britain off from the connection, or impair her co-equal allegiance to 
the Monarchial principle." (Rush to Adams, Dec. 27, 1823. Rush Corresp. 
in Mass. Hist. Soc. 2d Series, XV., 434, 436.) 



97 



CHAPTER VI— ITS REFUSAL 



The United States Refused to Enter into Any Such Joint 
Declaration with Great Britain. 



The situations considered in the last three chapters had 
been slowly but gradually developing, both before and during the 
presidency of James Monroe. At the same time an intense 
spirit of nationalism, guided and nourished by Henry Clay and 
to a great extent by Chief Justice John Marshall, was also 
developing in the United States. ' Prior to and even during 
the War of 1812 a considerable part of the population, par- 
ticularly in New England, was opposed to any interference 
with Great Britain's conduct of the war against France. « 
They were willing to suffer quietly and submissively all the 
injuries inflicted upon the United States by Great Britain,* 
and even considered seriously the dissolution of the Union. ■« 
Open rebellion was imminent.* "Since the adoption of the Con- 
stitution, nearly all Americans except the younger generation, 
had become re-Europeanized in thought and feeling. "« Of 
that younger generation it was Henry Clay, from Kentucky, 
the great exponent of Americanism, who stirred the country 
to action in 1812. 

The War of 1812, however, "achieved an inestimable good — 
it de-Europeanized America. It put an end to our thinking 
and feeling in European terms and emotions. It developed the 
spirit of the new America — now for the first time emanci- 
pated from the intellectual and spiritual sovereignty of the 
Old World. "^ 

Monroe had been Minister to France under Washington's 
administration in 1794,8 during the period when Washington, in 
his attempt to safeguard the country, was deliberately apply- 
ing the principle of his purely American foreign policy of 
keeping out of all wars between the European nations. Mon- 
roe was undoubtedly familiar with this principle before he went 

^A. J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, IV., 1-58: Scott v. Peters, 5 
Cranch (U. S. Rept.), p. 135. 

-Morris, Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, II., 548: A. J. Bever- 
idge, Life of John Marshall, IV., 5. 

'John Lowell, Peace with Dishonor — War without Hope (by a "Yankee 
Farmer"), pp. 39, 40. 

^H. Adams, History of U. S., V. 36. 

*A. J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, IV., 1-58. 

'A. J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, IV., 4. 

^A. J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, IV., 56. 

*D. C. Oilman, James Monroe, p. 40. 

99 



to France/ and while in France, was forcefully reminded of it 
by Randolph, then Secretary of State. ^ 

He and Livingston were sent to France by President 
Jefferson in 1802, as special envoys to negotiate the purchase 
of Louisiana,' in which transaction the interests of Spain, of 
France and of England, as well as those of the United States 
were involved. In these negotiations he and Livingston were 
eminently successful. In 1803, he was special envoy to Eng- 
land for the purpose of asserting our national claims relative 
to impressment, blockade, and search,* and again went to 
England, with Pinkney in 1806 and 1807. In 1804 he was in 
Spain as special envoy to secure the cession of Florida, an 
effort which proved unsuccessful. ^ 

President Madison named Monroe as his Secretary of 
State in 1811. He therefore held that great office at the time 
when England's persistent violation of our rights as a neutral, 
her insistence on her right of impressment, and her determined 
hostility to the United States brought on the War of 1812. « 
He was a party to the regeneration of that great spirit of nation- 
alism which animated that period, and undoubtedly he was 
familiar with Madison's message of January 3, 1811, and the 
accion of Congress thereon, making clear the attitude of the 
United States as to Spain's transfer of Florida to any other 
foreign power. 

Monroe was also familiar with the warnings of Washington, 
of Adams, of Jefferson and of Madison as to the absolute 
necessity of the United States abstaining from participation in 
European politics. This thoroughly American foreign policy, 
actually applied during Washington's administration, was 
essentially the policy which guided all administrations from 
that of Washington down to the time of Monroe's presidency. 
If not a tradition, this policy had very nearly approached it 
at the time when Monroe was confronted with the two situations 
already referred to, the one involving the Holy Alliance, its 
direct threat to the Spanish- American nations, and its indirect 
threat to the United States; the other involving Russia and 
the Oregon boundary. 

Monroe's Secretary of State was John Quincy Adams, 
probably the most distinguished American in active public 
life at that time. He had, as a boy, accompanied his father 
when the latter went to France as envoy. When fourteen, 
he had gone to St. Petersburg as private secretary to Francis 
Dana.^ Later he acted successively as Minister to Holland, 

*D. C. Oilman, James Monroe, pp. 41, 48. 

^Ibid, pp. 57, 58. 

^Ihid, pp. 79-95. 

^Ibid, pp. 96, 97, 105. 

^Ihid, pp. 98, 99. 

''Ihid, 107-127: A. J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, IV., 6-58. 

'J. T. Morse, Jr., John Quincy Adams, p. 13. 

100 



to Portugal, to Prussia, to Russia and to England. ^ He par- 
ticipated actively in the diplomatic matters resulting from 
both the Revolution and the War of 1812. He was undoubtedly 
the best equipped man in the country to handle the problems 
then confronting the State Department.'' 

Monroe and Adams were, therefore, well versed in European 
affairs, European designs, and European methods of political 
thought. 

During most of Monroe's Presidency, Richard Rush was 
the American Minister in London. His official dealings with the 
British government were with Castlereagh, the Foreign Secretary, 
and on his death with George Canning. 

The situation presented to Monroe in 1823 resembled in 
many ways the situation which confronted Washington in 
1793 at the time of the French -English War. On both occasions 
the United States was in grave danger, which consisted to a great 
degree in the difficulties of European nations and the probability 
of involving the United States in these difficulties. A mistake 
might mean the total destruction of the nation. In 1793 the 
danger lay in the United States taking positive action in Euro- 
pean affairs. The only solution of the problem was carefully 
to avoid becoming involved, and then, it was a question of 
volition upon the part of the United States. At that time, 
the Neutrality Proclamation, an exercise of volition and dis- 
cretion, saved the country. In 1823 one aspect of the prob- 
lem was to avoid becoming involved in the designs of France, 
of Spain, of Great Britain, and of the Holy Alliance. The 
threatened danger, at this time, however, lay in Europe's 
taking positive action in American affairs. While in 1823 any 
action to be taken by the United States might be regarded as 
voluntary, yet, as a matter of fact, if Europe actively intervened 
in the Americas, the United States without any exercise of voli- 
tion would necessarily be obliged to fight for its own protection. 

The settlement of the crisis of 1793 pointed the way to 
safety' and the same principle of self -protection, which dictated 
Washington's Neutrality Proclamation, and his statement 
as to British intervention in American affairs, dictated the 
program. In 1793 self -protection required the United States to 
keep out of European affairs. In 1823 on the other hand, it 
demanded that Europe keep out of American affairs. The 
latter was the complement of the former and would undoubtedly 
have been the definite policy of this coimtry even if Monroe's 
message had never been written. < 

On November 7, 1823, President Monroe's cabinet began 
discussing the proposition of such a joint declaration upon the 

ij. T. Morse, p. John Quincy Adams, pp. 19, 23, 24, 70, 75, 76. 
2Rept. of Sec'y Fish to Pres. Grant, July 14, 1870, Senate Ex. Doc, 
112- 41st. cong., 2d. session 1, 3. 

*J. B. Moore, Principles of American Diplomacy, p. 198. 
*Ibid, pp. 258, 259. 

101 



part of the United States and Great Britain. Monroe^ and 
Calhoun favored it. Jefferson^, in spite of his Hfe-long prejudice 
against Great Britain favored it, because he beHeved it to be a 
good diplomatic manoeuvre under the existing circumstances^ 
Madison also approved it.^ Secretary of State Adams, how- 
ever, stoutly opposed such a step and urged a separate and 
distinct American declaration. He was the only one of the 
Cabinet who saw and pointed out the significant part of Can- 
ning's suggestion, stating that, 

"The object of Canning appears to have been to obtain 
some public pledge from the Government of the United 
States, ostensibly against the forcible interference of the 
Holy Alliance between Spain and South America; but 
really or especially against the acquisition to the United 
States themselves of any part of the Spanish-American 
possessions, ... by joining with her, therefore, we give 
her a substantial and perhaps inconvenient pledge against 
ourselves."* 

Adams also pointed out the striking and sinister incon- 
sistency between Great Britain's anxious request for a joint 
protest against intervention by other European Powers, in 

i"My own impression is that we oug;ht to meet the proposal of the 
British Gov't., to make it known, that we would view an interference 
on the part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the 
Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they suc- 
ceeded with them, they would extend it to us. I am sensible however, of 
the extent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy to have yours & 
Mr. Madison's opinions on it." (Monroe's letter of Oct. 17, 1823 to 
Jefferson, Hamilton's Writings of James Monroe, VI., 323-325. Moore, 
Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 393. 

2"The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most 
momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of 
Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points 
the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. 
And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. 
Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle our- 
selves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to inter- 
meddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. . . . 

"But the war in which the present proposition might engage us, 
should that be its consequence, is nor her [Great Britain] war, but ours. 
Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out 
of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to inter- 
meddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own prin- 
ciple, not to depart from it. And if, to facilitate this, we can effect a di- 
vision in the body of the European powers, and draw over to our side its 
most powerful member, surely we should do it ... " (Jefferson's reply 
to above, Oct. 24, 1823, Ford's Writings of Thomas Jefferson, X., 277, 278- 
315: Wharton, Dig. of Int. Law, I., 268-270. 

•A. J. Beveridge Life of John Marshall, IV., 8, and^ notes. 

^Madison went further than Jefferson and recommended that the 
declaration disapprove of the invasion of Spain and of any interference 
with Greece. (Hamilton's, Writings of James Madison, IX., 161, 162: 
Madison's Works, III., 339: Wharton, Dig. of Int. Law., I., 270-271. 

sj. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI., 177, 178. 

102 



Spanish- America, and her stubborn refusal to recognize the 
independence of the Spanish- American repubhcs. He argued 
that, "The United States, having acknowledged the inde- 
pendence of the Trans-Atlantic territories, had a right to 
object to the interference of foreign powers in the affairs of these 
territories," and that, "The South Americans as independent 
nations . . . themselves, and no other nation, had the right to 
dispose of their condition, "i 

Adams, remindful of the traditional American foreign 
policy, urged a declaration by the United States only, which 
would contain, "an earnest remonstrance against the inter- 
ference of the European powers by force with South America: 
to make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that."^ 
He contended that the Russian communications should be made 
use of as an opportunity, and as a basis for such a declaration, ' 
which declaration, while answering Von Tuyll and Russia, 
would also, and at the same time, answer Canning, Great 
Britain and the Holy Alliance. His arguments to the Cabinet 
carried the day. 

It appears that the phraseology of Monroe's message, par- 
ticularly the two sections generally accepted as including the 
gist of the message, was to some degree at least the work of 
Adams. Plumer, a New Hampshire Congressman during 
that period, stated that the part of the message dealing with 
foreign affairs, bore "the direct impress of Mr. Adams' genius."^ 

W. F. Reddaway, the British writer upon the Doctrine, 
states that "The occasion and the principles of the Monroe 
Doctrine . . . point to the authorship of Adams. "^ Elihu 
Root says that Adams "played a major part in forming the 
policy. "6 Many other writers,' including Worthington Ford 
attribute to Adams the formulation of the ideas set forth in the 
Doctrine. * 

Jefferson, as is seen by his letter of October 24, 1823, 
to Monroe, also had much to do with the actual message. He 
was the first to set forth in so many words the broad principle 
that Europe should be kept out of American affairs. He therein 
stated that 

"Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to 

entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, 

'J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI, 186. 

*W. C. Ford, Genesis oj the Monroe Doctrine, in Mass. Hist. Soc. 2nd 
Series, XV, 392. 

5J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI., 178, 179. 

^Pennsylvania Mag. of Hist, and Biog., VI., No. 3, p. 358. 

^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 80. 

'E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 114. 

'A. B. Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 64: H. C. Lodge, George Wash- 
ington, II., 145: W. Ford Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine in Mass. Hist. Soc. 
2 Series, XV. 

*For criticism of such position see James Schouler, A uthorship of Mon- 
roe Doctrine, in Annual Report Am. Hist. Assoc. 1905, I., 126. 

103 



never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic 

affairs."! 

As a matter of fact, it might well be said that neither 
Adams, nor Monroe was the "author,"^ and that the phrase 
"Monroe Doctrine," has merely "become a convenient title by 
which is denoted a principle that doubtless would have been 
wrought out if the message of 1823 had never been written — 
the principle of the limitation of European power and influence 
in the Western Hemisphere."* 

Whatever may be the merits of this discussion as to the 
formulation of the ideas or principles, it remains true that it 
was the declaration of these principles by the President of the 
United States that gave them international standing.* The 
responsibility for this enunciation lay with President Monroe. 
His, therefore, must be the credit for its, "courageous pro- 
nouncement before Congress and all Europe, upon his own 
solemn responsibility as Chief Magistrate."^ 

iPord's Writings of Jefferson, X., 277, 278. 

"T. B. Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 92, 93, 

»J. B. Moore, Principles of Am. Diplomacy, pp. 258, 259: W. F. 
Johnson, America's Foreign Relations, p. 329. 

4Rush to Adams, Dec. 27, 1823,— Rush Corres. in Mass. Hist. Soc. 
2nd Series, XV., 434, 436. 

*James Schouler, Atilh. of Monroe Doctrine, p. 127. 



104 



CHAPTER VII.— THE MESSAGE TO CONGRESS 



The United States, through President Monroe, proclaimed 
to the world the determination to prevent any European nation from 
future colonization in, or extension oj its political system to the 
Western Hemisphere. 



After considerable discussion by the Cabinet, President 
Monroe's message was finally drafted and submitted to Con- 
gress on December 2, 1823. The portions of the message which 
bear upon the principles involved, and which have caused 
those principles to be known as "The Monroe Doctrine," are 
the following : 

"... The occasion has been adjudged proper for assert- 
ing, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the 
United States are involved, that the American continents, 
by the free and independent condition which they have 
assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be con- 
sidered as subjects for future colonization by any European 
Powers. . . 

". . . In the wars of the European powers, in matters 
relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor 
does it comport with our policy so to do. . . With the 
movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more 
immediately connected . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor, 
and to the amicable relations existing between the United 
States and those powers, to declare, that we should con- 
sider any attempt on their part to extend their system 
to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our 
peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependen- 
cies of any European power we have not interfered, and 
shall not interfere. But with the governments who 
have declared their independence and maintained it, and 
whose independence we have, on great consideration and 
on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any 
interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or con- 
trolling in any other manner their destiny, by any Euro- 
pean power, in any other light than as the manifestation of 
an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. . . . 
"... Our policy in regard to Europe, which was 
adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long 
agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains 
the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal con- 
cerns of any of its powers; . . . 

". ... It is impossible that the allied powers should 
extend their political system to any portion of either con- 
tinent without endangering our peace and happiness; . . , 
It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold 
such interposition, in any form, with indifference . . . "^ 
ij. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II., 2089: 
Am. St. Pap. For. ReL, V., 246, 250. 

105 



An analysis of these portions of the message produces the 
following brief propositions as the essence of the doctrine : 

1. The policy of the United States with reference to 

Europe is not to interfere in the internal concerns 
of any of its powers, and not to take part in any of 
their wars which concern such powers only. 

2. In both continents of the Western Hemisphere, the 

United States has an immediate interest. Neither 
continent can be considered as open to future coloni- 
zation by any European power. 

3. No European power may extend its political system 

beyond its present limits in either continent. 

4. Any attempt of any European power or combination 

of such powers so to extend its or their political sys- 
tem, and particularly any interposition of any such 
power or powers which would in any way control the 
political destinies of the Spanish-American nations 
will be considered as so dangerous to the peace, safety 
and happiness of the United States that they would 
not behold the same with indifference, but would 
consider it as a manifestation of an unfriendly 
disposition and act accordingly. 
These propositions are essentially the same in principle as 
the foreign policy thought out by Washington^ and applied by 
him in 1792* during his first administration, in his refusal to 
allow Great Britain to intervene between the United States 
and the Indians, and in his Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793.3 
This traditional American foreign policy, and its two 
complementary principles of no intervention in European 
affairs and of no toleration of any intervention by any non- 
American nation in the affairs of the American nations, both 
based upon that natural right of the nation to protect itself, 
are clearly summed up, and openly and deliberately announced 
to the world in this message of President Monroe. 

At the time when this message was published little if 
anything was thought politically of Asia, Africa, or Austraha, 
and the United States was not then menaced from any of those 
quarters. While the message refers to European powers, the 
principles laid down apply in essence to all non-American na- 
tions, and to Japan as well as to France. 

It is to be noted also that these complementary principles 
involved in the Monroe Doctrine do not comprise all the 
foreign policies of the United States. On the contrary, the 
Doctrine is strictly limited and is confined to the subjects which 
it purports to cover. < 

iQlney to Bayard, July 20, 1895 — Senate Ex. Doc.,ji-34th Cong. isi. 
Sess., p. 4. 

*H. C. Lodge, George Washington, II., 145. 
*Ibid, II., 144, 145, 185. 
^E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, 117. 
106 



CHAPTER VIII— THE DOCTRINE TESTED 



The Monroe Doctrine has been tested at various times by 
France, Spain, Germany, Great Britian and Japan, but the 
United States has resolutely maintained this policy to the present 
time. 



A— FRANCE 
(a) As TO Cuba. 



When President Monroe's message was published in Europe, 
Chateaubriand, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated 
that the principles therein enunciated, 

"Ought to be resisted by the Powers possessing either 

territorial, or commercial, interest in that Hemisphere."* 

This undoubtedly reflected the attitude of official France, 
for that country, despoiled of the Napoleonic conquests by the 
Treaty of Vienna, desired colonies and looked with eager eyes 
at South and at Central America, as well as at Cuba, and the other 
islands of the West Indies. Hence she bitterly resented the 
recognition of the South American nations by the United States. 

Prior to 1825 Great Britain had made one or more unsuc- 
cessful efforts to buy Cuba from Spain. « Apparently she con- 
templated seizing it in 1823." In 1825 Great Britain feared 
that Cuba might be acquired by the United States, and Canning 
was bitterly opposed to any such measure.* 

The menace of France to Great Britain from the western 
hemisphere was more or less taken care of by Canning in 1823, 
so that he had no fear in suggesting that Great Britain would 
rather see France secure Cuba than the United States.^ 

Subsequently, in 1825, France, then the second largest 
naval power in the world, sent a fleet to Cuba. At that 
time the rumor was widespread that Spain intended to transfer 
the island to France. Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, 
realizing the threatened infringement of the doctrine, and under 
the direction of President John Quincy Adams, promptly 

^Quoted by A. B. Hart, The Monroe Docttine, p. 84. 

*"From various sources intimations have been received here that the 
British Government have it in contemplation to obtain possession of the 
island [Cuba] . . . they have been for more than two vears in secret 
negotiation with Spain for the cession of the island," Adams to Forsyth, 
Dec. 17, 1822, MS. Inst. U. S. Ministers, IX., 158: See generally Niles' 
Register, Nov. 8, 1817, and The Cession of the Floridas to the United States 
of America, and the Necessity of Acquiring the Island of Ctiba by Great Brit- 
ain, (London, 1819.). 

^Corresp. of Canning, I., 116, 117 (note). 

^Wellington' s Despatches, I., 511, 545. 

'DeVillele, Memoirs, V., 160. 

107 



applied the principles underlying the Monroe Doctrine, and 
notified France that the United States could not under any 
circumstances whatever^ permit any power other than Spain 
to possess Cuba, or Porto Rico. This has been frequently 
stated to be the first occasion when the principle was actually 
applied to the prohibition of the transfer of American colonies 
by one European power to another. However, such a trans- 
fer clearly would have been contrary to the intent of the Doc- 
trine, and a violation of its fundamental principles. If 
France at that time contemplated the annexation of Cuba, she 
did not press the matter any further. 

(b) As TO Mexico. 

In 1821 Mexico became independent and thereafter set up 
a republican form of government. During a revolution in 1851 
President Comonfort was driven from the capital. Zuloaga 
was made President by the rebels and his government, estab- 
lished at Mexico City, was recognized as the de facto govern- 
ment of Mexico by the United States and by other powers. 
Meanwhile Juarez, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, pur- 
porting to act under the Mexican constitution, organized 
a rival government at Vera Cruz. Zuloaga later substituted 
Miramon for himself as President. Miramon published a 
decree in October 1859, providing for the issue of $15,000,000 
of Mexican bonds, expecting to raise by such issue the sum of 
1:750,000. Jecker, the Swiss promoter or underwriter of the 
issue, failed, and the bonds got into the hands of his creditors. 
France in 1861 made a claim against Mexico for several millions 
of dollars, including torts against French subjects in Mexico and 
defaults on this Miramon bond issue, ^ the then government of 
Mexico having denied the validity of such issue. » 

On October 31, 1861, while the United States was engaged 
by the Civil War, France, Great Britain and Spain, all alleging 
claims of similar nature against Mexico,^ agreed to act jointly 
against her,^ declaring their intention, however, not to inter- 
fere with Mexico's right to determine her own form of Govern- 
ment. « Their combined forces seized Vera Cruz in December 

Mm. State Pap. For. Rel., V., 855. 

''Wharton's Digest of Int. Law., I., 312, Sect. 58: J. B. Moore, Dig. 
of Int. Law, VI., 483, 484. 

^Br. & For. St. Pap., LIT., 294. 

*Br. & For. St. Pap., LII.: House Ex. Doc. loo-j^th, Cong., 2 Sess.; 
J. B. Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 483, 484. 

^Br. &■ For. St. Pap., LII.. 398. 

*"The high contracting parties bind themselves not to seek for 
themselves . . . any acquisition of territory . . . antJ not to exercise in 
the subsequent affairs of Mexico any influence of a character to impair the 
right of the Mexcian nation to choose and freelv to constitute the form of 
its own government." Br. & For. St. Pap., LII., 398: J. H. Latane, The 
U. S. &' Latin America, pp. 203, 204: House Ex. Doc, loo-jyth Cong., 2 Sess., 
pp. 185, 187: P. F. Martin, Maximilian in Mexico, App. I., 436-438. 

108 



of that year. Great Britain and Spain soon settled their 
disputes with Mexico and withdrew from the enterprise; 
on the other hand, the French remained and seized Mexico 
City in 1863. 

Thereafter France, by the aid of her forces, placed and sup- 
ported Maximilian, an Austrian Prince, upon the Mexican 
throne, with the title of "Emperor of Mexico. "^ Maximilian's 
Government was recognized by most of the European Govern- 
ments, but not by the United States. 

William F. Seward, Secretary of State, replying to a sug- 
gestion that the United States join with the Allies in such inter- 
vention, stated that, 

"The United States, so far as it is practicable, prefer 
to adhere to a traditional policy recommended to them 
by the Father of their country and confirmed by a happy 
experience, which forbids them from making alliances with 
foreign nations: Second, Mexico being a neighbor of the 
United States on this continent, and possessing a system 
of government similar to our own in many of its important 
features, the United States . . . cherish ... a lively in- 
terest in its security, prosperity and welfare. "2 / 

By reason of the relations of the North and the South, 
Mr. Seward at that time, could take no risk of involving the 
United States in war with any other country, and insistence 
upon the "Monroe Doctrine" in so many words would prob- 
ably have meant the recognition of the Confederate States by 
some nation or nations and consequently war.' 

Although the words "Monroe Doctrine" were not used, 
Seward asserted in as diplomatic a way as possible under the 
circumstances those principles of the traditional American for- 
eign policy which were the basis of the Monroe Doctrine.^ 
When, however, after the battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, 
the Civil War began to turn in favor of the Union, Seward 
changed his method of meeting the situation and spoke more 
boldly. 5 

On September 26, 1863, Secretary Seward declared: 

"Their [United States] own safety and the cheerful 

destiny to which they aspire are intimately dependent on 

the continuance of free republican institutions throughout 

iWharton, Dig. of Int. Law, I, 299-338: J. H. Latene, The U. S. & 
Lat. Am., pp. 193-237. 

^House Ex. Doc. 100-37 Cong. 2 sess., pp. 187-190: Br. &f For. St. 
Pap., LII, 394-397. 

'A. B. Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 148, 149: J. H. Latane, The 
U. S. & Latin American pp. 217, 218: Sen. Ex. Doc. ii-j8th, Cong., i Sess. 
p. 471. 

^J B. Moore, Prin. of Am. Diplom., p. 260. 

^J. H. Latane, The U. S. and Latin America, p. 226. 

109 



America ... In no case are we likely to neglect such pro- 
vision for our own safety as every sovereign state must 
always be prepared to fall back upon.''^ 

On April 4, 1864, the House of Representatives declared 
that, 

"The Congress of the United States . . . declare that 
it does not accord with the policy of the United States 
to acknowledge any monarchial Government erected on 
the ruins of any republican Government in America under 
the auspices of any European Power. "^ 

In 1865 about 100,000 Union troops, released from war 
service, were sent to the Texas border, under General Sheridan, 
and on November 6, 1865, Mr. Seward, through John Bigelow, 
our Minister at Paris, notified France that 

"The presence and operations of a French army in 
Mexico and its maintenance of an authority there, resting 
upon force and not the free will of the people of Mexico, 
is a cause of serious concern to the United States." . . .' 

On February 12, 1866, with the Civil War well out of the 
way, Seward demanded that France state definitely when she 
intended to withdraw her forces from Mexico,* and on April 
6, 1866, Napoleon III., confronted with the insistence of the 
United States upon this principle of the doctrine, issued the 
necessary orders for such withdrawal.* Maximilian's Empire 
collapsed in 1867 and the republic w^as restored. 

B. SPAIN 

As has been stated, Spain acted for a time with France 
and England in the matter of intervention in Mexico in 1861. 
One reason for her withdrawal from that expedition was a 
desire to concentrate her efforts in an attempt to reconquer 
Santo Domingo. In pursuance of this design Spain sent troops 
to Santo Domingo in 1861, whereupon the Dominicans appealed 
to the United States, 

Mr. Seward then notified Spain that the United States, 
"Would be obliged to regard them [the proceedings] 

as manifesting an unfriendly spirit towards the United 

States. "« 

diplomatic Corresp. (1863), II., 709. 

2J. B. Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 496. 

*Ms. Instr. France, XVII., 46. 

*House Ex. Doc, gj — 39th, Cong, i sess. 

^Ibid, 42. 

•Seward to Tassara, Apr. 2, 1861, MS. Notes to Span. Leg., VII., 200: 
Moore Dig. oj Int. Law, VI. 515. 

Seward to Schurtz, Apr. 2, 1861, MS. Inst. Spain, XV., 263: Moore, 
Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 515. 

110 



Spain, however, in spite of this protest, annexed Santo 
Domingo, the United States at the time being too much con- 
cerned with the Civil War to carry her protest to actual hos- 
tilities. In view of Seward's attitude toward the occupation 
of Santo Domingo, however, there can be no serious doubt 
but that the United States, when free of her domestic difficulties, 
would have insisted upon the applicability of the Doctrine, and 
would have made the same demand upon Spain to evacuate 
Santo Domingo that she made upon France with reference to 
Mexico. 

However, before that time arrived, Spain, finding the 
task too great, relieved the United States of that necessity 
by withdrawing from the island, definitely abandoning the 
project on April 30, 1865. ' 

C. GERMANY 

Shortly after the settlement of the Venezuelan boundary 
question between Venezuela and Great Britain, which will be 
referred to hereafter, Germany and Great Britain, in 1902, made 
demands upon Venezuela arising out of alleged mistreatment of 
their subjects. Other claims of Germany were based on con- 
tracts between German subjects and the government of Ven- 
ezuela. ^ Both European Powers agreed to, and effected, a 
reprisal program, which included a blockade of Venezuelan ports, 
and the seizing of Venezuelan warships,* in which procedure 
they were joined by Italy. Germany apparently was deter- 
mined to make a test of the Monroe Doctrine, at the exact time 
when the United States was negotiating a treaty with Colombia 
for the lease of a canal route across the Isthmus of Panama.* 

The American minister to Venezuela, acting under in- 
structions of the State Department, persuaded Venezuela to 
agree to recognize the principle of the claims and to arbitrate 
the amounts of them.* Great Britain and Italy also agreed 
to this proposition, but Germany declined, « and it was only 
by reason of the direct pressure exerted upon Germany by 
President Roosevelt that Germany finally consented to arbi- 
trate. Mr. Roosevelt informed the German ambassador at 
Washington that unless Germany agreed to arbitrate, Admiral 
Dewey and the American fleet, then manoeuvering around the 
West Indies, would be ordered to Venezuelan waters in ten 
days. A week later when the German ambassador declared 
that no word upon the matter had been received from his 

iMoore, Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 517, 518. 

Mot. St. Pap. For. Rel. (1901), p. 193: Am. St. Pap. For. Rel. (1903), 
pp. 427-429. 

Mot. St. Pap. For. Rel. (1903) 419-454: Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, VII., 
140. 

*T. B. Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 268, 269. 

'Moore, Dtg. of Int. Law, VI., 590. 

•J. H. Latand, The U. S. and Latin America, p. 252. 

Ill 



government, Roosevelt stated that Admiral Dewey's orders 
would be issued one day earlier, and gave Germany forty- 
eight hours to agree to arbitrate her claims. Within thirty- 
six hours Germany consented to do so.^ 

At the outset, Secretary of State Hay, had notified Ger- 
many that President Roosevelt had stated in his message to 
Congress of December 3, 1901. 

"We do not ask under this doctrine [Monroe] for any 
exclusive commercial dealings with any other American 
State. We do not guarantee any state against pun- 
ishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punish- 
ment does not take the form of the requisition of territory 
by any non- American power. "^ 

When, however, Germany, with the justice of her claim 
conceded, refused to arbitrate the amount, it began to look 
as if Germany had some ulterior motive in such refusal. Par- 
ticularly significant was this refusal in view of Germany's desire 
for colonies. 

Germany came into the field for colonies about 1890, after 
all available spots for colonization had been occupied by other 
nations. Her demand for colonies, therefore, meant their 
seizure from other powers. In this respect South America offered 
an attractive field, particularly in view of the number of German 
emigrants located there.' 

When, therefore, Germany refused arbitration. President 
Roosevelt, without discussing in words the traditional foreign 
policy of the United States, and without referring to the Monroe 
Doctrine by name, all of which was well known to Germany, at 
once brought into action the one force which has always stood 
behind that policy, viz., the American fleet, and indicated to 
the world in a most positive way that the United States in- 
tended to fight if necessary in support of that policy. The 
intimation itself, however, was sufficient. 

D. JAPAN 
In 1912 Japan was generally supposed to be engaged in an 
attempt to secure control of land in Magdalena Bay on the 
Pacific Coast of Mexico. It was reported that the purchase 
had been, or was to be negotiated in the name of a Japanese 
company. ■» Such an indirect method of securing a foothold in 
the Western hemisphere would be most ingenious, for while 
nominally title to such territory might be in the subjects of 
Japan, yet in time of the Empire's need, the holdings of such 

'W. R. Thayer, Lije and Letters of John Hay, if., 286-288. 
^J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 6662- 
6663: J. H. Latan6, The U. S. and Latin America, pp. 252-255. 
'A. B Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 269-278. 
'^Congressional Record, 62nd Congress, 2nd Sess., XLVIII., 5661-5663. 

112 



subjects, to all intents and purposes, would be the holdings of 

Japan. 

The situation appeared to be so threatening that Senator 

Lodge introduced into the United States Senate a resolution 

which was adopted in the following form: 

"Resolved, that when any harbor or other place in the 
American continents is so situated that the occupation 
thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the 
communications or the safety of the United States, the 
government of the United States could not see without 
grave concern the possession of such harbor, or other 
place by any corporation or association which has such 
a relation to another Government, not American, as to 
give that Government practical power or control for 
military or naval purposes. "^ 

Close analysis of this resolution shows the application of 
the same principle of our foreign policy as that upon which 
was based Monroe's message of December 2, 1823. Resting 
upon the same right of national self-preservation, and denying 
any foreign nation the right to interfere in purely American 
concerns, the Lodge resolution follows closely and logically 
the traditional American foreign policy. Lest, however, 
there be any doubt in the minds of any foreign statesmen, 
as to the exact extent to which such principle was applicable, 
this resolution proclaims definitely that the United States 
understands that the policy applies to all non-American Powers, 
Asiatic as well as European, and to all attempts, direct or 
indirect, to secure any foothold upon the two American con- 
tinents. 

E.— GREAT BRITAIN 

At the time that the Holy or Quadruple Alliance was 
threatening to intervene in the affairs of the Spanish-American 
colonies, Great Britain was interested in preventing France 
from extending her power to Spanish- America. As has been 
stated. Great Britain had secured great commercial advan- 
tages in the South American countries by reason of Spain's 
difficulties. Her desire for a joint declaration with the United 
States was to prevent such an intervention. 

Canning's suggestion was apparently designed to make it 
impossible for the United States to secure any territory in 
Spanish-America, and he was greatly disappointed when the 
United States, refusing such a joint declaration, enunciated 
the Monroe Doctrine. That doctrine was aimed not only 
at the intervention threatened, but was also directed against 
any new colonization or extension of the political system of 
any European power to the American Continents. This struck 

^Cong. Rec. 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., XLVIII, 9923. 

113 



at Great Britain more than at any other nation by reason of her 
holdings on these continents which she could not thereafter 
extend save at the risk of war with the United States. 

Great Britain's earlier activities with reference to Cuba 
have already been referred to, as have also Great Britain's 
activities in Mexico in 1861 and in Venezuela in 1902. 

(a) As TO Cuba. 

In 1840 considerable agitation was caused by the report 
that Great Britain was about to annex or seize Cuba. On 
July 15, 1840, Secretary of State Forsyth wrote our Minister 
to Spain that, 

"the United States will prevent it [transfer of title 

or possession to Cuba from Spain to Great Britain] . . . 

at all hazards . . . and ... in case of any attempt . . . 

to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may 

securely depend upon the military and naval resources of 

the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering 

it."i 

In 1843 when British interference in Cuba was again feared, 
Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, wrote our Consul at 
Havana with reference to the same subject that, 

"... the United States never would permit the 

occupation of that Island by British . . . ".^ 

He also renewed the "guaranty" of assistance to Spain to 
prevent Cuba's being wrested from her. No definite action, 
other than as stated in the way of interfering with Cuba was 
taken at this time by Great Britain. 

From 1849 to 1851 preparations were on foot for the in- 
vasion of Cuba from over seas, by armed bodies under the Cuban 
patriot, Lopez. At least three of these expeditions reached 
Cuba.* In 1851 British and French representatives at Wash- 
ington notified our government that orders had been issued 
to their fleets, then in Cuban waters, to repel all attempts at 
invasion of Cuba. To this the United States replied that 
such steps could 

"not but be regarded . . . with grave disapproval, as in- 
volving on the part of European sovereigns combined 
action of protectorship over American waters."* 

Thereafter, on April 23, 1852, Great Britain and France 
suggested that an abnegatory declaration as to Cuba be exe- 

'Forsyth to Vail, July 15, 1840, MS. Instr. Spain, XIV., Ill: House 
Ex. Doc. I2i-32nd, Cong, i Sess. 

^Webster to Campbell, House Ex. Doc, I2i — 32nd, Cong., i Sess. 
»J. H. Latan6, The U. S. and Latin Am., pp. 92-96. 
*Curtis, Life oj Webster, II., 551. 

114 



cuted by them and by the United States.' This proposition, 
however, was definitely rejected by the United States and the 
afifair ended. 

(b) As TO Yucatan. 

In 1848 there was an Indian outbreak in Yucatan and the 
authorities of that country, apparently unable to cope with the 
outbreak, offered to transfer to the United States "the dominion 
and sovereignty" of that country. Similar offers were also made 
to Great Britain and Spain. 

President Polk in a special message to Congress on April 
29, 1848, while disclaiming any desire for the annexation of 
Yucatan, referred to the Monroe Doctrine and stated that, 
"according to our established policy, we could not con- 
sent to a transfer of this 'dominion and sovereignty' 
to either Spain, Great Britain, or any other European 
power."' 

The trouble between the Indians and the Whites later 
blew over and no further action was taken by Yucatan, and 
there is no evidence that Great Britain ever pursued this 
offer of Yucatan.' 

This subject is treated here, not because it amounted to 
any test of the Doctrine initiated by Great Britain, for it 
was not. It is so treated, merely because Yucatan offered to 
transfer sovereign rights in American territory to Spain and 
Great Britain, and Great Britain was the more able and likely 
to accept that offer. 

(c) As TO Belize, the Mosquito Coast, the Bay Islands, 

AND TiGRE Island. 

The strip of territory bordering the Caribbean Sea, just 
south of Yucatan and known as British Honduras, or Belize, has 
been, and may yet be a cause of much concern between the 
United States and Great Britain. The territory was formerly 
a part of the Spanish province of Yucatan. A group of British 
adventurers, engaged in the business of cutting and exporting 
logwood, settled in this territory about 1682.^ They were 
limited to certain territory by a concession from Spain. The 
settlers, however, constantly overstepped these limits and 
frequent trouble between the British and Spanish resulted. 

In 1763 these nations sought to remedy the trouble by a 
treaty whereby Great Britain acknowledged Spain's sovereignty 
over Belize, and agreed to demolish all fortifications con- 

^Sen. Ex. Doc, 13-32nd, Cong., 2d sess. 

^S. Ex. Docs. 40, 45, 4Q,joth, Cong, i, sess; Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, 
VI., 423, 424. 

'See generally Br. & For. St. Pap., LI., 1184, et seq. 
*A. R. Gibbs, British Honduras, p. 26. 

115 



structed therein by the British settlers. ^ The settlers, how- 
ever, still persisted in extending the sphere of their operations, 
and, upon war with England breaking out in 1779, the Spanish 
destroyed the settlement. ^ Great Britain thereupon protested, 
but took no other action against Spain. In 1783 the British 
again entered Belize and engaged in their log wood activities, 
and again trouble began. ' 

On September 3, 1783, a new treaty was negotiated between 
Great Britain and Spain whereby Great Britain again recognized 
specifically the "rights of sovereignty of the King of Spain" 
over the district in question. < Friction arose, or rather contin- 
ued, even after this treaty.^ 

Another treaty was therefore executed in 1786, which con- 
firmed the prior treaties, and by the terms of which Spain allowed 
the British to extend their woodcutting, the "lands in question, 
however, being indisputably acknowledged to belong of right to 
the King of Spain. "« Great Britain also agreed to evacuate 
"the country of theMosquitoes as well as the continent in general 
and the islands adjacent." Trouble and warfare still persisted. 

A new treaty was negotiated in 1814' which among other 
things provided for the ratification and confirmation of the 
status provided for in the treaty of 1786, which as has 
been said, expressly recognized the sovereignty of Spain over 
Belize. 

In 1825 Great Britain suggested that the provisions of this 
1786 treaty be incorporated in a proposed treaty between Great 
Britain and New Granada.* In 1831 she did likewise with 
reference to a proposed treaty with the Republic of Central 
America.* In 1826 she actually incorporated these provisions 
in her treaty with Mexico, i" 

It is clear therefore that up to 1831 Great Britain had never 
acquired, or, in fact, asserted any title to this territory. 

The Bay Islands, a group of small islands off the coast of 
Belize provided with good harbors, were also Spanish territory, 
and no rights whatever under any of the treaties mentioned 
were ever accorded British subjects in these islands. On the 
contrary, the terms of the treaty of 1786 whereby Great Britain 

^L. Hertslet, Collection of Treaties Between Great Britain and Other 
Powers, II., 233-235. 

*A. R. Gibbs, British Honduras, pp. 41, 42. 

'L. Hertslet, Collection of Treaties, II, 237: A. R. Gibbs, British 
Honduras, 44, 45. 

^L. Hertslet, Collection of Treaties, II., 235-241. 

*A. R. Gibbs, British Honduras, 49-57. 

6L. Hertslet, Collection of Treaties, II., 245, 255: A. R. Gibbs, Br. 
Honduras, pp. 46, 47: Correspondence Relating to Inter oceanic Canal etc. 
(1885), pp. 171, 172. 

'J. 13. Henderson, Jr., American Diplomatic Questions, pp. 105, 106. 
L. Hertslet, Collection of Treaties, II., 269-273. 

*T. B. Edgington, r/je Monroe Doctrine, p. 64. 

nbid, p. 64. 
lo/Wd, p. 64. 

116 



agreed to abandon the continent and adjacent islands, included 
within their scope the abandonment of the Bay Islands. ^ 

Such was the international status of Belize and the Bay 
Islands until 1822 when theCentral American nations, including 
Honduras, established their independence. Belize and the Bay 
Islands then naturally came under the jurisdiction of Honduras. 
The title and the possession of Honduras to both remained 
unquestioned and undisputed until 1835, when the British 
settlers in Belize undertook to organize a local government which 
they styled "British Honduras," and in 1840 proclaimed that 
"the law of England is and shall be the law of this settlement or 
colony of British Honduras. "^ 

British Honduras thereupon laid claim to the strip of coast, 
known as the Mosquito Coast, the eastern frontier of Honduras 
and Nicaragua, as far south as the San Juan River, which 
effectually dominated the eastern entrance of any interoceanic 
canal such as was then contemplated, through Nicaragua. The 
British claim to the Mosquito Coast rested upon the absurd 
theory that the tribe of Mosquito Indians who occupied it had 
sovereign rights over it, and had requested its establishment 
into a British Protectorate. 

But in the Treaty of 1786 between Great Britain and Spain, 
the former recognized the sovereignty of the latter over the 
entire Mosquito Coast, which was an effectual denial of any 
sovereignty residing in the Mosquito Indians. In 1841 Great 
Britain announced this protectorate, and in 1848 in open 
defiance of the Monroe Doctrine drove all the Nicaraguans 
from the town of San Juan del Norte, at the Mouth of the San 
Juan River, occupied it, and called it Greytown.^ The United 
States, however, never recognized any such sovereignty in the 
Mosquito Indians,* and protested against the establislunent of 
any such alleged protectorate. 

On October 16, 1849, British forces seized Tigre Island off 
the west coast of Honduras^ which would control the western 
entrance of any interoceanic canal through Nicaragua. 

Great Britain, therefore, in 1849 occupied Belize, the 
Mosquito Coast, and Tigre Island without title to any of them. 
There can be no question but that the Monroe Doctrine was 
violated by her then asserted possession of all these places. 
If the United States had considered the situation sufficiently 
menacing and had been ready to apply the Doctrine and the 
force necessary to maintain it, there was no valid reason why 



45. 



1 Hertslet Coll. of Treaties, II., 237: A. R. Gibbs, Br. Honduras, pp. 44, 



2A. R. Gibbs, Br. Honduras, p. 92. 

'J B. Henderson, Jr., Am. Diplo. Questions, pp. 106, 107. 

«Marcy to Ingersoll, June 9, 1843, MS. Inslr. Great Britain, XVI., 210: 
Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, III., 150, 151: Marcy to Buchanan, Aug. 6, 1855, 
H. Ex. Doc. 1-34 Cong. — i sess., 69, 71: Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, III., 164: 
J. H. Latane, The U. S. and Latin Am., p. 158. 

*J. B. Henderson, Jr., Am. Diplo. Questions, p. 109. 

117 



this country should not have done so. As a matter of fact, 
Mr. Clayton, then Secretary of State, began to negotiate a 
treaty with Great Britain to secure a settlement of the difficulties 
arising from Great Britain's activities in Central America. 
These negotiations were apparently entirely outside the Monroe 
Doctrine. At least both Clayton and Bulwer, the British 
diplomat, both so stated. ^ 

By the terms of this Clayton-Bulwer treaty the United 
States and Great Britain agreed not to 

"occupy or fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise 

any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito 

Coast, or any part of Central America. "^ 



Almost immediately after the execution of this treaty. 
Great Britain asserted that Belize was not a part of "Central 
America" as that phrase was used in the treaty, ^ that such 
phrase applied only to the five republics formerly grouped in 
the "Republic of Central America,"^ and hence that Behze did 
not come within the treaty requirement that Great Britain 
abandon such territory as she held in "Central America." 
Clayton for some reason agreed to this proposition,^ and was 
most bitterly criticized therefor in Congress.® It is to be noted 
that although Belize was thereby excluded from "Central 
America," Honduras of which it had been and was a part, was 
included in "Central America" so defined. 

In 1852 with this proposition apparently established. Great 
Britain, violating the treaty, seized the Bay Islands, contending 
that they were dependencies of Belize and on July 17, 1852, 
established them into the British "Colony of the Bay Islands." 
The United States protested against this seizure, contending 
that it was a violation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.^ 

"It seems to be a just conclusion that when in 1852 

the Bay Islands were erected into a British 'colony' this 

was a flagrant infraction of the treaty; that as regards 

iBulwer letter of June 29, 1850, Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, III., 136, 
137: Clarendon to Bulwer, July 4, 1850, House Ex. Doc. i~j4 Cong, i sess., 
p. 119. 

^Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, Art. I. Moore's Dig. Int Law, III., 130. 

'Bulwer letter, June 29, 1850: Moore's Dig. Int. Law, III., 136, 137: 
Wharton, Dig. of Int. Law, II., 190. 

^Guatemala Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Honduras, — Clay- 
ton Speech in Senate, March 9, 1853, — Cong. Globe, j2d. Cong. 2d. sess., p. 
248. 

D. G. Munroe, The Five Republics of Central Atjierica. 

'Clayton to Bulwer, July 4, 1850, House Ex. Doc. 1-34, Cong, i sess., 
119: Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, 137. 

'Cong. Globe, 32, Cong. 2d. sess., App. 260-261. 

''Correspo. Relating to Interoceanic Canal, etc., 1885, 245: S. Douglass' 
speech, Cong. Globe, 32 Cong. 2 Sess., App. 260-261. 

118 



Belize, the American arguments were decidedly stronger 
and more correct historically. "^ 

As a result of Great Britain's attitude trouble increased 
and the situation became very threatening. ^ The matter, 
however, was adjusted by a treaty between Great Britain and 
the Republic of Honduras, signed on November 28, 1859, pro- 
viding for the recognition of the sovereignty of Honduras over 
the Bay Islands, and that part of the Mosquito Coast within 
the frontier of that republic,^ and a treaty with Nicaragua, 
signed on January 28, 1860, recognizing the latter's sovereignty 
over that portion of the Mosquito Coast "within the frontier 
of that republic."^ Though England in 1880 was reported to 
be then attempting to secure a cession of the Bay Islands from 
Honduras nothing ever developed from it.* 

In 1888, and again in 1894, the United States protested 
against British interference in Mosquito Coast affairs,^ in the 
latter year sending marines to Bluefields ostensibly to protect 
American interests. Great Britain having landed troops prior 
thereto.^ On both occasions Great Britain alleged that her 
interference was to secure to the Mosquito Indians rights under 
the British treaty with Honduras of 1860. On November 20, 
1894, the Mosquito Indians by a treaty surrendered to Nicaragua 
all their rights under the 1860 British treaty and this was ratified 
by Nicaragua on February 27, 1895. This new treaty removed 
any cause for further interference by Great Britain on that 
basis. 8 

This Clayton-Bulwer treaty, executed in 1850 has been 
charged up many times as a diplomatic defeat for this country. 
This charge has been based in part upon the fact that Great 
Britain, while apparently making great concessions, had nothing 
which she could concede, and that having no right in Central 
America, no such treaty should have been made with her. 
This charge has also been based on the fact that the Monroe 
Doctrine was not asserted against Great Britain as it might 
well have been. 

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty had this effect, that whereas 
Great Britain had no legal rights in Central America, yet, by 

'Cambridge Edition (1910) of the Encylopedia Britannica, vol. VI., 
495. 

^Buchanan's Message, Dec. 3, 1860, Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents V 639 

^Br. & For. St. Pap., XLIX., 13: Moore's Int. Arbitrations, II., 2106. 

*Br. & For. St. Pap., L., 96-105: Moore's Int. Arbitrations, II., 2106. 

"Evarts to Logan, Mar. 4, 1880— MS. Instr. Cent. Am. XVIII. ,73: 
Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 432. 

•Bayard to Phelps, Nov. 23, 1888, House Ex. Doc, 50 Cong. 2d sess., 
vol. 1, Pt. I., 759-768. 

^Gresham to Bayard, Apr. 30, 1894, Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, III., 
246. 

' *Am. St. Pap. For. Rel. (1894), Appendix I., 234-363: Moore's Dig. 
of Int. Law, III., 250-252. 

119 



becoming a party to such treaty, she established a basis for her 
contention that she was to be considered in all future matters 
relative to an interoceanic canal across the Isthmus of Panama. 
The importance of that fact will be discussed hereafter. 

(d) As TO THE Panama Canal 

The affairs of Belize, the Bay Islands, and the Mosquito 
Coast are most intimately connected with the relations of the 
United States and Great Britain to the Panama Canal, and the 
importance of these places in the political relations between the 
two countries has been tremendously increased by the construc- 
tion and operation of that interoceanic canal. 

"Its relation to our power and prosperity as a nation, 

to our means of defense, our unity, peace, and safety, are 

matters of paramount concern to the people of the United 

States."! 

The control of the approaches to both sides of the canal is 
as important as the control of the canal itself, or to put it in 
other words, the nation that controls the islands or coasts by 
which vessels intending to use the canal must pass, effectually 
dominates that canal. In times of peace, that control furnishes 
coaling or oil stations, and reshipment points, which relate to 
commercial competition only, but in times of war, that control 
vitally affects the very existence of any nation depending upon 
that canal for the protection of its shores or of its communica- 
tions. It is apparent that the nations controlling such strategic 
islands or coasts, are in possession of interior points, that is, points 
upon the line of communications necessarily passing through 
the canal. They can base their war fleets, battleships, swift 
cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft upon such places, 
and can greatly curtail or even prevent merchantmen and war- 
ships from passing such points and from entering into the canal, 
by the simple process of harassing raids conducted from such 
points.'' 

It is to be noted that there is a semi-circle of islands in the 
Caribbean, which control the approach to the canal from the 
East. Jamaica, which has been in British control since 1655, is the 
innermost of those islands, and hence the most valuable strate- 
gically, in that it controls all routes from the East, the other 
islands merely controlling certain alternative passages . * Various 
other islands control the passage into the Caribbean and to the 
Canal from the southeast. Bermuda and the Bahama Islands, 
also British, control the passage between them and the North 
American continent from the North Atlantic into the Carib- 

*Pres. Hayes' Message Mar. 8, 1880, Messages & Papers of the Pres., 
VIT., 585: Sen. Ex. Doc, Ii2~46th, Cong. 2 sess. 

^A. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power on History, pp. 29-35: Naval 
Strategy, pp. 38, 53, 102, 139, 382. 

»A. Mahan, Naval Strategy, pp. 140, 194, 310, 316, 351-356. 

120 



bean, but are themselves subject to a later control from Florida, 
Cuba, Porto Rico and Jamaica. 

The strategic value of Belize, the Bay Islands, and the 
Mosquito Coast is, therefore, at once apparent. They, with 
Jamaica, would constitute an effectual eastern control of the 
Canal. 

Tigre Island occupies a somewhat similar position with re- 
ference to the western approach to the Canal. At the time of 
the seizures referred to, the canal contemplated was one which 
would traverse Nicaraguan territory, and these places occupied 
a much more important strategical position with reference to 
such a route, but their lessened importance with reference 
to the present canal is only a matter of degree. 

Undoubtedly this was the reason why Great Britain, with 
her usual foresight, seized these places. By their possession she 
not only would exercise a military and strategic control over 
any canal, but also, if the seizures were recognized, would make 
herself a necessary party to all proceedings concerning Central 
America, and particularly concerning any interoceanic canal. 

In 1846 the United States and Coltmibia (then New 
Granada) executed a treaty which was ratified in June, 1848, 
whereby Colirmbia guaranteed 

"that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of 

Panama . . . shall be open and free to the . . . United 

States . . ."1 

Apparently stirred by this treaty Great Britain, as has been 
stated seized and occupied Greytown in 1848^ and Tigre Island 
in 1849' which gave absolute control over the east and west 
approach to any canal by way of the San Juan River through 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica, which then was the more preferred 
route for an interoceanic canal. These seizures and other 
activities of Great Britain in Central America led to much 
friction between this country and Great Britain resulting in the 
negotiation and execution of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 

On June 21, 1849 Hise, our charge in Central America, 
negotiated a treaty with Nicaragua which would give the 
United States exclusive rights to construct a canal through that 
country.^ On September 16, 1849, Squier, our charge in Hon- 
duras, negotiated a treaty with Honduras providing for the 
cession of Tigre Island to the United States.^ 

^Compilation of Treaties (1904), pp. 194-206: Corresp. in Relation to 
Interoceanic Canal., etc. (1885), p. 5: Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, III., 5-7. 

^H. Ex. Doc. 75-3ist. Cong., i sess., 92-96. 

'Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, III., 135: Br. & For. St. Pap., XL., 997- 
1002, 1019. 

^Interoceanic Canal Corresp., pp. 94-99; 133: Br. & For. St. Pap., XL. 
969. 

^Br. 6f For. St. Pap. XL., 997-1002, 1019. 

121 



On October 16, 1849, Chatfield, the British Minister to 
Guatemala, with an armed force took possession of Tigre Island, 
as has been stated. The United States protested and Great 
Britain ordered the island restored to Honduras. ^ For some 
reason these treaties were never submitted to the Senate but 
were merely used as one basis for the negotiation of the Clayton- 
Bulwer Treaty. 

Clayton apparently disregarded Great Britain's absolute 
lack of sovereignty in Belize, the Mosquito Coast, the Bay 
Islands, and Tigre Island, in arriving at the terms of the treaty. 
This treaty is really the only occasion wherein the United States 
might be criticised for not asserting the Monroe Doctrine in all 
its force, 2 for clearly it applied to Great Britain's hold upon any 
part of Central America, which hold was the only reason for that 
nation being a party to such a treaty.' It is to be noted, how- 
ever, that if British Honduras or Belize did not come within 
the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as Great Britain con- 
tended,^ and as Clayton later stated, ^ which fact alone might 
be argued in favor of Clayton's manner of handling the treaty, 
then Great Britain's title to Belize was not recognized^ and the 
Monroe Doctrine may still be applied. 

As has been stated, this Clayton-Bulwer treaty was bitterly 
assailed in this country as a gratuitous concession to Great 
Britain, and as a surrender or sacrifice of the Monroe Doctrine. 
It does not in any way constitute such a surrender, for as was 
stated by Clayton, and Clarendon, it was negotiated without 
reference to the doctrine. '' 

In the discretion of the United States it was not then ap- 
plied, the emergency apparently not being deemed sufficiently 
menacing to necessitate a resort to it,« or to the force necessary 
to maintain it ; Great Britain's title to Belize however, was not 

iMoore's Dig. of Int. Law, III., 135: 

^Buchanan to McClernand, Apr. 2, 1850. in Am. Hist. Rev., Oct. 1899 

'J. H. Latan^, The U. S. and Latin Am., p. 157. 

^Bulwer Letter of June 29, 1850,— Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, III., 136, 
137: Clarendon to Buchanan, Mav 2, 1854, House Ex. Doc, i, J4 Cong., 
I sess., 89; Br. & For. St. Pap., XLVL, 267. 

^Clayton letter to Bulwer, July 4, 1850, H. Ex. Doc. i, 34 Cong, i sess. 
J19. 

Clayton Speech in Senate, March 9, 1853, Cong. Globe, J2nd Cong. 
2d Sess., pp. 248-251. 

^Interoceanic Canal Correspondence, etc. (1885) 234: Wharton's 
Digest of Int. Law, II., 190: Clayton to Bulwer, July 4, 1850, H. Ex. Doc. i- 
34th. Cong. 1st. sess., 119: Clayton Speech in Senate, March 9, 1853 — 
Cong. Globe, 32 Cong.-2d Sess., Appendix 248. 

Buchanan to Clarendon, July 22, 1854, Wharton, Digest of Int. Law, 
II., 193. 

''House Ex. Doc. 1-34, Cong., ist. Sess., 89-119. 

'Buchanan to Clarendon, Jan. 6, 1854, Wharton Digest of Int. Law, 
II., 191, 192. 

122 



recognized,! and if, in the future, her claims to BeHze do con- 
stitute a menace to the peace and safety of the United States, 
the doctrine may then be resorted to. 

The terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty appHed to a canal 
through the territory of Nicaragua or Costa Rica, supposedly 
to be built soon thereafter by private capital, under the pro- 
tection of both nations. It did not contemplate a canal to be 
built by the United States, with its own funds and upon its 
own territory. 2 

The Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901, which superceded the 
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, mentioned for the first time any canal to 
be constructed "under the auspices of the Government of the 
United States."' It also provided that "the said Government 
shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, 
as well as the exclusive rights of providing for the regulation and 
management of the canal." Even this Hay-Pauncefote treaty 
still contemplated the Nicaraguan Canal and did not refer to 
any canal to be built through United States territory. 

The canal, however, which was actually built traversed 
territory over which the United States had sovereign rights, 
and was built with American money. In addition to securing 
from the Republic of Panama the cession of the Canal Zone,* 
the United States acquired the rights of the French Canal Com- 
pany. Hence, because of the fact that the canal was constructed 
through American territory instead of through foreign territory, 
neither the Clayton-Bulwer treaty nor the Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty apply to the present canal, ^ for it is well settled that 
treaties made with reference to known conditions existing at the 
time of such execution cease to be obligatory "so soon as the 
conditions upon which they were executed, are essentially 
altered."" 

^The Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate on 
February 11, 1853, reported a resolution to the Senate to the effect that 
the exchange of ratifications after this Bulwer reservation amounted to an 
admission by both nations that "nothing contained in the treaty [Clayton- 
Bulwer] was to be considered as affecting the title or existing rights of 
Great Britain to the EngHsh settlements in Honduras Bay. . . " Co7tg. 
Globe, J2d Cong., 2 sess., p. ^67. 

''Clayton-Bulwer Treaty Preamble, Arts. I, VIII: Compilation of 
Treaties in Force, (1904), pp. 327, 328: Correspondence in Rel. to Interoceanic 
Canal {1S85), pp. 99-101. 

Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, III., 130: 

J. H. Latan6, The U. S. and Latin Am., pp. 144, 145, 165. 

^Compilation of Treaties {igo4)p^. 380-382: Senate Ex. Doc. 85, — 57th 
Cong. 1st. sess. 7: Moore, Digest of Int. Law, III., 219-221.: M. Poindexter, 
American Rights in Panama, in Foium, February, 1921. 

^Ani. St. Pap. For. Rel. (1904), p. 543: Compilation of Treaties (1904), 
pp. 609-616. 

*M. Poindexter, Am. Rights in Panama, in Forum, Feb., 1921, pp. 
134, 136. 

Hannis Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, pp. 148, 400. 

"Hannis Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, p. 400: Oppenheim Int. Law, I. 550. 

123 



Acting upon this principle Congress enacted a law in 1912 
which exempted American vessels from the payment of 
canal tolls. This, however, was only after: a long and bitter 
debate in which the British contention was most vigorously 
put forward that Great Britain's rights under the Hay-Paunce- 
fote treaty would be infringed in that the provision as to the 

canal being "free and open to the vessels of all nations 

... on terms of entire equality," prohibited such toll exemption. 

In 1914 President Wilson under a veiled implication as to 
difficult international relations, requested Congress to repeal 
that law, which Congress did.^ 

In 1921 Senator Borah introduced a bill into the Senate to 
re-establish that toll exemption. 

The United States has the right to establish such rules 
governing American ships with reference to the use of the Canal 
as it deems proper, particularly is this true as to coastwise ships 
which must necessarily be American. The Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty, apart from its abrogation in 1901, had been previously 
broken by Great Britain, by the refusal to withdraw from 
Central America and by her seizure of the Bay Islands, and 
therefore no longer bound the United States, if they elected not 
so to be bound. 2 The Hay-Pauncefote treaty does not apply 
in that it referred to conditions which did not attend the con- 
struction of the present Canal. Even if it did apply, the phrase 
"open to the vessels ... of all nations ... on terms of entire 
equality" logically refers to nations other than the United States. 
That this is so is indicated by the position of Great Britain in 
not contending that United States naval vessels should pay tolls, 
as they do not, while those of other nations do. It would be 
absurd to make such a contention because it would simply mean 
that the United States would pay tolls to itself. Yet the same 
provisions in the treaty covers "vessels of commerce and war." 

This question of tolls is but an incidental question, the 
settlement of which, however, will have a distinct effect upon the 
future of this country, because while it is but an incident in the 
affairs of the canal it really goes to the gist of the question of 
whether the United States is to be the exclusive sovereign over 
its own territory. Its settlement may have, and undoubtedly 
will have, a very vital effect upon the future of the Monroe 
Doctrine. 

(e) As TO Venezuela. 

Great Britain secured title to British Guiana from Holland 
under the treaty of 1814. The territory then ceded, however, 
was merely described as, "the establishments of Demarara, 

•As to this implication see The London Letters of Walter H. Page, in 
World's Work, Sept., 1921. 

^Frelinghuysen Despatch, May 8, 1882, Corresp. re Interoceanic Canal, 
etc. (1885), pp. 160, 161. 

124 



Essequibo, and Berbice," and thenceforth the boundary of this 
ceded territory was in dispute. ^ 

Great Britain began pushing her claim of jurisdiction north 
and west, and in 1841 sent Schomburgk, an engineer, to Guiana, 
to erect boundary posts. ^ These were erected far to the north 
and west of any previous boundary claims, but were asserted by 
Great Britain to be merely "a preliminary measure,"* and to 
leave open for discussion the determination of the correct 
boundary. Gradually, while Venezuela was constantly pro- 
testing against the encroachment, British colonists pushed still 
further north and west into Venezuelan territory, and Great 
Britain pushed its claim of title north and west with them. 
Venezuela frequently appealed to Great Britain to arbitrate, 
but Great Britain constantly refused, or offered to arbitrate 
only a part of that territory which Venezuela claimed to be 
improperly occupied by Great Britain, and refused to arbitrate 
title to any territory within the Schomburgk "preliminary" 
line.* 

President Cleveland, in a special message to Congress on 
December 17, 1895,^ which was based to a large extent on a 
despatch which Richard Olney, Secretary of State, had sent to 
Great Britain, on July 20, 1895, « and Lord Salisbury's reply 
thereto of November 26, 1895,^ insisted that the Monroe Doc- 
trine controlled the situation, and called for the appointment of 
an American Commission which was to be sent to Venezuela to 
report to the United States upon the true boundary. If Great 
Britain persisted in claiming beyond that, it would undoubtedly 
have meant war, for President Cleveland in that same message 
said, 

"When such report is made and accepted, it will, in 
my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist by 
every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its 
rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain 
of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over 
any territory which after investigation we have determined 
of right belongs to Venezuela. In making these recom- 
mendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred, 
and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow. 

"I am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that while 
it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English- 
speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than 
friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization, 

^J. H. Latan6, The U. S. and Latin America, p. 238. 
^G. Cleveland, Presidential Problems, pp. 178, 182. 
^Ibid, pp. 178-180. 
^Ibid, pp. 177-270. 

^Sen. Ex. Doc. 31 — 54 Cong., ist. sess.; Richardson's Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, IX., 655. 

^Sen. Ex. Doc. 31 — 54 Cong. ist. sess., p. 4. 
Ubid, 22. 

125 



and strenuous and worthy rivals in all arts of peace, 
there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which 
equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and 
injustice, and the consequent loss of national self-respect 
and honor, beneath which are shielded and defended a 
people's safety and greatness." 

Lord Salisbury in his reply to Olney had denied the ap- 
plicability of the Monroe Doctrine to the situation. For a time 
affairs were very threatening. Great Britain, however, capitu- 
lated and agreed to arbitrate the matter with Venezuela. 
Strangely enough, considering Great Britain's prior refusals to 
arbitrate, the decision was in a great measure, to the advantage 
of Great Britain. ^ 

Cleveland and Olney have been many times criticised for 
their handling of this situation. But their insistence upon the 
Monroe Doctrine and its applicability was as logical, cogently 
reasoned, and as thoroughly American in its purpose and effect 
as well might be desired. The later developments in the Carib- 
bean and in the Isthmus of Panama prove that both Cleveland 
and Olney had the foresight which probably saved this country 
much future trouble. 

"It was a great triumph of American diplomacy. "" 

iQ. Cleveland, Presidential Problems, 272-277. 

2J. H. Latane, The U. S. and Latin America, p. 249. 



126 



CHAPTER IX.— COMMENTS, CRITICISMS, AND FALLACIES 



Many mistakes and misinterpretations have arisen rela- 
tive to the Monroe Doctrine such as the following: 

A. That George Canning, the British statesman, was 
the author of the Monroe Doctrine, and that the British 
fleet has ever supported it. 

B. That the Monroe Doctrine has been changed, or 
extended beyond ^'ts original scope. 

C. Thatth>^ Monroe Doctrine is a guaranty given by 
the United States to Spanish America. 

D. That the Monroe Doctrine has not been con- 
sistently applied by the United States. 

E. That the Doctrine is a prohibition against the 
acquisition of new territory by the United States. 



A. British Authorship and Support of the Monroe 
Doctrine. 

It has been frequently said by Americans as well as by 
others that the Monroe Doctrine was suggested by George 
Canning and that the credit of originating it should be his.i In 
this respect it is interesting to note that Canning's biographer 
does not go so far, as he merely states that Canning's act 
"encouraged, if it did not originate," the Doctrine.'' In addi- 
tion to, and in connection with this, it is also frequently stated 
that from 1823 to date the Monroe Doctrine has rested upon, 
and has been supported by the "broad back of the British 
fleet. "3 A mere cursory study of the Monroe Doctrine, its 
origin, and its history, utterly disproves both statements, and 
emphasizes the fact that in its philosophy, its origin and its 
history, as has been admitted by Reddaway, the British writer, 
it is essentially and solely American, < and that far from being 
supported, it has never been recognized as a controlling prin- 
ciple by any great power, but has always been challenged and 
opposed by all the European powers, including Great Britain. 

The allegation of British authorship rests practically upon 
the following basis: 

(a) Canning's inquiry of Rush on August 16, 1823, as to the 
possibility of the United States joining with Great Britain in a 

'W. G. Sumner, Prophetic Votces Concerning America, p. 157, "The 
Monroe Doctrine, as now familiarly called, proceeded from Canning. He 
was its inventor, promoter, and champion, at least so far as it bears against 
European intervention in American affairs." 

T. B. Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 51, 

J. S. Ewart, The Canning Policy, in Kingdom Papers, No. 16, pp. 171, 
173. Mr. Ewart even says that "Canning persuaded Monroe to send to 
Congress his message." (J. S. Ewart, Kingdom Papers, I, No 6.) 

^A. G. Stapleton, Political Life of George Canning, II., 39. 

»Owen Wister, A Square Deal, pp. 120, 137. 

*W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 28. 

127 



'joint declaration" opposing intervention by France or the Holy 
Alliance in Spanish America. ^ 

(b) Canning's letter of August 20, 1823, to Rush relative 
to his earlier inquiry, and stating his five propositions under- 
lying Great Britain's attitude toward the Spanish colonies. " 

(c) Canning's speech of December 12, 1826, defending his 
position with reference to the French invasion of Spain, in 
which he said : 

"I looked another way. I sought material for com- 
pensation in another sphere. ... I called the New World 
into existence, to redress the balance of the old."' 

(d) Canning' letter of December 31, 1823, to Sir William 
a Court to the effect that, 

"while I was yet hesitating what shape to give to the 
declaration and protest which ultimately was conveyed 
in my conference with P. de Polignac; and while I was 
more doubtful as to the efTect of that protest and declara- 
tion, I sounded Mr. Rush (the American minister here) 
as to his powers and disposition, to join in any step which 
we might take to prevent a hostile enterprise on the part 
of the European powers against Spanish America. He 
had no powers; but he would have taken upon himself 
to join with us, if we would have begun by recognizing the 
Spanish-American States. But I have no doubt that his 
report to his government of this sounding (which he 
probably represented as an overture) had a great share in 
producing the explicit declarations of the President."* 

But an analysis of Canning's acts and statements, in addi- 
tion to revealing the fact that he totally ignored the recognition 
of the South American nations by the United States, shows that 
he desired, 

1. A joint declaration for the purpose of preventing 
intervention only. 

2. A pledge from the United States that it would 
not in any way acquire any Spanish -American territory. ^ 

A review of the cabinet discussions which took place prior 
to the publication of the message conclusively proves that both 
suggestions were voted down,^ and that it was finally deter- 
mined to answer the Russian Minister Von Tuyll, and to make 
that answer the vehicle for declaring to the world, the attitude 
of the United States toward the threat of the Holy Alliance 
against Spanish America, and toward Russia's claim to Oregon, 

iR. Rush, The Court of London from i8iQ to 1825, pp. 361, 366. 

^Ibid, 376, 378: Mass. Hist. Soc. 2d. Series, XV., 415, 416. 

'Hansard, Pari. Debates new series, XVI, .398. 

••A. G. Stapleton, George Canning and his Times, pp. 394-396. 

6J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI., 177, 178. 

*Ibid, VI., 178, 179. 

128 



thereby rendering any special answer to Canning unnecessary. 
According to Reddaway, a British writer, "the cabinet of 
Monroe was full of suspicion of Great Britain, "^ believing, 
"both that Great Britain might be induced to return to her 
allegiance [to the Holy Alliance], and that the object of the 
European league was the overthrow of liberty, first in South and 
then in North America. "^ Canning's suggestion was not 
followed, therefore, and no claim of British authorship can 
properly be based upon that phase of the transactions. 

Canning, patriotically and rightfully enough, believed that 
"The interests of his own native land, are those to which above 
all others a Statesman should attend."* Washington had the 
same belief.^ Canning put that belief into practice, and his 
entire policy with reference to the Spanish-American colonies 
was based upon it. As Rush said, Canning's policy * 'was British 
selfishness . . . this was its beginning and its end; this its in- 
spiring principle, and only aim."^ His policy was "essentially 
British. "6 

Canning was interested only in preventing the threatened 
intervention by France or by the Holy Alliance, in Spanish- 
America, and that because of British interests.'' France, by 
reason of her invasion of Spain in spite of British opposition, 
and by reason of the restoration of Ferdinand VH, a "legiti- 
mist" to the Spanish throne, had gained a great ascendancy in 
European political affairs. If France should undertake to 
suppress the revolution in the Spanish colonies and should suc- 
ceed, it was probable that some of them would be expected by 
her, and would be ceded to her by Spain, as a recompense for 
her expense and effort. As has been stated, Great Britain, as 
a result of these revolutions, had secured an immense trade with 
the Spanish- American nations, which had been denied her before, 
and undoubtedly would be denied her again if Spain or France 
should secure possession of them. 

The large and powerftd merchant class of England was 
rising in protest against any conditions which would curtail 
British trade, and was insisting that such intervention by France 
would accomplish that end, and hence must be prevented. 
Great Britain's "newly-won commercial supremacy must be 
maintained and developed."* In other words, British com- 
merce "was the lode star of the British statesman."* 

^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 40. 

^Ibid, 19; Rush to Adams, Dec. 27, 1823, Mass. Hist. Soc, 2d Series, 
XV., 434-436. 

^A. G. Stapleton, Political Life of George Canning, I., 134. 

^H. C. Lodge, George Washington, II., 144. 

*R. Rush, The Court of London from i8ig to 1825, p. 466. 

*W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 1, 3. 

UHd, 17. 

*W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 12, 13. 

Hhid, pp. 21, 23: Rush to Adams, Dec. 27, 1823, Mass. Hist. Soc, 
2d Series, XV., 434-436; G. F. Tucker, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 8.: A. 
Mahan, The Monroe Doctrine in National Review (1903), XL., 874. 

129 



Castlereagh had been Mettemich's "second self" so far as 
legitimacy went.^ and his successor, George Canning, in opinion, 
also was a "legitimist" from beginning to end.^ However, 
Canning decided that the principles of "legitimacy" must, as 
a practical matter, yield to the interests of commerce. He, 
therefore, endeavored by every means possible to prevent inter- 
vention, and when he felt that he could not count on a joint 
declaration with the United States, he secured from France a 
declaration to the effect that she would not intervene. ^ Having 
received such an assurance, on October 9, 1823* he took no 
further steps toward joint action with the United States. 

Canning was not in accord with the fundamental basis of 
the Monroe Doctrine, viz., the protection of republican principles 
in the United States by the protection of the same principles in 
South as well as Central America. This is clearly shown by 
his letter to Sir William a Court, already referred to, dated 
Deceniber 31, 1823, in part as follows : 

"Monarchy in Mexico and monarchy in Brazil would 
cure the evils of universal democracy and prevent the 
drawing of the line of demarcation which I most dread — 
America vs. Europe. The United States naturally enough, 
aim at this division and cherish the democracy which leads 
to it."' 

It is clear, then, that Canning merely desired to prevent 
intervention. He never anticipated, and never accepted the 
other principle laid down in Monroe's message to the effect that 
the American continents were no longer subjects for future 
colonization. In a letter to Bagot, the British Minister at 
Washington, dated January 9, 1824, Canning said, 

"It is hardly necessary for me to add . . . that the 

principle . . . prohibiting colonization ... is as new to this 

Government as that of France."* 

He wrote Granville on December 17, 1824, a year later, 
that 

"The fight has been hard, but it is won. Spanish 
America is free; and if we do not mismanage our matters 
sadly, she is English."^ 

*W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 18, 22, 24. 
T. B. Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 49. 

*"I am no more a lover of revolution than Prince Mettemich. I 
have certainly passed near thirty years in fighting for old institutions." 
(Stapleton's George Canning and his Times, 380) : W. F. Reddaway, The 
Monroe Doctrine, p. 24: R. Rush, The Court at London, from 1810-1825, 
p. 467,. 

A. G. Stapleton, Political Life of George Canning, II., 26. 

Hbia, II., 26, 32. 

*A. G. Stapleton, George Canning and his Times, 394-396: Moore's 
Digest of Int. Law, VI., 410. 

*C. H. Sherrill, Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine, p. 85. 

^A. G. Stapleton, George Canning and His Times, pp. 407-411. 

130 



This may have referred to commercial relations and it may 
also have referred to something more than mere commercial 
relations. 

Canning asserted further that, 

"Great Britain could not acknowledge the right of 
any power to proclaim such a principle, much less to bind 
other countries to the observance of it. If we [Great 
Britain] were to be repelled from the shores of America, it 
would not matter to us whether that repulsion were 
effected by the Ukase of Russia excluding us from the sea, 
or by the new Doctrine of the President prohibiting us 
from the land. But v;-e cannot yield obedience to either. "i 
He also contended that, 

"The principle was one which his Majesty's Ministers 
were prepared to combat in the most unequivocal man- 
ner. "* 

This principle indeed was aimed at Great Britain as much 
as it was aimed at any other nation. Considering Great Bri- 
tain's apparent designs in the Northwest, in the West Indies, 
and in Central as well as South America, that principle, if 
carried out by the United States, would work to Great Britain's 
very great disadvantage. In effect it created a deadlock with 
Great Britain.' Accordingly Canning challenged this prin- 
ciple to the very end and never accepted it,* which is rather 
convincing evidence that he, at least, never claimed any credit 
for authorship of that principle. 

If other proof were needed, however, it is at hand in ample 
quantity. Canning's first reported conversation upon this 
matter with Mr. Rush was on August 16, 1823, and his first 
letter to Mr. Rush on August 20, 1823. It was on the first of 
these occasions that Canning inquired as to the possibility of a 
joint declaration, and on the latter that he suggested his five 
principles already referred to. Clearly, if there was any British 
authorship of the Monroe Doctrine, it must be found in the 
transactions covered by these two occasions. But if the pri- 
mary principles enunciated by President Monroe had been 
enunciated prior to August, 1823, Canning can not, of course, 
be regarded as the father of them. 

The "Non-colonization" principle had been set forth by 
Adams in his conference upon the Oregon situation with Von 
Tuyll on July 17, 1823,^ and again in his letter of instructions to 
Rush of ]vdy 22, 1823,* and in a similar letter sent at the same 

^W. F. Reddaway. The Monroe Doctrine p. 97: J. B. Henderson, Jr. 
Am. Diplo. Questions, p. 339. 

'^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 97. 

^IbU, p. 114. 

*W. F. Johnson, America's Foreign Relations, p. 349: R. Rush, The 
Court at London, from 181Q-1825, p. 419. 

6J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI., 163. 

^Am. St. Pap. For. Rel., V., 447. 

131 



time to Middleton, our Minister to Russia. ^ The first of these 
events antedated by a month Canning's first talk with Mr. 
Rush. Canning could not possibly have been a "posthiimous" 
father. 

The other principle of "non-intervention" by European 
nations was more or less definitely suggested by Washington in 
1792, when he refused to permit any interposition or mediation by 
Great Britain in the struggle then going on between the United 
States and the Indians. It was developed by the repeated de- 
clarations against Spain's transfer of Cuba to any other power. 
It was most definitely proclaimed in 1811 by President Madison* 
and approved by Congress with reference to Florida. Madison's 
message of 1811 and Monroe's of 1823, were both based upon 
the same principle, viz., that the "United States had the right 
to limit the action of foreign powers with regard to territory 
within the western hemisphere but beyond their own borders, 
in order to prevent possible injury to their interests. "^ 

On May 13, 1818, more than five years before Canning's 
talk with Rush, Monroe proposed at a cabinet meeting the 
following : 

"Whether Ministers of the United States in Europe 
shall be instructed that the United States will not join in 
any project of interposition between Spain and the South 
Americans, which should not be to promote the complete 
independence of those provinces."* 

With this principle clearly enunciated some twelve years 
before Monroe's message, and suggested by Monroe himself over 
five years before it, the claim of British authorship does not 
rest on very secure foundations. 

As a matter of fact. Canning denied any connection with 
the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, and very carefully 
pointed out to France the difference between Great Britain's 
principles and those set forth in Monroe's message. ^ 

The most conclusive evidence against Canning is furnished 
by Canning himself. In a letter to Bagot dated January 9, 1824, 
recently discovered. Canning said, 

"The first and most essential difference is that . . . 
The United States have actually acknowledged the inde- 
pendence of the late Spanish Colonies, while His Majesty's 
Government continues still to withhold such recognition. . . 
... If the message ... is to be considered as objecting 
to an attempt to recover her dominions on the part of Spain 

^Ibid, 436. 

^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 9. 

Ubid, p. 10. 

*J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 91-92. 

^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 95, 96, 97. 

132 



herself, there is again as important a difference between his 
[Monrie's] view of the subject and ours as perhaps it is 
possible to conceive. "^ 

The poHcy of non-intervention and neutrality established 
by Washingtol at least as early as 1793 was novel to the world^ 
It was the logical outcome of the great straggle for liberty. The 
devebpment of that principle into "America -hands off 
Europe^and "Europe.-hands off America" was just as logical 
and as purefy American. As Reddaway, the British author. 

P^^' '*' "For forty years the United States had beeii hastening 
toward the position that they assumed m 1823. ' 

Far from being suggested by British statesinen it is a most 
distinctively American creation. Reddaway says that the 
"tioni between Rush and Canning ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
tirne and manner of the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine. 
tSs is thT most that can truthfuUy be said of Canning s con- 

'"ThrdtSl'tfat the Monroe Doctrine has rested for its 
support upon^he British fleet is just as unsound as is the claim 
of British^ authorship. A review of the events ^^ which the 

doctrine was tested shows that at ^-.^^^"^^ J^.^^^^^^,^^^^^^^^^^^ 
4-v,^ -Rritkh fleet suooorting the position of the Unitea Estates. 
*^ Sf tte'Xrrnd G?eat Intata was either engaged m 
• 1- -J 1 ^ff^^c oc in her attempt on Cuba, m 1525 ana again 
Sfvettlf S:^^^^ indifferently disposed. 

She consented to the efforts of other nations to test the doctrine 
e, her joiBt attempts with Spain and Franceresultmg m the 
French invasion of Mexico in 1862 and her joint effort with 
Italy and Germany against Venezuela i^ 1902 

The closest approach to any basis ^^ f^ct for such a state 
ment is furnished by the reported action of the British fleet w^h 
respect to the German Fleet m Manila Bay m 1898, at the time 
SnAchniral Dewey was preparing for his attack upon the 
SpaSsh torts However, at that time Germany was just eight 
yLrs advanc^^ on her naval-colonial -expa™ P-|;^- ^^^^ 
ultimately brought on the World War m 1914. ^he wjs tnen 
Ssrbecoming a great commercial and territorial, rival of Great 
BrLin Shf ha'd already acquired coaling stations and other 
t^nci^p^sions throughout the world. Great Britain, tnereiore, 
feared Ge^any and any effort which might have been exerted 
by the BrSh Fleet at that time was a measure of f f-P^^tect^n 
for Great Britain and not of friendliness toward the United 
States, or i n support of the Monroe Doctrine. 

iCharles H. SherriU, Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine, pp. 84, 85. 

2W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine p. 3. 

Hbid, 14. 

133 



The Monroe Doctrine, therefore, is a policy thoroughly 
American in its conception, development and application. It 
"was formulated by Americans to promote American interests. "^ 
For its efficacy it has rested solely upon the power of the United 
States and must necessarily continue so to do. 

B. The Monroe Doctrine and Changes, or Extensions 
Thereof. 

There are some critics of the Monroe Doctrine who, in 
effect, hold that the original Monroe Doctrine no longer exists,* 
that it has been expanded,' enlarged, warped or distorted so 
that in its present state neither President Monroe nor John 
Quincy Adams would recognize it as their "literal teaching."^ 
There is, of course, no question but that the particular circum- 
stances which obtained in 1823 have long since ceased to exist. 
The message of Monroe, however, was not intended to be 
limited to those particular circumstances, but was intended to 
set forth general principles^ subject to future application as cir- 
ctmistances might require. Its terminology, general in char- 
acter, the antecedent cabinet discussions, the statements and 
understanding of those who had to do with it, all point to the 
fact that it was not a mere statement of policy for that period 
only. Jefferson, for instance, in his letter to President Monroe 
of October 24, 1823, preceding the drafting of the message, and 
referring to the principles set forth in the message, said 

"This sets our compass and points the course which 
we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. 
. . . Our first and fundamental maxim should be never 
to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, 
never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic 
affairs. 

"We will oppose with all our means, the forcible inter- 
position of any other power, as auxiliary, stipendiary, or 
under any other form or pretext, and more especially their 
transfer to any other power by conquest, cession or acqui- 
sition in any other way."" 

The grounds generally stated in support of the assertion of 
a change in, or enlargement of, the Doctrine are the following: 

(a) Henry Clay's notification to France of October 25, 
1825, that the United States 

^W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 28. 

*J. B. Henderson, Jr., Am. Diplo. Questions, pp. 293, 294, 448: W. I. 
Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 2, 22, 23, 29, 37, 38: H. Bingham, The 
Monroe Doctrine, An Obsolete Shibboleth, Atlantic Monthly, June, 1913. 

Lord Bryce, The Monroe Doctrine and a League of Nations, — The 
Nation, Dec. 13, 1917. 

»A. C. CooHdge, The U. S. as a World Power, p. 101. 

*A. C. Coolidge, The U. S. as a World Power, p. 107. 

^E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 107. 

•Ford's Writings of Thomas Jefferson, X., 277-278. 

134 



"Could not consent to the occuption of the islands 
[Cuba and Porto Rico] by any other European power than 
Spain under any circumstances whatever. "^ 
This is alleged to be the "first distinct official statement that it 
is contrary to the interests of the United States and forbidden 
by the Monroe Doctrine for any European colony in the Americas 
to be transferred to another European Power. "* 

(b) President Polk's message of December 2, 1845, to 
Congress in which he said, 

"It should be distinctly announced to the world as 
our settled policy that no future European colony or do- 
minion shall with our consent be planted or established on 
any part of the North American continent."' 
It is contended that the words "or dominion" constitute an 
extension of the Doctrine in that it prevents any European 
nation from securing territory by purchase or cession, in effect 
prohibiting any European interference on the North American 
continent.^ 

(c) President Grant's special message of May 31, 1870, in 
which he said, 

"I now deem it proper to assert the equally important 

principle that hereafter no territory on this continent shall 

be regarded as subject of transfer to a European Power. "^ 

It is alleged that this prohibition of Spanish-American States 

from transferring American territory to European nations is an 

enlargement of the Doctrine. 

(d) President Cleveland's special message to Congress of 
December 17, 1895, in which he stated that the Monroe Doctrine 
"has its place in the code of international law."* It is asserted 
that this amounts to a claim of a status which the doctrine has 
never attained. 

(e) Senator Henry Cabot Lodge's pronouncement relative 
to Venezuela in 1895: 

"The Monroe Doctrine ... is merely the declaration 
that no foreign power must establish a new government, 
acquire new territory by purchase or force or by any 
method whatever, or seek to control existing Governments 
in the Americas."^ 
It is asserted that this use of the word "foreign" is an extension 

Mot. 5 . Pap. For. Rel., V., 855: Moore's, Dig. of Int. Law, VI, U7. 

^W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, 5, 6: A. B. Hart, The Monroe 
Doctrine, pp. 90, 91: J. H. Latane, The U. S. and Latin America, pp. 323, 
324. 

'J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 2248- 
2249: Sen. Doc. i-sg Cong, i sess., 14-15: Moore's Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 
420. 

*W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 9: H. Bingham, The Monroe 
Doctrine, An Obsolete Shibboleth. 

*J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 4015. 

^Ibid, pp. 6088-6090. 

''Cong. Rec. 54th, Cong, ist Sess.; 413-420. 

135 



to all foreign powers, Asiatic as well as European; that the 
words "by any method whatever" is a distinct departure from 
the message of Monroe. 

(f) The Senate Resolution, offered by Senator Lodge, in 
1912, relative to Magdalena Bay. 

"Resolved, that whenever any harbor or other place 
in the American continents is so situated that the occupa- 
tion thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten 
the communications or safety of the United States, the 
Government of the United States could not see without 
grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place 
by any corporation or association which has such a relation 
to another government, not American, as to give that 
Government practical power, or control for naval or military 
purposes."! 

It is contended that this is an enlargement in that it applies not 
only to Asiatic powers, but also to the acquisition of territory 
by agencies other than national governments. 2 

In spite of these contentions it is safe to say that the 
Monroe Doctrine has not been changed. As has been stated, 
the purpose of the message was to declare a general principle 
parallel with that of Washington's of non-intervention in Euro- 
pean affairs. The underlying principle was to prevent any 
foreign political influence of any kind from getting such a foot- 
hold on the American continents that it might be dangerous 
to the peace and safety of the United States. One reasonable 
way to determine whether the doctrine has been changed in its 
application to any given circiimstances is to consider how 
Monroe and John Quincy Adams would have viewed those 
same circimistances. To hold that President Monroe and 
Secretary Adams intended to exclude future colonization by a 
non-American nation solely because it might endanger this 
country, and at the same time to assert that he did not intend 
to cover the purchase of territory by such a nation, or by a 
fictitious person created by such a nation, is to strain at the 
gnat and to swallow the camel. In fact John Quincy Adams, 
referring to PoUc's message already quoted, said that he 
"approved entirely. "^ 

The Statement of Jefferson quoted above shows most clearly 
that it was intended to apply the principle to all non- American 
interposition in American political affairs, direct or indirect, 
and under any form or pretext such interposition might take. 

The doctrine is strictly limited as to its scope.* It applies 

^Congressional Rec. dzd. Cong., 2 sess., Vol. 48,*Pt. 10, p. 9923. See 
also pp. 5661-5663. 

2W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 10, 11. 
3J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, XII., 218. 
^E. Root, Addresses in Int. Subjects, p. 117. 

136 



to the occupation or use of territory in the Western Hemisphere 
to the overthrow or exclusion of an American Government, or 
to the danger of the United States. Hence, the principle an- 
nounced by Monroe as a measure of self -protection, necessarily 
and by fair implication, included within its general terms all 
measures looking to the prevention of all extension of the poli- 
tical system of any non-American nation, and of all acquisition 
or occupation of territory by any such nation, if it endangered 
the peace or safety of the United States. It, therefore, included 
those manifestations appearing in the later application of the 
doctrine referred to which are improperly called enlargements 
of the doctrine or extensions of its meaning. 

C. The Monroe Doctrine a Guaranty of Protection to 
Spanish America. 

It has been urged frequently and particularly by the repre- 
sentatives of Spanish-American nations that the Monroe Doc- 
trine extended such a guaranty of protection to those nations, 
that almost upon the mere request of a South American nation 
the United States ought to go to war if necesary to prevent 
any foreign nation, American as well as European, from inter- 
fering in any way with such Spanish- American nations. ^ 

At the time of the original proclamation, there was un- 
doubtedly a great element of sympathy for the South American 
nations, but it is not that sympathy which was the basis of the 
doctrine. It is solely the safety of the United States which 
constituted such basis. The doctrine offers, and was intended 
to offer, no such guaranty. It is an individual policy of the 
United States designed and intended solely for its own protec- 
tion. Except as stated, 

"It has not otherwise any relation to the affairs of 
either American or European States. In good conduct or 
bad, observance of rights or violations of them, agreement 
or controversy, injury or reprisal, coercion or war, the 
United States finds no warrant in the Monroe Doctrine for 
interference."'' 

The Panama Congress, called in 1826, undoubtedly failed 
because of the attitude of the United States of distinct opposi- 
tion to giving any such pledge to the Spanish- American nations.^ 
Secretary of State Hay said with reference to Venezuela, 
and it applies to all similar cases, that the United States, while 
it 

"regretted that European Powers should use force against 
Central and South American Countries, could not object 
to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries suffered 

^J. H. Latane, The U. S. and Latin America, pp. 326-327. 

*E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 117. 

Mot. St. Pap. For. Rel., V., 83'l-905: Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 



416. 



137 



by their subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory 
was contemplated."! 

President Roosevelt, speaking of this matter in his annual 
message of December 3, 1901, said: 

"We do not guarantee any state against punishment 
if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not 
take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non- 
American power. "2 

Secretary of State Olney in his dispatch of July 20, 1895, 
to Bayard, set forth most clearly the negative phases of the 
Monroe Doctrine, as follows : 

"It does not establish any general protectorate by 
the United States over other American states. It does not 
relieve any American state from its obligations as fixed 
by international law, nor prevent any European Power 
directly interested from enforcing such obligation or from 
inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them. It 
does not contemplate any interference in the internal 
affairs of any American State or in the relations between 
it and other American States. It does not justify any 
attempt on our part to change the established form of gov- 
ernment of any American State or to prevent the people of 
such State from altering that form according to their own 
will and pleasure."' 

Henry Clay in discussing this phase of the question said, 

"The declaration must be regarded as having been 
voluntarily made, and not as conveying any pledge or 
obligation, the performance of which foreign nations have 
a right to demand."* 

D. The Inconsistent Application of the Monroe Doctrine. 

In connection with the assertion that the Monroe Doctrine 
has been changed, the charge is also made that the United States 
has not always applied or enforced the doctrine, but has on some 
occasions ignored circumstances of a nature appropriate for resort 
to it. From this it is argued that the doctrine cannot be a fixed 
or permanent political policy of the United States. The follow- 
ing examples are cited in support of such argument. 

^E. Root, Addresses on Int. Sub., p. 112. 

*J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 6662- 
6663: Moore, Dig. of Int. Law, VI., 595, 596. 

'Olney to Bayard, July 20, 1895: Sen. Ex. Doc. 31, 54th Cong. ist. 
sess. 4. 

*Clay to Forbes, U. S. Minister to Buenos Ayres, Jan. 3, 1828, XII. 
MS. Inst. U.S. Min. 49. 

138 



(a) Great Britain and the Falkland Islands. 

In 1824, Buenos Ayres seized the Falkland Islands, off 
the coast of Patagonia, declaring them to be part of that repubHc. 
Great Britain then occupied the Islands, declaring that they had 
been British possessions for some sixty years. In spite of the 
contention of Buenos Ayres that Great Britain's act was a 
violation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States recognized 
British sovereignty over the Islands. 

(b) Great Britain, Italy, Germany and Venezuela (1902). 
_ In July, 1902, Great Britain and Germany brought claims 

against Venezuela, and upon her refusing to recognize them, or 
to agree upon a common tribunal to pass on them, these European 
Powers proclaimed and carried out a pacific blockade "in re- 
prisal," seizing and sinking some Venezuelan gunboats. Ven- 
ezuela finally agreed to the validity of the claims and offered 
to_ arbitrate the amounts. Great Britain and Italy, who had 
joined in the enterprise, were satisfied and discontinued the 
reprisal program, Germany refusing so to do. Until President 
Roosevelt brought pressure to bear against Germany, as here- 
tofore related, the United States took no action relative to the 
situation so far as the Allied Powers were concerned. 

As has been stated, the Monroe Doctrine is in the interest 
of the United States and of no other nation. It is, therefore, 
within the discretion of the United States to say when any given 
situation constitutes a menace to their peace and safety. It is 
reasonable to assume that every instance of pressure brought 
to bear on a Spanish-American nation by a foreign power does 
not constitute such a menace. Hence the United States is not 
required to apply the doctrine on every occasion, but may 
refrain from doing so if the occasion is not considered a real 
menace. 

In the Falkland Islands episode, the United States recog- 
nized a title of Great Britain, acquired many years before. It 
was, therefore, not a question of a new venture by Great 
Britain, and as was said later by Secretary Bayard, 

"It is not seen that the Monroe Doctrine . . . has any 

application to the case."i 

With reference to the Venezuelan incident President 
Roosevelt said that the Monroe Doctrine was not intended 
to prevent European nations from collecting their just claims, 
but applied only to territorial acquisitions. Inasmuch as 
Germany and Great Britain denied any such intention and the 
latter nation's actions supported that denial, there was no need 
of invoking the principle. However, when Germany's attitude 
later showed that her intentions were in all probability other 

^Bayard to Quesada, March 18, 1886 — MS. Notes to Arg. Rep., VI., 

139 



than she had stated, Roosevelt immediately brought pressure to 
bear on Germany and that nation discontinued its objectionable 
activities. Just as the Doctrine asserts no right of the United 
States to control the sovereignty of other American nations, so 
it asserts no obligation on the part of the United States to hold 
the South and Central American nations harmless against 
foreign powers, and asserts no obligation to such foreign powers 
to police any South American or Central American nation. i 

E. The Monroe Doctrine and the Territorial Expansion 
OF THE United States. 

It is frequently stated that the Monroe Doctrine has in 
some way been violated or extended beyond its intent by the 
expansion of the territorial limits of the United States into the 
Caribbean Sea, into Central America and into the Pacific 
Ocean. It is argued that the possession of Porto Rico, of the 
Panama Canal Zone, of the Virgin Islands and of the Philippines 
controvert the Doctrine. ^ 

It is argued that "the principles of its [Monroe Doctrine] 
growth will be found to be only two . . . the integrity of national 
territory, and . . . the preservation of popular government ;"' 
that while the United States has insisted many times that the 
Monroe Doctrine prohibited acquisition of American territory 
by non-American nations, it has nevertheless refused to permit 
the rule "to work both ways, and forbid the further acquisition 
of American lands by the United States. "* It is asserted that 
this is a one-sided interpretation of this feature of the Monroe 
Doctrine, 6 which "enables us to annex American lands at our 
pleasure, "6 and which has been "utilized not only to extend 
the boundary of the United States southward and eastward to 
include parts of Mexico and Columbia and a West India Island, 
but to bring some islands of the Pacific under the Stars and 
Stripes as well."' All this, it is said, is, in effect, a violation of 
territorial integrity by the United States. 

As a matter of fact the Monroe Doctrine has no relation 
whatever to any governmental action outside the Western 
hemisphere or to territorial expansion by the United States. 
The doctrine was intended solely as a defensive measure, and at 
the very time of its promulgation the United States was engaged 
in the process of consolidating its continental boundaries. 
Washington believed that the true mission of the United States 
was continental in its extent. He, therefore, worked unceas- 

^E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 119. 

*W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine; H. Bingham, The Monroe Doctrine 
an Obsolete Shibboleth. 

^W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 4. 
'Ibid, pp. 12, 13. 
^Ibid, pp. 14, 22. 
^Ibid, p. 40. 
Ubid pp. 19, 20. 

140 



ingly to secure the control of the Mississippi, the cession of the 

western posts by Great Britain, and generally to make the United 

States in fact independent. ^ 

John Quincy Adams, some eight months before the message 

was announced, stated: 

"In looking forward to the probable course of events 
for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible 
to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our 
Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance 
and integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious, however, 
that for this event we are not yet prepared."* 

Jefferson, in his letter to Monroe relative to the proposed 
message, said: 

"I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba 
as the most interesting addition which could ever be made 
to our system of states."^ 

When Mr. Monroe was sent to France as envoy in 1794, 
his very specific instructions contained the following: 

"Among the great events with which the world is now 
teeming, there may be an opening for France to become 
instrumental in securing to us the free navigation of the 
Mississippi. Spain may, perhaps, negotiate a peace, sepa- 
rate from Great Britain, with France. If she does, the 
Mississippi may be acquired through this channel, espe- 
cially if you contrive to have our mediation in any manner 
solicited."^ 

Later, Monroe was sent to France by Jefferson to negotiate 
with Livingston the purchase of Louisiana, in which transac- 
tion, as events have proved, he was eminently successful. ^ 
In 1804, as Envoy to Spain, Monroe endeavored to secure the 
cession of all Spain's possessions east of the Mississippi, but 
failed.' 

During the administration of his predecessor, West 
Florida had been occupied by the United States, and in pur- 
suance of a Presidential message. Congress expressed its opposi- 
tion to any Spanish transfer of that territory to any other 
nation,^ and during Monroe's first administration in 1819, the 
cession of Florida by Spain was finally negotiated.' 

m. C. Lodge, George Washington, II., 133, 162-164, 215. 

2J. Q. Adams to Nelson, April 28, 1^2?,; House Ex. Doc, 121, 32nd Co7ig. 
I sess., 6: Br. 6* For. S . Papers XLIV., 138: Moore, Digest of hit. Law, 
I., 583. 

'Jefferson to Monroe, Oct. 24, 1823, Ford's, Writings of Thomas 
Jefferson, X., 277, 278. 

■•D. C. Oilman, James Monroe, p. 48. 

^Ibid, pp. 78-95. 

'D. C. Oilman, James Monroe, pp. 98-99. 

''American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 571. 

'D. C. Oilman, James Monroe, p. 146. 

141 



President Polk in his annual message of December 2, 1845, 
with reference to this point and the bearing of the Monroe 
doctrine upon it, stated that, 

"... We must ever maintain the principle that the 
people of this continent alone have the right to decide their 
own destiny. Should any portion of them, constituting an 
independent state, propose to unite themselves with our 
Confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to 
determine without any foreign interposition. We can 
never consent that European powers shall interfere to 
prevent such a union because it might disturb the 'balance 
of power' which they may desire to maintain upon this 
continent."' 

In view of the statements from the persons who had so 
much to do with the enunciation of the Doctrine, it is absurd 
to say that the doctrine was bilateral; that it forbade non- 
American nations to acquire territory in the Western Hemisphere 
and at the same time forbade the United States from extending 
their borders in any way. 

The Monroe Doctrine, however, does not in any way 
justify, nor was it intended to justify, intervention in the in- 
ternal affairs of any of the nations of Central or of South 
America. This is made very clear by the attitude of John 
Quincy Adams with reference to the recognition of Brazil in 
1824. If the doctrine, with the formulation of which Adams 
had so much to do in December 1823, was intended to provide 
for, or to justify such interference, it is certain that in May, 
1824, that same doctrine would have been made use of to justify 
a refusal to recognize the independence of Brazil, a monarchy 
amid republics. Brazil through a revolution established its inde- 
pendence but set up a monarchy rather than a republic. Con- 
siderable opposition was aroused in the United States to the 
recognition of that form of government in America. Adams, 
however, argued that such interference in the internal affairs of 
Brazil was contrary to American policy,'^ and Brazil was 
accordingly recognized on May 26, 1824. 

The Monroe Doctrine claims no right upon the part of the 
United States in any way to control the sovereign rights of any 
American nation. Such incidents as are offered in proof of the 
allegation that our government has coerced other weaker 
American nations if examined show clearly that any rights 
asserted by the United States against such other nations were 
those of an equal and not of a superior.' In these assertions of 
right which exist in every sovereign state, th& Monroe Doctrine 
was in no way concerned. 

' J. D. Richardson Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 2248- 
2249. 

*W. F. Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 115-116. 
'E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 116. 

142 



In instances such as the Venezuelan controversy with the 
Allied Powers in 1902, the initial "intervention" of the United 
States was rather under the Hague Convention right or obliga- 
tion of ' 'rendering the offices of good fellowship . " ' The United 
States under this provision has frequently offered its services 
in the settlement of disputes between American nations. 

As a result of this, and of the misunderstanding as to its 
basis, it has been asserted that the United States has become the 
great American "schoolmaster" to all the South and Central 
American nations. This feeling is rather prevalent in South 
America where those who feel that way, either fail or refuse to 
distinguish between the Monroe Doctrine and the course of 
action by the United States of which they complain. It matters 
not whether the cry of "Yankee Imperialism" by South Am- 
ericans, is or is not justified, the Monroe Doctrine is in no way 
involved. 

This feeling of resentment is, however, directed against the 
Monroe Doctrine as being "patronizing" or "menacing. "^ 
It has undoubtedly been fostered by the Canning myth,' which 
has been carefully nourished in South America to the effect 
that it was Canning who prevented Spain from subduing her 
American colonies, and hence that it was Great Britain, and not 
the United States, that brought about the independence of the 
Spanish-American nations, when, as a matter of fact. Great 
Britain did not recognize any of these nations until two years 
after the United States had done so. 

It is interesting to note that while this cry of "School 
Master" is raised, at the same time the cry is heard from non- 
American nations that all the bandit chiefs of South and Central 
America conduct their marauding expeditions as they will, 
and when threatened with punishment, answer with the counter 
threat that the Monroe Doctrine will overwhelm such threaten- 
ing nation if it does not let the marauder conduct his business 
without interference.* In one breath it is said that the United 
States is too much interested to suit South America and in the 
next, that South America is too much interested in the protec- 
tion of the United States. Both claims, however, have this 
common basis, viz., that those who make them want to see the 
power of the IJnited States to protect itself greatly diminished. 

President Roosevelt's message of December 6, 1904, is 
frequently quoted as a justification for this South American 
fear of this country, but in that message the President merely 
stated that, 

"Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results 

in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may 

^E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 119. 

^George H. Blakeslee, A New Basis Needed jor the Monroe Doctrine, 
1913, North Am. Rev., CXCVIIL, 779-789. 

*C. H. Sherrill, Modernizini The Monroe Doctrine, p. 87. 

*Is the Monroe Doctrine a Bar to Civilization? by "An American 
Business Man," 1903, North Am. Rev., CLXXVL, 525. 

143 



in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention 
by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere 
the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine 
may force the United States, however reluctantly, in fla-- 
grant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise 
of an international police power. . . . 

"We would interfere with them only in the last resort, 
and then only if it became evident that their inability or un- 
willingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated 
the rights of the United States or had invited foreign ag- 
gression to the detriment of the entire body of American 
nations. 1 

This is thoroughly sound in principle and independent of 
the Monroe Doctrine, as stated in the first chapter, rests upon 
the right of self -protection, and is, in no sense, a threat to South 
or Central America. President Roosevelt made this amply clear 
in his message of December 5, 1905, in which he said, 

"There are certain essential points which must never 
be forgotten as regards the Monroe Doctrine. In the first 
place we must as a nation make it evident that we do not 
intend to treat it in any shape or way as an excuse for 
aggrandizement on our part at the expense of the republics 
to the South. We must recognize the fact that in some 
South American countries there has been much suspicion 
lest we should interpret the Monroe Doctrine as in some 
way inimical to their interests, and we must try to convince 
all the other nations of this continent once and for all that 
no just and orderly government has anything to fear from 
us "' 



7054 



'J, D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 7051- 
Hbid, p. 7357. 



144 



CHAPTER X.— THE FUTURE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 



The future of the Monroe Doctrine in effect must resolve it- 
self into one of two following policies. 

A. Its absolute abandonment. 

B. Its continued assertion and maintenance, by the 
United States acting alone. 



The query naturally presents itself as to what is to be the 

future of the Monroe Doctrine. Some authors say that the 

doctrine which was 

"the sine qua non of American pubhc policy in the nine- 
teenth century, is fast taking the aspect, in this twentieth 
century of the bete noire or the Frankenstein of the Republic 
which called it into existence."^ 
According to some writers, the future holds approximately 

eight possible "solutions" of the "problem" raised by the 

"present status" of the Monroe Doctrine." 

These solutions may be classified as follows : 

1 . Reduction of its interpretation to the literal phraseology 

of President Monroe. 

2. Its support by a concert of powers. 

3. Its support by an "A. B.C." alliance. 

4. Its support by the Pan-American nations. 

5. Its international recognition. 

6. Its submission to the "Supra National" jursidiction of 

(a) The Hague Court of Arbitration or of Arbitral 

Justice. 

(b) The League of Nations. 

7. Its absolute relinquishment. 

8. Its continued assertion and maintenance by the United 

States alone. 
The first "solution" is based on the assumption that the 
doctrine has been enlarged and no longer represents the principles 
announced by President Monroe. It is suggested that its 
interpretation be restricted to the prevention, (a) of conquest 
or colonization by European Powers, and (b) of restoration of 
monarchy in Central or in South America. As has been stated, 
the doctrine has never been changed or expanded to include 
any principles other than those contained in Monroe's message. 
Conditions and circimistances may have changed, and the 
manner of applying the principles enunciated may have changed 
with them, but the fundamental principle of preventing foreign 
nations from influencing the future of the various nations of the 
American continents to the danger of the peace and safety of 
the United States has ever been the same. The very dangers 
which the Holy Alliance held for the United States still threaten 

^W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 1. 
"W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 42-124. 

145 



it, whatever forms they may asume. Colonization and Absolut- 
ism assume very many forms. "Peaceful penetration" in all 
its subtle phases is more menacing than avowed colonization by 
reason of its very indirectness. "Claims, financial and other- 
wise, of European Powers against weaker nations of this hemi- 
sphere present a problem no less pressing and no less dangerous" 
than the problems of 1823.i 

Imperialism, however described, whether in the euphonious 
terminology of "Commonwealth" or "Empire" is just as dan- 
gerous to republicanism today as it was in 1823, when it was 
labelled "Legitimacy," and "Holy Alliance." "Eternal Vigi- 
lance is the price of Liberty." The advocates of "compression" 
base their argument upon false premises, and their conclusions 
are necessarily unsound. 

The second, third,^ and fourth' "solutions" are predicated 
upon alliances with foreign nations, which alliances, if the 
doctrine is to be permanent, must necessarily be permanent 
also. Such alliances would be absolutely contrary to the funda- 
mental principle of American foreign policy announced by 
Washington and adhered to ever since, viz., that of avoiding 
permanent alliances with foreign nations. This has become so 
firmly planted in the national character that even to suggest 
abandoning it is almost equivalent to suggesting national 
filicide.* The results of the national election of 1920 are a 
suiiicieni: maicaLion of the way in which the country at large 
regards such alliances with foreign powers, whether actual or 
apparent, and whether temporary or permanent. 

The fifth "solution" rests upon the suggestion that inas- 
much as certain powers are supposed to threaten the United 
States, a treaty should be made with them, under which, and 
in consideration of the United States giving "suitable quid pro 
quo — such as the Philippines, or tariff concession," such powers 
would agree to recognize the binding force of the doctrine.^ 
Nothing, however, would be gained by such a step because if at 
any time any of such powers believed it to be for its interest to 
avoid the doctrine, and believed itself powerful enough, no such 
agreement would protect the United States. On the other 
hand, if they were not powerful enough to make such an at- 
tempt, lack of power and not the treaty would be the deterrent. 
The United States then, apart from the undignified bargaining 
to maintain a self-protective measure, has more to gain by 

iR. D. Armstrong, Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Aban- 
doned? 10 Am. Journal of Int. Law, p. 77. 

''G. H. Blakeslee, A New Basis Needed for the Monroe Doctrine, 1913 
No. Am. Rev., CXCVIII, 779-789. Is the Monro'e Doctrine a Bar to 

Civilization? by "An American Business Man," 1903 No Am. Rev. CLXXVI. 

'R. D. Armstrong, Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Aban- 
doned? 10 Am. Journ. Int. Law. 

^C. H. Sherrill, Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine, pp. 105, 112, 113, 
121, 133. 

'W. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine. 

146 



maintaining its traditional policy of no permanent alliances, 
and looking to its own resources for its preservation. 

The sixth "solution" goes further than the others, suggest- 
ing in euphonious terms that the "United States take another 
grand and noble stride along the path of the new internation- 
alism, and place its Pan-American problem ... in the hands of 
the entire family of nations represented by the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration at the Hague, "i or place it in the hands 
of the League of Nations." In other words it is suggested 
that the United States submit to the determination of other 
agencies than itself the absolute control of the doctrine, and 
that the doctrine cease to be solely American and that it have 
a world basis.* 

Such a step would amount to an admission that the self- 
preservation and self -protection of the United States, so_ far as 
they rested upon the future affairs of the American Continents, 
were no longer to be a matter solely for the United States to 
pass upon, and so far it would be a waiver of the right of self- 
protection. The fundamental right to national self-preserva- 
tion, recognized in toto as to all other nations would be denied, 
or at least considerably restricted as to the United States. 

When the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were held, 
and the peace conventions were under discussion, the United 
States specifically reserved the Monroe Doctrine froni the 
operation of these conventions.* The question of submitting 
the administration of the Monroe Doctrine to the Hague, 
therefore, has been considered already. On both occasions it 
was determineed that the interests of the United States pro- 
hibited any such submission. 

The reasons for such refusal are even stronger to-day than 
then, particularly in view of the attitude of the United States 
toward the League of Nations Covenant. There was room for 
argument that the provision of that Covenant reserved to the 
United States the jurisdiction over the doctrine, but the United 
States Senate insisted upon a more specific reservation, and the 
people of the country, not satisfied with the Covenant even 
with that reservation and others, by ballot in the national 
election of 1920, refused to become a party to that Covenant. 

All suggestions of securing international support, or inter- 
national recognition for the doctrine are beside the point. 
Whatever effect such action might give has already been 
secured to this country. When the powers represented at the 
second Hague Conference recognized our reservation as to the 

iW. I. Hull, The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 43, 44. 

«World Peace Foundation, A League of Nations, I. No. 5, pp. 253-265. 

'C. H. Levermore, World Court, Sept. 1917. 

^HoU's, Peace Conference at The Hague, pp. 477, 531; W. M. Malloy, 
Treaties, Conventions, etc. of the U. S. 1776-1909 II. 2032: A. B. Hart 
The Monroe Doctrine, pp. 213, 214: Moore, Princ. of Am. Diplomacy 
p. 261. 

147 



Monroe Doctrine, i they in effect recognized our right to make 
such a reservation, and in reality to assert the doctrine against 
the world. If that Hague recognition will not control such for- 
eign nations, no other written memorandum will have greater 
weight. 

As the doctrine is based upon the right of self-protection, 
it cannot possibly be changed to a joint declaration with any 
other states, American, European, or Asiatic. Similar declara- 
tions by such powers might be made, based upon a similar right 
of self-protection inherent in such other states. Anything 
other than this would necessarily be an alliance and entirely 
hostile to American traditions. * 

Lord Bryce argues that the Monroe Doctrine, 
"was originally delivered as announcing a restriction or 
limitation which America proposed to place on her own 
action. She would not interfere in the wars and alliances 
of the Old World and she expected that in return the states 
of the Old World would not interfere with the affairs of the 
Western Hemisphere. . . . 

"Monroe's policy, which was also Washington's, of 
holding aloof from European complications was long main- 
tained, and wisely maintained, by America, but the current 
of events has been too strong to make it possible to stand 
apart any longer. The whole world has now become one, 
and must remain one for the purposes of politics. No 
great nation can stand out. 

"Thus the Monroe Doctrine in its old form may seem 
to have disappeared; for the counterpart to the exclusion 
of the European Powers from interfering with the freedom 
of American states was the abstention of America from 
interference in European affairs."* 

Lord Bryce, in effect, contends that the United States by 
participating in the World War sacrificed whatever right this 
country may have had to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. He 
argues speciously that we practically agreed not to interfere in 
European affairs if Europe would not interfere in American 
affairs, and that inasmuch as we did intervene in European 
affairs by participation in the World War, the agreement was 
terminated. 

The premises of this argument are wholly unsound. There 
is nothing historically to justify the conclusion that President 
Monroe was laying a restriction upon this country. All the 
facts point to the opposite conclusion, that the United States 
asserted the principle as a matter of self -protection and in spite 

^E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 109. 
*E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 120. 

^The Monroe Doctrine and a League of Nations, — The Nation, Dec. 13, 
1917. 

148 



of the opposition of foreign nations thereto. Lord Bryce's 
conclusion, therefore, is wholly unwarranted. 

The seventh "solution" is more courageous than the others 
in that it argues that the doctrine has been outgrown, has no 
application whatever at the present time, is not worth while, 
"is an ignis fatuus,"^ devotion to which is "mere slavery to 
rhetoric and sentiment''^, and that it should be abandoned as 
an "obsolete shibboleth."* It is in reahty the only alternative 
to the eighth "solution," that of the United States maintaining 
the doctrine singly. 

The problem of national self-protection has not materially 
changed from the time of Monroe's mesage to the present. To 
abandon the doctrine now would be to leave South and Central 
America open to the territorial ambitions of the European and 
Asiatic powers. The treaty of Versailles, following the World 
War, made it clear that the great world powers are as greedy 
for territory now as they ever were.* "The spirit of colonial 
expansion still exists,"* and the abandonment of the Monroe 
Doctrine would really be an open invitation to such Powers to 
secure, or to increase their foothold in the Americas. The 
control of the Caribbean Sea, and of the Panama Canal would 
follow. The very dangers which threatened in 1823, and which 
called forth the enunciation of the Doctrine would overwhelm 
the United States." 

The people of this country, 

"have yet in mind that France seized upon the apparent 
opportunity of our Civil War to set up a monarchy in 
the adjoining state of Mexico. They reaHze that had 
France and Great Britain held important South American 
possessions to work from and to benefit, the temptation 
to destroy the predominance of the Great Republic in this 
hemisphere by furthering its dismemberment might have 
been irresistible. . . ."' 

It has been well said that, 

"Nothing but the . . . Monroe Doctrine, has . . . pre- 
vented the acquisition of territory in South America and in 

^Sydney Brooks, 76 Fortnight Rev., p., 1021. 

"J. B. Henderson, Jr., Am. Diplo. Questions, p. 293. 

»H. Bingham, The Monroe Doctrine— An Obsolete Shibboleth, Atlantic 
Monthly, June 1913. 

*J. B. Angell. The European Concert and the Monroe Doctrine, Harvard 
Grad. Mag. XIV. 23. 

J. Bryce, The Monroe Doctrine and a League of Nations in The 
Nation, Dec. 13, 1917. 

*R. D. Armstrong Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Aban- 
doned? 10. Am. Jour. Int. Law, 84. 

^Ibid, 77-78. 

^Olney to Bayard July 20, 1895, Sen. Ex. Doc. 54th Cong., i sess. p. 4. 

149 



the neighborhood of the Panama Canal in recent years by 
certain nations of Europe. "^ 

The Monroe Doctrine "cannot become obsolete while our 
republic endures."'' It has become an unceasingly vital and 
compelling policy for this country.* 
The Monroe Doctrine, 

"Like the independence of this country, it is a question 
of fact and not of law. The independence of this country 
is unquestioned, because, having declared it, we compelled 
the world to recognize it. In the same way we have always 
acted on the declaration of Mr. Monroe as the guiding prin- 
ciple of our foreign policy. . . . 

"We declare the Monroe Doctrine to be a principle 
which we believe essential to the honor, the safety, the 
interests of the United States. We declare it as a state- 
ment of fact, and we must have it recognized, because we 
sustain and support it, and we can no more permit it to be 
a matter of discussion with other nations than we can 
afiford to discuss with them our national welfare or our 
forms of government. It embodies for us the same principle 
as the balance of power so jealously maintained by the 
nations of Europe. They will not allow that to be dis- 
turbed, and we hold to our balance of power with equal 
tenacity."* 

From the time of President Monroe's announcement to the 
present time, a period of about ninety-eight years, this country 
has been engaged in but three foreign wars, the Mexican, the 
Spanish and the World War. During that same period 
Eiirope has beheld at least seventeen wars, an average of one 
new war for approximately every four years. The Monroe 
Doctrine by keeping European powers from the Western Hemi- 
sphere has tended toward a long continued peace. To abandon 
it now would be to welcome Europe's almost chronic warfare. 

The Monroe Doctrine was intended then, as a purely 
defensive measure, for the sole purpose of securing the peace 
and safety of this country. It was designed to prevent any 
danger from non-American nations by reason of the possession 
or occupation of territory thereafter, or the interference with 
the internal affairs of any American nation. It was based upon 
this country's right of self-preservation. The principle announ- 
ced in the Monroe Doctrine, therefore, by fair implication, if 

iH. Holt. Independent, LXI, 1119. 
F. Snow, Treaties 6* Topics in Am. Diplomacy, p. 423. 

^Pres. Cleveland's Message of Dec. 17, 1895, J. D. Richardson, 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, pp. 8088-6090. 

*E. Root, Addresses on Int. Subjects, p. 106. 

*H. C. Lodge, Speech in Senate, Dec. 30, 1895, Cong. Rec. 54 Cong, 
ist. Sess. p. 419-420. 

150 



not by words, apply to any occupation of American territory, 
temporary or permanent, direct or indirect, by any non-American 
power, which the United States beHeves to endanger the peace 
or safety of this country. To permit the temporary occupation 
of custom houses, or of ports, by non- American powers, to en- 
force pa3mient of debts, or for any other reason, as stated by 
President Roosevelt, is very inadvisable, for such temporary 
occupation might very easily turn into a permanent occupa- 
tion. ^ 

The Monroe Doctrine cannot, then, be abandoned, but 
must continue to hold its position in the foreign policy of the 
United States. The avoidance of permanent or entangling 
alliances with foreign nations and the absolute prevention of any 
direct or indirect interference upon the part of non-American 
nations in the political affairs of American nations must still be 
our policy. The United States must not only assert the Monroe 
Doctrine, but also enforce it, eliminating conditions which are 
provocative of aggression, as well as opposing actual aggres- 
sion. " No other policy has yet been suggested which compares 
in safety with that doctrine so ably worked out and adopted by 
the early fathers, whose wisdom and statesmanship, viewed 
through the years, seem inspired. 

As President Roosevelt said, 

"Our people intend to abide by the Monroe Doctrine 

and to insist upon it as the one sure means of securing the 

peace of the Western Hemisphere."* 

It is the one sure means for the preservation of the United 
States and for the preservation of liberty and republicanism, 
for as was so eloquently expressed by Washington in his in- 
augural address, 

"... the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the 
destiny of the republican model of government are justly 
considered perhaps as deeply, as finally, staked on the 
experiment entrusted to the hands of the American 
people."* 

^Message of Feb. 15, 1905. Confidential Ex. V., 58 Cong., 3d Sess.; 
Moore Dig. oj Int. Law, VI, 518-528. 

*R. D. Armstrong, Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Aban- 
doned, p. 97. 

'Roosevelt's Annual Message, Dec. 3, 1901, J. D. Richardson 
Messages and Papers of the President, pp. 6662-6663. 

^Washington's First Inaugural. J. D. Richardson, Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, I., p. 53. 



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